STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Pasquotank County
No. 00 CRS 50786
LARRY TERRELL WHITEHURST No. 00 CRS 50812
No. 00 CRS 50813
No. 00 CRS 50815
No. 00 CRS 50818
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Elizabeth J. Weese, for the State.
Hosford & Hosford, P.L.L.C., by Geoffrey W. Hosford, for the
defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
From convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon, second
degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a felon,
defendant, Larry Terrell Whitehurst, appeals and assigns error to
the trial court's (1) denial of his motion to dismiss, (2) denial
of his motion to suppress, and (3) jury instruction on the doctrine
of recent possession. We find no error.
At trial, the State's evidence tended to show that on 13
December 2000, a masked man entered the Southern Pig Barbeque
Restaurant in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. The man held a gunto the head of Catherine Howell, an employee, and demanded access
to the cash register. When Ms. Howell could not open the register,
the man forced her into the back of the restaurant. Thereafter,
the masked man, holding the gun to Ms. Howell's neck, demanded that
Dorothy and Thomas Kerring, the owners of the Southern Pig, open
the cash register or he would blow [Ms. Howell's] head off. Ms.
Kerring opened the register, gave the man the cash, and allowed the
man to take a roll of quarters wrapped in plastic. Thereafter, the
man forced Ms. Kerring to open another register, wherein the man
obtained more cash, including a $50 bill that Ms. Howell had marked
with a special yellow pen earlier in the day.
After the robber left the Southern Pig, Mr. Kerring called 911
and described the robber as a masked man, with a mustache, about
5'10" to 6'1" tall. Upon arriving at the scene, Ms. Howell told an
Elizabeth City Police Detective, Robin Vanscoy, that through the
mask she noticed that the robber was an African-American male with
a mustache. Furthermore, Ms. Howell described the assailant as
5'8", wearing a black-leather coat, a blue-fleece shirt, brand-new
blue jeans, gloves, thick boots, and carrying a silver gun with a
black handle.
Meanwhile, the detectives went to a housing project near the
Southern Pig and noticed defendant, dressed in all dark clothing,
get out of a taxi cab. Defendant made two trips up and down the
apartment building stairs, at which time Officer John Ethridge
approached defendant and initiated a conversation. After a short
conversation in which Officer Ethridge questioned the veracity ofdefendant's identity, defendant fled on foot. Upon apprehending
defendant, Officer Ethridge conducted a pat-down and discovered
$100 in various denominations in defendant's pockets, including a
$50 bill marked with a yellow pen.
After placing defendant under arrest, Officers Edwards and
Vanscoy went to an apartment rented by Denise Riddick where
defendant was known to have stayed the previous night. Inside the
apartment, the officers discovered a plastic coin wrapper and a
receipt tape. Furthermore, Ms. Riddick told the officers that she
had packed up a suitcase of defendant's belongings and taken it to
defendant's aunt's house. Ms. Riddick told the officers that the
suitcase contained a silver gun and clothing.
At trial, various witnesses identified defendant as well as
the gun, clothing, plastic coin wrapper, and receipt tape, as
involved in the 13 December 2000 robbery of the Southern Pig. Upon
hearing the evidence, arguments from counsel, and instructions from
the court, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
The court sentenced defendant to a combined term of between 313
months and 400 months imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant first contends the trial court committed
reversible error in denying his motion to dismiss. Defendant does
not contend the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of each
element of the offenses charged. Instead, defendant argues the
State failed to prove that Larry Whitehurst [was] the man who
committed this robbery. In support of this proposition, defendant
relies on Ms. Howell's (1) assertion that the masked man had apermanent mark beneath his eye, whereas defendant does not have
such a mark, (2) description of the assailant as 5'8", whereas
defendant is 6'0", and (3) her inability to determine, with
absolute certainty, that the clothing items presented by the State
were the exact items worn by the robber.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence,
the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, which is entitled to every reasonable
inference which can be drawn from that evidence. State v. Dick,
126 N.C. App. 312, 317, 485 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1997). Any
contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for the jury to
resolve and do not warrant dismissal. State v. Olson, 330 N.C.
557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992). Furthermore, on a motion to
dismiss the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged
. . . and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such
offense. State v. Brayboy, 105 N.C. App. 370, 373-74, 413 S.E.2d
590, 592 (1992). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. State v. Williams, 133 N.C. App. 326, 328, 515 S.E.2d
80, 82 (1999) (citation omitted).
In this case, the State presented overwhelming evidence that
defendant robbed the Southern Pig on 13 December 2000. For
instance, when asked by counsel how certain she was that defendant
was the robber, Ms. Howell testified: I'm sure. I'm absolutely
one hundred percent positive. Furthermore, when arrested byOfficer Ethridge, a $50 bill was discovered in defendant's pocket,
and the $50 bill bore a yellow pen mark that Ms. Howell identified
as the one she made on that bill earlier in the day. Finally,
items taken from the Southern Pig, as well as a distinctive silver
pistol, were found in defendant's suitcase and temporary residence.
The silver pistol was identified by Ms. Howell and the Kerrings,
from a lineup containing six guns, as the gun used in the robbery.
Likewise, the items discovered at defendant's temporary residence,
which included clothing, a white bag, a coin wrapper taken from the
register, and the register tape, were all positively identified by
Ms. Howell and the Kerrings. We hold that this was substantial
evidence from which a reasonable mind could conclude that defendant
was the individual who robbed the Southern Pig on 13 December 2000.
Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss.
Defendant next contends the trial court committed reversible
error by denying his motion to suppress the coins and currency
obtained by Officer Ethridge in searching defendant's body.
According to defendant, Officer Ethridge did not have a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity, and,
therefore, his search was unconstitutional. However, we hold, for
reasons stated herein, that defendant failed to preserve his right
to contest the admissibility of this evidence on appeal.
Chapter 15A, Article 53, of the General Statutes sets forth
the exclusive method for challenging evidence on the ground that
its exclusion is constitutionally required. State v. Maccia, 311N.C. 222, 227, 316 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1984); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-975. The defendant has the burden of showing that he has
complied with the procedural requirements of Article 53. Maccia,
311 N.C. at 227, 316 S.E.2d at 244. In Superior Court a
'defendant may move to suppress evidence only prior to trial'
unless he falls within certain exceptions. Id. (citing N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-975). When no exception to the general rule applies,
failure to make a timely motion to suppress prior to trial is a
waiver of any right to contest the inadmissibility of evidence on
constitutional grounds. Maccia, 311 N.C. at 228, 316 S.E.2d at
244.
In this case, the record reflects that defendant did not make
a pre-trial motion to exclude the evidence. Moreover, our review
of the record indicates that no exceptions apply. Therefore, we
hold that defendant waived his right to contest the admission of
the coins and currency found on his body at the time of his arrest.
By his final argument, defendant contends the trial court
committed reversible error by instructing the jury on the doctrine
of recent possession. As defendant did not object to this
instruction at trial, our appellate review of this assignment error
is limited to a plain error analysis. State v. Odom, 307 N.C.
655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983). As our Supreme Court noted
in Odom, when the 'plain error' rule is applied, 'it is the rare
case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a
criminal conviction. Id. at 660-61, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
In this case, we hold that the State presented sufficientevidence that defendant perpetrated the robbery under the doctrine
of recent possession. This doctrine allows the jury to infer that
the possessor of the stolen property is guilty of its taking.
State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 379, 382, 565 S.E.2d 747, 750 (2002)
(citation omitted). The doctrine of recent possession applies
where the State can prove three things: (1) that the property was
stolen; (2) that the defendant had possession of this stolen
property . . . ; and (3) 'that the defendant had possession of this
property so soon after it was stolen and under such circumstances
as to make it unlikely that he obtained possession honestly.' Id.
(citations omitted).
Defendant argues that the instruction was erroneous because
the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he had
possession of the stolen property. As defendant concedes,
constructive possession is sufficient to support the possession
requirement of the doctrine. See e.g., State v. Osborne, 149 N.C.
App. 235, 562 S.E.2d 528, aff'd by 356 N.C. 424, 571 S.E.2d 584
(2002) (holding that trial court did not err in instructing the
jury as to the doctrine of recent possession based upon evidence of
defendant's constructive possession of the property.).
Accordingly, to support the element of possession under the
doctrine of recent possession, actual physical possession of the
property is not necessary. State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 96, 340
S.E.2d 450, 456 (1986). Evidence of constructive possession is
sufficient to support a conviction if it would allow a reasonable
mind to conclude that defendant had the intent and capability toexercise control and dominion over the stolen property. State v.
Carr, 122 N.C. App. 369, 372, 470 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1996). Where a
defendant does not have exclusive possession of the place where the
[stolen property is] found, the State must show other incriminating
circumstances before constructive possession may be inferred.
State v. Butler, 147 N.C. App. 1, 11, 556 S.E.2d 304, 311 (2001).
This Court has consistently emphasized that constructive
possession depends on the totality of the circumstances in each
case. Id.; State v. Jackson, 103 N.C. App. 239, 243, 405 S.E.2d
354, 357 (1991).
In this case, the stolen items were found in the residence of
Denise Riddick and in a suitcase. Denise Riddick testified that
defendant stayed in her apartment on the night of 12 December 2000.
On the morning of 13 December 2000, Ms. Riddick gave defendant a
key to her apartment. Ms. Riddick testified that no one else had
a key to her apartment and that usually the apartment is locked.
During the course of the day, Ms. Riddick heard about the robbery
at the Southern Pig. Upon returning to her apartment, Ms. Riddick
noticed that her apartment was messy and that defendant's suitcase
was in her son's room. Suspecting something unusual, Ms. Riddick
opened the suitcase and discovered a silver gun and other items.
Upon discovering the silver gun, Ms. Riddick took the suitcase to
defendant's aunt's house. After returning from defendant's aunt's
house, the police were waiting for Ms. Riddick at her apartment.
In the apartment, Officer Vanscoy discovered a plastic coin wrapper
and a receipt tape which were both later identified by Ms. Kerringas items stolen from the cash register at the Southern Pig.
Furthermore, the silver gun, as well as other items in the
suitcase, were also identified as belonging to the robber.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we hold that
this evidence was sufficient to establish the incriminating
circumstances necessary to infer constructive possession where a
defendant does not have exclusive possession of the place where
stolen property is found. See State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235,
562 S.E.2d 528, aff'd by 356 N.C. 424, 571 S.E.2d 584 (2002).
Therefore, the trial court did not commit error, and this
assignment of error is overruled.
No Error.
Judges McCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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