An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced
ure.
NO. COA02-846
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 April 2003
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Guilford County
No. 99 CRS 112877-8
MELVIN CHRISTOPHER PARKER
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 February 2002 by
Judge A. Moses Massey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 25 March 2003.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Elizabeth N. Strickland,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Irving Joyner for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Defendant, Melvin Christopher Parker, appeals convictions of
two counts of attempted robbery with a firearm, assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill, and assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. He argues four
assignments of error. For the reasons discussed herein, we find no
error.
The State's evidence tended to show that on the night of 30
December 1999, four men, brothers John and Marlen Goodwin, their
cousin, Dwayne Watkins, and Anthony Dula, decided to drive to getVerdie Watkins from a liquor house located at 1418 Olga Street in
High Point, North Carolina. Marlen drove his truck to the liquor
house. Upon arriving, the four men went into the house to try to
persuade Verdie to leave. He did not. The four men exited the
house and walked toward the truck. As they approached the vehicle,
a black man with dreadlocks and a hooded sweatshirt came out of the
bushes and approached them demanding money. Before the men could
respond, the man with dreadlocks, later identified as defendant,
shot Dwayne in the head at point-blank range. Defendant then
turned the gun toward Marlen, but Marlen struck the barrel of the
gun and the bullet fired into the truck. Marlen then ran away.
Several more shots were fired as Marlen fled. John and Anthony ran
from the truck after the first shots were fired.
Emergency assistance was called and Dwayne was taken to the
hospital. Marlen later identified defendant as the man who fired
the gun. Marlen's brother, Nathaniel Goodwin, testified that he
heard defendant say that the bullet was meant for Marlen, not
Dwayne, while both defendant and Nathaniel were in the jail's
holding cell.
Defendant presented no evidence. The jury returned guilty
verdicts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury and attempted robbery with a firearm as
to Dwayne and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill andattempted robbery with a firearm as to Marlen. Defendant was
sentenced to 133 to 169 months for his crimes against Dwayne and
received a consecutive sentence of 94 to 122 months for his crimes
against Marlen. Defendant appeals.
I.
In his first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the attempted
robbery charges because the State failed to present sufficient
evidence of an overt act. We disagree.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the only issue for the
trial court is whether there is substantial evidence of each
essential element of the charged offense and of the defendant being
the perpetrator. State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d
920, 925 (1996). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995).
The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable
inference from that evidence. State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 274,
464 S.E.2d 448, 463 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed.
2d 1080 (1996). Contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence
are resolved in favor of the State. State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142,
150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 199 (1995). The elements of attempted robbery with a firearm are: (1) an
intent to commit the substantive offense; and (2) an overt act done
for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation but falls short
of the completed offense. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d
164 (1980). Defendant contends there was no overt act.
In State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 561 S.E.2d 245 (2002),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 154 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2002), our Supreme
Court held that where the defendant pointed a gun at the victim's
face and demanded money there was sufficient evidence of an overt
act. In State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 477 S.E.2d 915 (1996), our
Supreme Court held that a defendant's sneak approach to the
victim with his pistol drawn and the first attempt to shoot were
each more than enough to constitute an overt act, not to mention
two fatal shots fired thereafter. (Citing State v. Powell, 277
N.C. 672, 178 S.E.2d 417 (1971)). In State v. Applewhite, 127 N.C.
App. 677, 493 S.E.2d 297 (1997), this Court held that there was
sufficient evidence of an overt act to deny a motion to dismiss
where the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and ordered him to
get down and empty his pockets.
In the instant case, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence of an overt act by defendant's ambushing of the four men,
demanding money, pointing a gun, ultimately shooting one of them,
and then firing shots at another. This assignment of error has nomerit.
II.
In his second assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the charge of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill Marlen Goodwin.
We disagree.
As discussed above, a motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence should be denied if there is substantial evidence of each
element of the crime. State v. Roddey, 110 N.C. App. 810, 812, 431
S.E.2d 245, 247 (1993). Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might find sufficient to support a
conclusion. Id.
The elements of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill are: (1) an assault; (2) with a deadly weapon; and (3) with
the intent to kill. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(c) (2001). Defendant
contends no intent to kill Marlen Goodwin was shown. The evidence
at trial showed that defendant shot Dwayne in the head at point-
blank range and then turned the loaded gun on Marlen. Marlen
swatted at the gun as defendant pulled the trigger and the bullet
struck the truck instead of Marlen. As Marlen ran away, defendant
fired more shots at him. In addition, defendant stated that the
bullet that hit Dwayne was meant for Marlen. We hold that this
evidence constitutes sufficient evidence to properly denydefendant's motion to dismiss, and this assignment of error has no
merit.
III.
By his third assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior bad acts.
We disagree.
Pursuant to Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,
[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. Rule 404(b) provides that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,
entrapment or accident.
Here, the State presented evidence that defendant had
previously tried to rob Marlen by getting into Marlen's vehicle,
pulling out a gun, and searching for drugs and money. Marlen was
one of the witnesses who identified defendant as the robber and
shooter in this case. This evidence was admitted by the courtafter a voir dire hearing, for the purposes of identification of
defendant, which is a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b).
The State also introduced the testimony of Avery O'Mont
Thompson, who testified that shortly before the shooting, defendant
told him that Marlen and Paco had beaten him. Defendant had
asked Thompson for a gun. Thompson later ran into Marlen, who told
him that defendant had tried to rob him earlier and that was the
reason they had beaten defendant. This evidence was admissible to
show a motive for defendant to rob and shoot Marlen. The testimony
concerning Marlen's statements corroborated Marlen's prior
testimony that identified defendant as the perpetrator of the
crimes. This assignment of error has no merit.
IV.
In his fourth and final assignment of error, defendant argues
the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of 133
to 169 months and 94 to 122 months where defendant presented
mitigation evidence and the sentence was incorrectly calculated.
We disagree.
The trial court is not required to make findings of
aggravating and mitigating factors unless it departs from the
presumptive range of sentences. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(c)
(2001). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing defendant within the presumptive range. Defendant was sentenced for the Class C felony of assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury to an
active sentence of a minimum of 133 months and a maximum of 169
months. Defendant argues that the statute provides that for a
Class C offense at a record level IV, the appropriate sentence is
a minimum of 107 months and a maximum of 133 months. Defendant
does not understand the Felony Structured Sentencing chart set
forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17. For a Class C felony, at
a prior record level IV, in the presumptive range, the sentencing
judge has the discretion to impose a
minimum sentence anywhere from
107 to 133 months.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17 (2001). Once
the minimum sentence has been imposed under the chart set forth in
subsection (c), the court must impose the corresponding
maximum
sentence as set forth in subsection (d) or (e).
Id. Since this is
a Class C felony, the corresponding maximum sentence is found in
subsection (e), and is 169 months.
Id. This assignment of error
has no merit
NO ERROR.
Judges WYNN and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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