An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

                    NO. COA02-1010                
                                          &nb sp; 
                                          &nb sp; 
Filed: 6 May 2003


         v.                        Wayne County
                                No. 01 CRS 53605

    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 January 2002 by Judge Clifton W. Everett, Jr., in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 April 2003.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Lorrin Freeman, for the State.

    Lynne Rupp for defendant-appellant.

    MARTIN, Judge.

    Defendant appeals from a judgment imposing a term of imprisonment entered after a jury found him guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The State's evidence tended to show that on the morning of 24 May 2001, defendant and Donald Jerome Swinson entered the La Palmita store on Potts Road in Dudley, North Carolina, their faces covered with stockings. While defendant stood at the door, Swinson drew a Derringer handgun, put it to the store clerk's head and stole the money from the cash register. Defendant and Swinson then ran from the store to a nearby church and divided the money between them. They stopped briefly at defendant's residence in Rollingwood Estates before walking to O'Quinn's Store to buy something to eat. Acting on the La Palmita clerk's description of her assailants, Wayne County Sheriff's Deputies Lynn Davis and Richard Blizzard apprehended defendant and Swinson at O'Quinn's. Swinson, who testified at defendant's trial, led police to the gloves, gun and stocking he used in the robbery, which were buried near the church under a pile of leaves. Defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave a written statement admitting in detail to the robbery.
    Defendant first claims the trial court improperly punished him for exercising his right to a jury trial. At sentencing, the court asked the prosecutor about the sentence Swinson had received for the robbery. The prosecutor stated that Swinson had entered a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence in the mitigated range, whereupon the following exchange occurred:
        THE COURT: In the mitigated range? Well--
        [PROSECUTOR]: That was probably negotiated, Judge.

        THE COURT: Yeah, it was negotiated? But this one wasn't though, was it?

        [PROSECUTOR]: No, we tried it out, Judge.
        THE COURT: Okay. Well, you should have got the other judge.

As noted above, the court ultimately sentenced defendant within the presumptive range.
    A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 24. Moreover, “[i]t is improper for the trial court, in sentencing a defendant, to consider the defendant's decision to insist on a jury trial.” State v.Peterson, __ N.C. App. __, __, 571 S.E.2d 883, 885 (2002) (citing State v. Cannon, 326 N.C. 37, 39, 387 S.E.2d 450, 451 (1990)). A defendant is entitled to re-sentencing “[w]here it can reasonably be inferred from the language of the trial judge that the sentence was imposed at least in part because defendant . . . insisted on a trial by jury.” Cannon, 326 N.C. at 39, 387 S.E.2d at 451.
    We find nothing in the trial transcript evincing an intention by the trial court to penalize defendant for going to trial. The court simply indicated it would not be as lenient as the judge who had accepted the terms of Swinson's guilty plea. Here, the court's sentencing decision was guided by a particular concern about the proliferation of robberies involving handguns:
        THE COURT: I will say this. That I take a very dim view of robbery with pistols. There's too much of it going on. It's too easy now. People working in these convenien[ce] stores, gas stations. I never go in one at night . . .[,] although that's not even safe anymore because this occurred in the daytime, didn't it?

        [COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. I believe so.
        THE COURT: And the only way I know how to send a message out that this is not going to be tolerated is to sentence him so he thinks about it the next time he uses poor judgment and runs off with one of his unsavory friends to do something like this. . . .

It is entirely proper for a trial court to consider the seriousness of the defendant's offense in imposing a sentence within the presumptive range prescribed by the legislature. See State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E.2d 783 (1983). Defendant's assignment of error is overruled.    Defendant next avers the trial judge failed to sentence him in the mitigated range, despite acknowledging in open court that his offense was mitigated by his young age. Defendant cites the following exchange as reflecting the court's finding on this issue:         THE COURT: [W]hat did you say, he was 18 years-old?

        [COUNSEL]: Yes, sir, he turned 18 on May the 12th.

        THE COURT: The government says you're grown when you turn 18.

        [COUNSEL]: Right.
        THE COURT: It used to be 21 but they've reduced it down to 18. You're a man now, legally and physically, although sometimes not mentally. And in this case I think the latter was the case. I want to tell you something. I can't imagine what compelled him to do this kind of crazy mess . . . .

As the quoted passage makes clear, the trial court did not view defendant's age to be a mitigating factor. Rather, the court rejected counsel's suggestion that defendant was less culpable because of his age, noting defendant's adult status under the law and voicing dismay at his decision to participate in the robbery.
    Defendant points to additional mitigating factors which he claims were established by the evidence. However, “since the trial judge imposed [a] presumptive sentence . . ., he was not required to consider either aggravating or mitigating factors.” State v. Hart, 105 N.C. App. 542, 549, 414 S.E.2d 364, 368, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 348, 421 S.E.2d 157 (1992). Defendant shows no abuse of discretion by the court in sentencing him within the presumptive range. Id.    In his remaining argument on appeal, defendant asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. To sustain such a claim, defendant must show both that his counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient and that this deficiency had a probable impact on the outcome at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 324 S.E.2d 241 (1985).
    Defendant faults his trial counsel for failing to move to suppress two pieces of evidence: (1) a show-up identification of defendant and Swinson by the clerk of the La Palmita store and (2) a statement defendant made to law enforcement before he was advised of his Miranda rights, in which he implicated Lorenzo Peacock in the robbery. In light of Swinson's testimony and defendant's own signed confession recounting his participation in the robbery, we find no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had the challenged evidence been excluded. Because defendant was not prejudiced by the alleged errors, we need not assess the reasonableness of counsel's performance. See State v. Rogers, 355 N.C. 420, 562 S.E.2d 859 (2002).
    The record on appeal contains additional assignments of error not addressed by defendant in his brief to this Court. By rule, we deem them abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
    No error.
    Judges McCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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