An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA02-1097
                

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 June 2003

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v .                         Rowan County
                            No. 00 CRS 52411
WILLIAM JAMEL WILSON

    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 August 2001 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2003.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ronald M. Marquette, for the State.

    David G. Belser for defendant appellant.

    TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.

    William Jamel Wilson (“defendant”) appeals from his conviction for first-degree non-capital murder. For the reasons discussed herein, we find no error by the trial court.
    The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 14 June 2000, Jarvis Garner (“Garner”), accompanied by several friends, approached defendant in order to retrieve radio equipment he had previously loaned to defendant. The radio equipment was installed inside of defendant's automobile and after a verbal dispute about the return of the equipment, Garner informed defendant that he would vandalize his vehicle in order to recover the equipment. The conversation between defendant and Garnerbecame increasingly combative and defendant informed Garner that damage to defendant's vehicle would result in “guns [being] fired.”
    Defendant then entered a vehicle operated by Antonio Troutman (“Troutman”) and drove away from the scene of the dispute; however, defendant returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Upon defendant's return, Garner broke the rear window of defendant's automobile with a metal pole. Defendant then removed a firearm from Troutman's vehicle, pursued Garner, and shot him in the back. The bullet entered Garner's back and punctured his left lung. Garner died as a result of the injuries.
    On 14 June 2000, Detective Jamie Beach (“Detective Beach”) obtained a written statement from John Arnold (“Arnold”). Arnold's statement revealed that prior to the shooting, defendant “acted in a pissed off” manner, and stated that “this mother . . . thinks he's going to break out my window. [Garner] thinks I'm a punk.” At trial, Arnold was shown a copy of his statement and testified that “some of the stuff in [the statement] looks different.” Over defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the statement into evidence for the purpose of corroborating or impeaching Arnold's testimony.
    At trial, defendant testified that during the incident he feared for his life and discharged his firearm in order to “scare” Garner. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.

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    Defendant presents two assignments of error on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) admitting Arnold's prior written statement; and (2) failing to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the trial court committed no error.
    By his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Arnold's prior written statement into evidence, because the written statement failed to corroborate his trial testimony. We disagree.
    “The law is well-settled that a witness's prior consistent statement may be admitted into evidence where the statements corroborate the witness's in-court testimony.” State v. Jones, 110 N.C. App. 169, 173, 429 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1993), cert. denied, 336 N.C. 612, 447 S.E.2d 407 (1994). Our Supreme Court has held that a “witness's prior statements as to facts not referred to in his trial testimony and not tending to add weight or credibility to it are not admissible as corroborative evidence.” State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986). Furthermore, “the witness's prior contradictory statements may not be admitted under the guise of corroborating his testimony.” Id. “'In a noncapital case, where portions of a statement corroborate and other portions are incompetent because they do not corroborate, the defendant must specifically object to the incompetent portions.'” Jones, 110 N.C. App. at 173, 429 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 682, 403 S.E.2d 301, 304 (1991)) (emphasis added). Anassignment of error is waived, where a defendant makes only a “broadside objection to the allegedly incompetent corroborative testimony.” State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 549, 417 S.E.2d 756, 764 (1992).
    Here, the following colloquy took place during the direct examination of Arnold:
        Q: Does that [statement] look right, Mr. Arnold?
        
        A: Is this the original?
        
        Q: Well, that's a photocopy, it's not the original. Do you recognize your signature on it?
        
        A: I think this thing has been added to . . .?
        
        Q: Excuse me?
        
        A: If that's a different statement from the one he wrote that night.
        
        Q: . . . that has your signature on the bottom of each page, that's a photocopy, you say that [its] different . . .
        
        A: . . . some of the stuff in it looks different. I just . . . at a couple of things that was said. I didn't say that.
        
        Q: . . . let me draw your attention to - - on the second page.
        
        A: Well, I would object, Your Honor.
        
        . . . .
        Q: . . . Did you have time to finish reading [your statement]?
        
        A: I read it.
        
        . . . .
                Q: . . . the copy that I handed you that was State's Exhibit Number 4, I've just marked it State's Exhibit Number 4A, that original that you were just looking at, is that the one you were just reading . . . .
        
        A: Looks like the same one.
        
        Q: Okay. All right.
        
        [The State]: Your Honor, I'm going to move to admit both State's Exhibit 4 and 4A.
        
        The Court: All right. It may be received.
        
        [Defense]: Objection.
        The Court: That is your statement, sir? You recognize that?
        
        Witness: Yes, I'm looking at it.
        
        . . . .
        
        Q: Now, my question is, having read your statement, does it refresh your recollection about what happened on June the 14th?
        
        A: Part of it does.
        
        Q: Parts of it does and parts of it does not; is that right?
        
        A: True.
        
        [Defense]: We object to admission of those statements.
        
        The Court: Overruled.
    We first note that defendant failed to object to the allegedly incompetent corroborative testimony at trial. Instead, defendant made a general broadsided objection to the statement. We nevertheless elect to grant review of the issue. See N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2002).     Assuming for the benefit of argument that the prior statement did not corroborate the trial court testimony and the trial court erred in admitting the prior statement, the error was not prejudicial to defendant. Given the evidence against defendant which includes eyewitness testimony that defendant stated he would discharge a firearm if his automobile were damaged; that Garner indeed damaged defendant's vehicle; and that defendant pursued Garner while discharging a firearm, defendant fails to show that absent admission of Arnold's written statement, the jury would have reached a different result. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2001) (concluding that a defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that, had the evidence been excluded, the jury would have reached a different verdict). This assignment of error is overruled.
    In his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder. Defendant contends that the short-form indictment did not give him sufficient notice and violated his federal and state rights to due process, notice, grand jury presentment, fundamental fairness, and trial by jury under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Sections 19, 22, and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution.
    The North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that the short-form indictment is sufficient to charge a defendant with first-degree murder. State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174, 531 S.E.2d 428, 437 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d797 (2001); see also State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 508, 528 S.E.2d 326, 343, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000). In the present case, defendant concedes that this issue has previously been decided against him by this Court. Defendant fails to present a compelling reason for this Court to reconsider this issue. Accordingly, defendant's final assignment of error is overruled.
    For the reasons contained herein, we hold that the trial court did not err.
    No error.
    Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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