STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Sampson Coun
ty
No. 02CRS 1134<
br>
ERIKA CATRICA PASILLAS
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Claud R. Whitener, III, for the State.
Angela Humes Brown for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Erika Catrica Pasillas (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment
revoking her probation and activating her suspended sentence. We
remand to the trial court for appropriate findings.
On 30 September 1998, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant
pled guilty to conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. Judge Knox V.
Jenkins suspended defendant's thirty-five to forty-two month
imprisonment sentence and placed her on thirty-six months probation
(intensive followed by supervised). A 6 March 2000 violation
report charged defendant with moving from her place of residence
without notifying her probation officer and failing to maintain
contact with her probation officer after her probation wastransferred to El Paso, Texas. At her probation hearing, counsel
for defendant admitted the charged violations. The court also
heard from defendant's probation officer, who stated that defendant
absconded from supervision while in Texas. In response, defense
counsel stated that there was “no showing” for the defense but
relayed defendant's claim “that she was under domination of her
current boyfriend and was not allowed to report as she should.”
Counsel conceded that defendant's “record, as far as being on
probation, is not good[,]” but asked the court to continue
defendant on probation. Finding that defendant admitted to the
charged violations and that it was “not appropriate to continue her
on probation[,]” the court revoked probation and activated her
suspended sentence.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in revoking probation
without findings of fact evaluating the cause of her non-compliance
with the terms of probation. She faults the court for failing “to
state for the record whether or not her evidence amounted to [a]
lawful excuse” for her violation. She further claims that the
judgment “leaves the potential basis upon which [her] probation was
revoked a mystery.”
In order to revoke probation and activate a suspended
sentence, the trial court must find based upon competent evidence
“that the defendant has violated, without lawful excuse, a valid
condition” of probation. State v. Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 287, 103
S.E.2d 376, 380 (1958). Under the “lawful excuse” rule, the court
must also make findings of fact addressing any evidence of a lawfulexcuse for the defendant's violation. State v. Hill, 132 N.C. App.
209, 212, 510 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1999) (citing State v. Smith, 43
N.C. App. 727, 259 S.E.2d 805 (1979)). However, it is the
defendant's burden to adduce evidence of a lawful excuse. State v.
Crouch, 74 N.C. App. 565, 567, 328 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1985). If the
defendant stipulates to the allegations in a probation violation
report and offers no competent evidence to explain her violation,
the trial court need not make specific findings regarding her
ability to comply. Id. A defense counsel's representations to the
trial court do not constitute competent evidence upon which the
trial judge is required to make specific findings of fact. Id.
In the case at bar, defendant admitted the charged probation
violations and offered no evidence of a lawful excuse therefor.
Accordingly, the trial court was not required to make specific
findings of fact addressing her ability to comply. See Crouch, 74
N.C. App. at 567, 328 S.E.2d at 835.
Although not squarely raised by defendant, we note that the
trial court's judgment fails to identify the nature of defendant's
probation violation and contains no finding that the violation was
willful or without lawful excuse. It appears these omissions are
merely a clerical oversight on the second page of the judgment. We
therefore remand to the trial court for entry of the appropriate
findings. See State v. Sanders, 19 N.C. App. 751, 753, 200 S.E.2d
221, 222 (1973).
Remanded.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
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