An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA02-837

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 20 May 2003

SCARLETT CASE, Individually and
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of JAMES CASE,
    Plaintiff

v .                             Guilford County
                                No. 00 CVS 11609
JAMES EDWARDS, M.D.; ROBERT BUCCINI,
M.D.; EAGLE PHYSICIANS & ASSOCIATES,
P.A., Formerly GREENSBORO
GASTROENTEROLOGY, P.A.; CLINTON
YOUNG, M.D.; GREENSBORO CHEST DISEASE
AND ALLERGY ASSOCIATES, P.A.; JOSEPH
ZAMMIT, M.D.; and MOSES H.
CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Formerly
WESLEY LONG COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,    
    Defendants

    Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 25 February 2002 by Judge Russell G. Walker in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2003.

    Donaldson & Black, P.A., by Rachel Scott Decker; Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sperando, by Linda Elise Capobianco; and Keith R. Bishop, for plaintiff- appellant.

    Carruthers & Bailey, P.A., by Joseph T. Carruthers and Michelle B. Clifton; Cozen O'Connor, by Kimberly Sullivan and Russ Brinson; and Patterson, Dilthey, Clay & Bryson, L.P., by Charles George, for defendants-appellees.

    TYSON, Judge.

    Scarlett Case (“plaintiff”), both individually and as personal representative of the Estate of James Case, appeals from the trial court's order which struck plaintiff's designation of Bruce Krieger, M.D., Aldo N. Serafini, M.D., Phillip Leavy, M.D., andAndrew Garlisi, M.D. as expert witnesses. The order precludes any of them from testifying at trial as a sanction for violation of a discovery order. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.

I. Background
    On 31 October 2000, plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against defendants alleging negligence that resulted in James Case's death from massive pulmonary thromboembolism. On 4 September 2001, the trial court entered a consent discovery scheduling order wherein plaintiff was required to designate all expert witnesses on or before 1 November 2001 and to make those expert witnesses available for deposition on or before 15 January 2002. The order stated, “Experts not designated and made available for deposition in accordance with this Order shall not be permitted to testify at trial.”
    On 31 October 2001, plaintiff disclosed seven expert witnesses including Krieger, Serafini and Leavy. On 1 November 2001, plaintiff amended her disclosure statement to include Garlisi. On 5 November 2001, defendants requested dates for depositions for all of plaintiff's experts. Plaintiff provided dates for the depositions of three of the experts but failed to provide dates for Krieger, Serafini, Leavy or Garlisi prior to the 15 January 2002 deadline.
    The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's expert designation and to preclude expert testimony from Krieger, Serafini, Leavy and Garlisi on 25 February 2002. Plaintiff appeals.
II. Issues
    Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in striking the expert designation and precluding expert testimony by Krieger, Serafini, Leavy, and Garlisi. Defendants argue this appeal is interlocutory and is not properly before us.
III. Interlocutory
    An interlocutory order is one “made during the pendency of an action which [does] not dispose of the case, but instead leave[s] it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73, 511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999) (citing Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)). There is no general right to appeal an interlocutory order. Myers v. Mutton, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 574 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2002), disc. rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (27 March 2003). “Generally, appellate courts do not review discovery orders because of their interlocutory nature.” Stevenson v. Joyner, 148 N.C. App. 261, 263, 558 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2002).
    However, an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed “if (1) the order is final as to some claims or parties, and the trial court certifies pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) that there is no just reason to delay appeal, or (2) the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that would be lost unless immediately reviewed.” Meyers, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 574 S.E.2d at 75. “Certain sanctions have been deemed immediately appealable because they affect a substantial right under G.S. § 1-277 or §7A-27(d)(1). See Willis v. Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 30, 229 S.E.2d 191, 198 (1976) (civil or criminal contempt); Adair v. Adair, 62 N.C. App. 493, 495, 303 S.E.2d 190, 192, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 319, 307 S.E.2d 162 (1983) (order striking pleadings); Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977) (denial of request to depose out of state witness).” Long v. Joyner, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 574 S.E.2d 171, 175 (2002), disc. rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (27 February 2003) (“[A]n order to pay attorney's fees as a sanction does not affect a substantial right.”).
IV. Conclusion
    The discovery order appealed from is interlocutory. The trial court did not certify the order as immediately appealable. The parties were not assessed with monetary sanctions and there has been no judgment of contempt. Plaintiff failed to show a substantial right that is lost if the order is not immediately appealed. This appeal is dismissed as interlocutory.
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judges WYNN and STEELMAN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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