BRENDA STAINBACK CROWDER,
    Plaintiff

v .                         Vance County
                            No. 95 CVD 749
ROBERT H. CROWDER,
    Defendant

    Appeal by defendant from order entered 20 March 2002 by Judge J. Henry Banks in Vance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 June 2003.

    Kirk, Kirk, Howell, Cutler & Thomas, by C. Terrell Thomas, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.

    Stainback & Satterwhite, by Paul J. Stainback, and McFarlane Law Office, by Susan McFarlane, for defendant-appellant.

    CALABRIA, Judge.

    Robert H. Crowder (“defendant”) appeals from an amended order filed 20 March 2002 entering an adjusted date of separation value for Crowder Logging Company. We affirm the order of the trial court.
    This is the third appeal from disputes arising out of the equitable distribution of the parties' marital estate. In Crowder I, in an unpublished opinion, this Court remanded the case for determination of: the net value of the total marital estate; equitable distribution without consideration of the debt ratio of Crowder Logging Company; and a reassessment of the parties' shares of appreciation of the company. Crowder v. Crowder, 132 N.C. App.822, 519 S.E.2d 785 (1999). In Crowder II, in a published opinion, this Court remanded “solely for entry of an adjusted date of separation value for the logging company, that does not include deductions for sales commissions, income taxes, or wind up expenses upon the future sale of the logging company.” Crowder v. Crowder, 147 N.C. App. 677, 685, 556 S.E.2d 639, 644 (2001). Pursuant to this directive, the trial court entered the 20 March 2002 order valuing the company without consideration of the aforementioned deductions. Defendant appeals.
    Defendant asserts the trial court erred by failing to reconsider the distribution of the marital estate due to the new valuation of the logging company. Defendant argues the March 2002 order is inadequate because it fails to include findings of the net value of the entire marital estate, and the July 2000 order for unequal distribution of the estate is not supported by the evidence. Defendant also asserts the trial court erred in failing to reconsider the value of the logging company in light of its inevitable sale. We find no merit to defendant's assertions and affirm the order of the trial court.
    As previously noted, in Crowder II this Court remanded the case “solely for entry of an adjusted date of separation value” of the logging company. Id. The trial court properly limited its review to this issue and provided that “all other provisions of the prior Order in this case, not inconsistent with this Order, shall remain in full force and effect.” A reconsideration of the distribution of the marital estate or the sufficiency of thefindings of fact, as urged by defendant, would be contrary to this Court's directive in Crowder II. The trial court likewise properly abstained from considering the sale of the company in determining the value of the logging company since in Crowder II this Court determined “the sale of the logging company [i]s a hypothetical future event” which could not be considered in determining the value of the company. Id., 147 N.C. App. at 684, 556 S.E.2d at 644. Accordingly, the trial court complied with this Court's instructions to consider only the value of the logging company, and not improper deductions or additional issues.
    Affirmed.
    Judges WYNN and HUDSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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