STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Columbus Cou
nty
No. 01CRS052581
JIMMY BALDWIN
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Belinda A. Smith, for the State.
Paul T. Cleavenger for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Jimmy Baldwin (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment of the
Columbus County Superior Court imposed as a result of a jury
verdict finding him guilty of second degree trespass for which he
was given a split sentence of fifteen days in jail and supervised
probation of thirty-six months. We find no error.
The State's evidence tends to show that on 1 August 2001,
defendant was on the premises of the Hasty Mart Convenience Store,
where he was grunting and/or making lewd comments to female patrons
as they entered the store. When he was asked to leave the store by
the store's owner, David Worley, defendant refused to leave. As a
result, Worley called the police. Officer Chris Olsen (“OfficerOlsen”) of the Chadbourn Police Department responded to the call
for assistance at Hasty Mart. Once Officer Olsen arrived, Worley
again asked defendant to leave the premises. Again, defendant
refused. Officer Olsen also asked defendant to leave, but
defendant refused to do so. Officer Olsen then arrested defendant
for trespassing.
At trial, defendant proceeded pro se and testified in his own
behalf. Defendant recounted that some three weeks before the 1
August 2001 incident, he had a previous disagreement with Worley
over a vehicle repair performed by Worley's Automotive and Tire.
Defendant stated that he contacted the Chadbourn Police Department
about the disagreement after he and Worley could not come to an
agreement about his vehicle repair. Defendant testified that on 1
August 2001, he purchased some food at Hasty Mart and was eating in
a designated area. Defendant insisted that he was not causing any
type of disturbance, and that he was deprived of his constitutional
rights when he was arrested for trespassing. Defendant testified
that he and Officer Olsen had also had previous “incidents.”
As defendant represented himself at trial, the court on its
own motion, moved to dismiss the charge against defendant at the
close of the State's evidence and at the close of all of the
evidence. The court denied these motions, and the matter of
defendant's guilt was submitted to the jury, which found him guilty
as charged.
On appeal, defendant argues only that the trial court erred in
failing to dismiss the charge against him because the evidence wasinsufficient to establish the essential elements of second degree
trespass. We disagree.
A motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence is
properly denied if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, and giving the State every reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom, “'there is substantial evidence of
each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant
being the perpetrator of the offense.'” State v. Williams, 150
N.C. App. 497, 501, 563 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2002) (quoting State v.
Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)).
“Substantial evidence” has been defined as that quantum of evidence
that “'a reasonable juror would consider sufficient to support a
conclusion that each essential element of the crime exists.'” Id.
(quoting State v. Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. 596, 604, 540 S.E.2d 815,
821 (2000)).
As a general proposition, one is guilty
of second degree trespass “if without
authorization, [he] enters or remains on [the]
premises of another: (1) after he has been
notified not to enter or remain there by the
owner, by a person in charge of the premises,
by a lawful occupant, or by another authorized
person.”
State v. Marcopolos, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 572 S.E.2d 820, 821
(2002) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13 (2001)). In
Marcopolos, this Court reiterated that a person “who lawfully
enters a place may be subject to [being convicted of] trespass if
he . . . remains [in that place] after being asked to leave by
someone with authority.” Id. at ___, 572 S.E.2d at 822. In the instant case, the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State tends to show that defendant did lawfully enter the
Hasty Mart store on 1 August 2001. However, the owner of the store
twice asked defendant to leave after complaints that defendant was
grunting and/or making lewd comments towards female patrons of the
store. When defendant refused to leave, the store owner called the
police. When an officer responded to the scene, both he and the
owner again asked defendant to leave the premises. Defendant again
refused to leave the store, and he was thereafter arrested.
We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to prove all of
the essential elements of second degree trespass. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss and
submitting the charge to the jury.
Having so concluded, we hold that defendant received a fair
trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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