An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA02-957

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 March 2003

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

    v.                            Guilford County
                                No. 00 CRS 080777
JAMES WAYNE LITTLE

    Appeal by defendant from judgment filed 26 February 2002 by Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 2003.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isaac T. Avery, III and Assistant Attorney General Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.

    Neill A. Jennings, Jr. for defendant appellant.

    BRYANT, Judge.

    James Wayne Little (defendant) appeals from a judgment filed 28 February 2002 entered consistent with a jury verdict finding him guilty of Driving While Impaired (DWI).
    Defendant was charged with DWI on 25 February 2000. Subsequently, defendant's North Carolina driver's license was revoked for thirty days pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 by an order dated 27 March 2000 because there was probable cause defendant had an “alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at any relevant time after . . . driving.”
    Prior to trial in the district court, defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him on the basis that prosecution forDWI following the thirty-day suspension violated prohibitions against double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion, and defendant was subsequently found guilty as charged. Defendant appealed de novo to the superior court. Again, prior to trial in superior court, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him alleging a violation of the double jeopardy clause. The superior court also denied defendant's motion.

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    The issue is whether the immediate thirty-day driver's license revocation for persons charged with implied consent offenses under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 bars subsequent prosecution for DWI and other alcohol related offenses.
    Specifically, defendant contends that such prosecution violates the prohibition against double jeopardy. As noted in State v. Newsome, --- N.C. App. ---, ---, --- S.E.2d ---, --- (Mar. 18, 2003) (No. COA02-792), this issue has been previously addressed by this Court in State v. Reid, 148 N.C. App. 548, 559 S.E.2d 561 (2002) and State v. Evans, 145 N.C. App. 324, 550 S.E.2d 853 (2001) and decided contrary to defendant's position. See also State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 470 S.E.2d 16 (1996) (holding that the ten- day driver's license revocation for persons charged with implied consent offenses pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 is a civil penalty, and therefore, subsequent prosecution for DWI does not result in a double jeopardy violation). In light of existing authority, we decline defendant's invitation to revisit this issue. See In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d30, 37 (1989) (providing that one panel of this Court may not overrule the decision of another panel of this Court). Again, the principles of double jeopardy are not violated when a defendant's license is revoked for thirty days under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5 for an implied consent offense and the defendant is subsequently prosecuted for DWI. See Reid, 148 N.C. App. 548, 559 S.E.2d 561; Evans, 145 N.C. App. 324, 550 S.E.2d 853; see also Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 470 S.E.2d 16. Thus, we overrule defendant's argument.
    No error.
    Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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