An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA02-870


Filed: 20 May 2003


v .                         Buncombe County
                            No. 01 CVD 2961


    Appeal by defendant from order entered 2 May 2002 by Judge Ronald K. Payne, District Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2003.

    Michael E. Ciochina for defendant-appellant.

    Robert K. Riddle, P.A., by Diane K. McDonald for plaintiff- appellee.

    WYNN, Judge.

    For reasons given in Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 537 S.E.2d 854 (2000), we uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction.
    Briefly stated, Lisa Kay Dalgewicz brought an alienation of affections and criminal conversation action against Donna Langenbach. In response, Ms. Langenbach argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her because at all times relevant to the complaint she was a resident of Florida; has never been a resident of North Carolina; has never been to this state except for changing airplanes at an airport; has never engaged in business in this state; does not own any real or personal propertyin this state; has never made any promises or promised to perform any services in this state and does not have sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina. From the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss, Ms. Langenbach appeals.   (See footnote 1) 
    The standard of review of an order determining personal jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the record; if so, this Court must affirm the order of the trial court. The determination of whether jurisdiction is statutorily and constitutionally permissible due to contact with the forum is a question of fact. To resolve a question of personal jurisdiction, the court must engage in a two step analysis. First, the court must determine if the North Carolina long-arm statute's (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4) requirements are met. If so, the court must then determine whether such an exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.

Cooper v. Shealy
, 140 N.C. App. 729, 732, 537 S.E.2d 854, 856 (2000).
    “A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter may render a judgment against a party personally only if there exists one or more of the jurisdictional grounds set forth in G.S. 1-75.4 or G.S. 1-75.7 . . ..” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.3 (2001). Moreover, a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant “in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury either: (a) solicitation or servicesactivities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant . . ..” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4).
    In Cooper, this Court held that the underlying facts of an alienation of affections and criminal conversation claim constitute an injury to person and that telephone calls between the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse constituted solicitations within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4. 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857 (2000).
    In this case, Ms. Dalgewicz filed an affidavit providing details of eleven phone calls from Ms. Langenbach to Ms. Dalgewicz's husband between January and May 2001. The affidavit also provided evidence of Ms. Langenbach's trips to North Carolina, including flying to Paris from Charlotte, North Carolina with Ms. Dalgewicz's husband. In light of that evidence and the holding of Cooper, we conclude that the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss is supported by competent evidence that Ms. Langenbach had sufficient minimum contacts with this state to meet the requirements of North Carolina's long-arm-jurisdiction statute.
    Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

Footnote: 1
    Although generally an appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss is not immediately appealable, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1- 277(b)(2001) provides “any interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant . . ..”

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