Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 August 2001 by
Judge Michael E. Beale in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 23 April 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Ronald M. Marquette, for the State.
David G. Belser for defendant appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
William Jamel Wilson (“defendant”) appeals from his conviction
for first-degree non-capital murder. For the reasons discussed
herein, we find no error by the trial court.
The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following:
On 14 June 2000, Jarvis Garner (“Garner”), accompanied by several
friends, approached defendant in order to retrieve radio equipment
he had previously loaned to defendant. The radio equipment was
installed inside of defendant's automobile and after a verbal
dispute about the return of the equipment, Garner informed
defendant that he would vandalize his vehicle in order to recover
the equipment. The conversation between defendant and Garnerbecame increasingly combative and defendant informed Garner that
damage to defendant's vehicle would result in “guns [being] fired.”
Defendant then entered a vehicle operated by Antonio Troutman
(“Troutman”) and drove away from the scene of the dispute; however,
defendant returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Upon
defendant's return, Garner broke the rear window of defendant's
automobile with a metal pole. Defendant then removed a firearm
from Troutman's vehicle, pursued Garner, and shot him in the back.
The bullet entered Garner's back and punctured his left lung.
Garner died as a result of the injuries.
On 14 June 2000, Detective Jamie Beach (“Detective Beach”)
obtained a written statement from John Arnold (“Arnold”). Arnold's
statement revealed that prior to the shooting, defendant “acted in
a pissed off” manner, and stated that “this mother . . . thinks
he's going to break out my window. [Garner] thinks I'm a punk.”
At trial, Arnold was shown a copy of his statement and testified
that “some of the stuff in [the statement] looks different.” Over
defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the statement into
evidence for the purpose of corroborating or impeaching Arnold's
testimony.
At trial, defendant testified that during the incident he
feared for his life and discharged his firearm in order to “scare”
Garner. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found
defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced
to a term of life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.
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Defendant presents two assignments of error on appeal, arguing
that the trial court erred by (1) admitting Arnold's prior written
statement; and (2) failing to dismiss the charge of first-degree
murder. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the trial
court committed no error.
By his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred in admitting Arnold's prior written statement
into evidence, because the written statement failed to corroborate
his trial testimony. We disagree.
“The law is well-settled that a witness's prior consistent
statement may be admitted into evidence where the statements
corroborate the witness's in-court testimony.”
State v. Jones, 110
N.C. App. 169, 173, 429 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1993),
cert. denied, 336
N.C. 612, 447 S.E.2d 407 (1994)
. Our Supreme Court has held that
a “witness's prior statements as to facts not referred to in his
trial testimony
and not tending to add weight or credibility to it
are not admissible as corroborative evidence.”
State v. Ramey, 318
N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986). Furthermore, “the
witness's prior contradictory statements may not be admitted under
the guise of corroborating his testimony.”
Id.
“'In a noncapital
case, where portions of a statement corroborate and other portions
are incompetent because they do not corroborate, the defendant
must
specifically object to the incompetent portions.'”
Jones, 110 N.C.
App. at 173, 429 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting
State v. Harrison, 328 N.C.
678, 682, 403 S.E.2d 301, 304 (1991)) (emphasis added). Anassignment of error is waived, where a defendant makes only a
“broadside objection to the allegedly incompetent corroborative
testimony.”
State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 549, 417 S.E.2d 756,
764 (1992).
Here, the following colloquy took place during the direct
examination of Arnold:
Q: Does that [statement] look right, Mr.
Arnold?
A: Is this the original?
Q: Well, that's a photocopy, it's not the
original. Do you recognize your signature on
it?
A: I think this thing has been added to . .
.?
Q: Excuse me?
A: If that's a different statement from the
one he wrote that night.
Q: . . . that has your signature on the
bottom of each page, that's a photocopy, you
say that [its] different . . .
A: . . . some of the stuff in it looks
different. I just . . . at a couple of things
that was said. I didn't say that.
Q: . . . let me draw your attention to - - on
the second page.
A: Well, I would object, Your Honor.
. . . .
Q: . . . Did you have time to finish reading
[your statement]?
A: I read it.
. . . .
Q: . . . the copy that I handed you that was
State's Exhibit Number 4, I've just marked it
State's Exhibit Number 4A, that original that
you were just looking at, is that the one you
were just reading . . . .
A: Looks like the same one.
Q: Okay. All right.
[The State]: Your Honor, I'm going to move to
admit both State's Exhibit 4 and 4A.
The Court: All right. It may be received.
[Defense]: Objection.
The Court: That is your statement, sir? You
recognize that?
Witness: Yes, I'm looking at it.
. . . .
Q: Now, my question is, having read your
statement, does it refresh your recollection
about what happened on June the 14th?
A: Part of it does.
Q: Parts of it does and parts of it does not;
is that right?
A: True.
[Defense]: We object to admission of those
statements.
The Court: Overruled.
We first note that defendant failed to object to the allegedly
incompetent corroborative testimony at trial. Instead, defendant
made a general broadsided objection to the statement. We
nevertheless elect to grant review of the issue.
See N.C.R. App.
P. 2 (2002). Assuming for the benefit of argument that the prior statement
did not corroborate the trial court testimony and the trial court
erred in admitting the prior statement, the error was not
prejudicial to defendant. Given the evidence against defendant
which includes eyewitness testimony that defendant stated he would
discharge a firearm if his automobile were damaged; that Garner
indeed damaged defendant's vehicle; and that defendant pursued
Garner while discharging a firearm, defendant fails to show that
absent admission of Arnold's written statement, the jury would have
reached a different result.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a)
(2001) (concluding that a defendant must show that there is a
reasonable possibility that, had the evidence been excluded, the
jury would have reached a different verdict). This assignment of
error is overruled.
In his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court committed plain error by denying his motion to dismiss
the charge of first-degree murder. Defendant contends that the
short-form indictment did not give him sufficient notice and
violated his federal and state rights to due process, notice, grand
jury presentment, fundamental fairness, and trial by jury under the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Sections 19,
22, and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that
the short-form indictment is sufficient to charge a defendant with
first-degree murder.
State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174, 531
S.E.2d 428, 437 (2000),
cert denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d797 (2001);
see also State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 508, 528
S.E.2d 326, 343,
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498
(2000). In the present case, defendant concedes that this issue
has previously been decided against him by this Court. Defendant
fails to present a compelling reason for this Court to reconsider
this issue. Accordingly, defendant's final assignment of error is
overruled.
For the reasons contained herein, we hold that the trial court
did not err.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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