Appeal by plaintiff from order and judgment entered 15 May
2002 by Judge James W. Morgan, Jr., in Mecklenburg County Superior
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 February 2003.
LESESNE & CONNETTE, by Louis L. Lesesne, Jr., for plaintiff
appellant.
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, by Kimberly Q. Cacheris for defendant
appellee.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Kathryn T. Merrick (“plaintiff”) appeals a judgment and order
of summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas
Healthcare System (“defendant”). For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm the trial court's decision.
An examination of the pleadings, exhibits, and depositions
filed in response to defendant's summary judgment motion,
considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, tends to show
the following: From 17 July 1989 through 11 May 2000, plaintiffwas employed by defendant as a registered nurse. Prior to December
of 1998, plaintiff received four “on-the-job” injuries, which
resulted in claims for workers' compensation benefits. On 1
December 1998, while at work, plaintiff ruptured her Achilles
tendon. As a result of her injury, plaintiff was unable to return
to work until 18 November 1999. Defendant did not dispute
plaintiff's workers' compensation claim.
On 11 May 2000, plaintiff voluntarily resigned her employment
with defendant in order to accept a position with a different
employer. During the periods prior to plaintiff's resignation, as
well as after her resignation, plaintiff and defendant remained in
negotiations to settle her workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff
was represented by counsel at all times. After her resignation,
plaintiff and defendant entered into a settlement of plaintiff's
workers' compensation claim. The terms of the settlement are
reflected in a document entitled “Agreement for Final Compromise
Settlement and Release” (“the settlement”), which was executed by
the parties on 30 June 2000 and a “General Release and Waiver of
Employment” (“the release”), which was executed by the parties on
11 July 2000. The release provides in pertinent part as follows:
“In further consideration, [plaintiff] waives any right to
reinstatement of employment with [defendant] and further agrees
that [defendant], or any of its related corporations, is not or
will not be at any time under any obligation to employ her.” In
consideration for signing the settlement and release agreements,
plaintiff received the sum of $21,500.00 from defendant. On 27 June 2000, Dr. Marsha Ford (“Dr. Ford”), an employee
with defendant, contacted plaintiff regarding possible part-time
employment with defendant in the Poison Control Center. Dr. Ford
testified that at the time she contacted plaintiff, she was unaware
that plaintiff had signed the release agreement. Defendant was
also unaware that Dr. Ford had contacted plaintiff until Dr. Ford
initiated the appropriate hiring procedures to employ plaintiff.
Dr. Ford was then informed that plaintiff had signed a release and
was ineligible for employment. As a result, Dr. Ford informed
plaintiff that she was unable to offer her employment in the Poison
Control Center.
On 15 March 2001, plaintiff filed a claim with the North
Carolina Commissioner of Labor (“the Commission”) alleging that
defendant violated the North Carolina Retaliatory Employment
Discrimination Act by refusing to re-employ plaintiff, because she
previously filed a workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff received
a “right-to-sue” letter from the Commission and filed the present
action. Thereafter, the trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
_____________________________________________
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether plaintiff is within
the class of persons protected by the North Carolina Retaliatory
Employment Discrimination Act (“REDA”).
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-
241 (2001). For the reasons stated herein, we hold that plaintiff
is not within the protected class and we affirm the order of the
trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)
(2001). The party moving for summary judgment must “clearly
demonstrate the lack of any triable issue of fact and entitlement
to judgment as a matter of law.”
Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v.
Price Waterhouse, LLP, 350 N.C. 214, 220, 513 S.E.2d 320, 324
(1999). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
she was not an “employee” and therefore not within the class of
persons protected by REDA. Therefore, plaintiff contends that as
a “former employee,” she is protected by REDA. We disagree.
We first examine the class of persons protected under REDA.
REDA states that “no person shall discriminate or take any
retaliatory action against an employee because the employee in good
faith does or threatens to . . .” file a workers' compensation
action. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-241(a)(1)(a) (2001). We note that,
on its face, REDA does not offer a definition for “employee.” This
Court has long held that in determining the meaning of a statute,
“undefined words are accorded their plain meaning so long as it is
reasonable to do so.”
Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290,
297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 143L. Ed. 2d 671 (1999). A statute must be evaluated as a whole and
the court “will not construe an individual section in a manner that
renders another provision of the same statute meaningless.”
Id.
“A construction of a statute that hinders its purpose must be
avoided if courts can reasonably do so without doing [harm] to the
legislative language.”
Williams v. Holsclaw, 128 N.C. App. 205,
212, 495 S.E.2d 166, 170-71 (1998). Moreover, statutes should be
interpreted to ensure that the purpose of the legislature is
accomplished.
Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d
222, 227 (1991).
We next turn to the plain definition of employee. An
“employee” is “a person who works for another in return for
financial or other compensation.”
The American Heritage Dictionary
450 (2nd ed. 1985).
Black's Law Dictionary defines “employee” as
“a person in the service of another under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the
power or right to control and direct the employee in the material
details of how the work is to be performed.”
Black's Law
Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990). Moreover, the Workers' Compensation
Act defines “employee” as “every person engaged in an employment
under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship,
express or implied, oral or written, . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-
2(2) (2001).
In the present case, plaintiff gave the following relevant
testimony regarding her employment status with defendant: Q: And of course you voluntarily resigned, I
think it was, around May 10 or 11 of 2000 to
go up to Lake Norman?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: And had you received a job offer and
accepted a job offer from Lake Norman at the
time you turned in your resignation on May 11,
2000?
A: Yes.
. . . .
Q: Why did you leave [defendant]?
A: Because of the hours and the days and the
drive back and forth to Charlotte. I loved it
there besides that.
In the instant case, plaintiff's testimony reveals that she
resigned on 11 May 2000. Plaintiff also offered testimony that Dr.
Ford contacted her on 27 June 2000 to offer her employment with
defendant, that she was no longer employed by defendant, and was
actually employed by Lake Norman Regional Hospital at the time of
the offer from Dr. Ford. Therefore, in applying the plain
definition of employee, the record clearly establishes that
plaintiff (1) was not under a contract of hire with defendant; (2)
that defendant had no power or control to direct plaintiff; and (3)
that plaintiff was not providing any services to defendant in
exchange for financial compensation on 27 June 2000, when she was
contacted by Dr. Ford. Given the facts of this case, we hold that
plaintiff did not meet the definition of an “employee” following
her voluntary resignation in May 2000.
Thus, plaintiff has failed to establish that she is within the
class of persons to which REDA offers a remedy.
Therefore, the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant.
For the reasons contained herein, we decline to address
defendant's cross-assignment of error. The order of the trial
court is hereby
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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