LISA KAY DALGEWICZ,
Plaintiff,
v
.
Buncombe County
No. 01 CVD 2961
DONNA LANGENBACH,
Defendant.
Michael E. Ciochina for defendant-appellant.
Robert K. Riddle, P.A., by Diane K. McDonald for plaintiff-
appellee.
WYNN, Judge.
For reasons given in Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 537
S.E.2d 854 (2000), we uphold the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction.
Briefly stated, Lisa Kay Dalgewicz brought an alienation of
affections and criminal conversation action against Donna
Langenbach. In response, Ms. Langenbach argued that the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over her because at all times
relevant to the complaint she was a resident of Florida; has never
been a resident of North Carolina; has never been to this state
except for changing airplanes at an airport; has never engaged in
business in this state; does not own any real or personal propertyin this state; has never made any promises or promised to perform
any services in this state and does not have sufficient minimum
contacts with North Carolina. From the trial court's denial of her
motion to dismiss, Ms. Langenbach appeals.
(See footnote 1)
------------------------------------------------
The standard of review of an order determining personal
jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact by the trial
court are supported by competent evidence in the record;
if so, this Court must affirm the order of the trial
court. The determination of whether jurisdiction is
statutorily and constitutionally permissible due to
contact with the forum is a question of fact. To resolve
a question of personal jurisdiction, the court must
engage in a two step analysis. First, the court must
determine if the North Carolina long-arm statute's (N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4) requirements are met. If so, the
court must then determine whether such an exercise of
jurisdiction comports with due process.
Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 732, 537 S.E.2d 854, 856
(2000).
“A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject
matter may render a judgment against a party personally only if
there exists one or more of the jurisdictional grounds set forth in
G.S. 1-75.4 or G.S. 1-75.7 . . ..” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.3
(2001). Moreover, a court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant “in any action claiming injury to person or property
within this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or
about the time of the injury either: (a) solicitation or servicesactivities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the
defendant . . ..” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4).
In Cooper, this Court held that the underlying facts of an
alienation of affections and criminal conversation claim constitute
an injury to person and that telephone calls between the defendant
and the plaintiff's spouse constituted solicitations within the
meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4. 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537
S.E.2d 854, 857 (2000).
In this case, Ms. Dalgewicz filed an affidavit providing
details of eleven phone calls from Ms. Langenbach to Ms.
Dalgewicz's husband between January and May 2001. The affidavit
also provided evidence of Ms. Langenbach's trips to North Carolina,
including flying to Paris from Charlotte, North Carolina with Ms.
Dalgewicz's husband. In light of that evidence and the holding of
Cooper, we conclude that the trial court's order denying the motion
to dismiss is supported by competent evidence that Ms. Langenbach
had sufficient minimum contacts with this state to meet the
requirements of North Carolina's long-arm-jurisdiction statute.
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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