IN THE MATTER OF:
Mecklenburg County
RAKALA BRIANNA GRAHAM, No. 01-J-585
a minor child
Associate County Attorney Tyrone C. Wade for Mecklenburg
County Department of Social Services, Division of Youth &
Family Services petitioner appellee.
Joseph F. Dodge for Felicia Graham respondent appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Felicia Graham (respondent) appeals from the trial court's
order of 18 January 2002 which terminated her parental rights to
her daughter Rakala Brianna Graham. Rakala was born on 23 February
1997, and the trial court placed her in foster care on 3 February
2000. The trial court subsequently adjudicated her to be an
abused, neglected and dependent juvenile on 5 April 2000. In a 3
May 2000 dispositional order, the trial court directed respondent
to undertake domestic violence counseling through the Women's
Commission, submit to a substance abuse assessment and
psychological evaluation, and follow the case plan and
recommendations of the Division of Youth and Family Services of the
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (DSS). Respondent did not appear at a 12 July 2000 review hearing,
but her counsel was present. After finding that respondent had not
complied with the requirements of her case plan and that her
address was unknown, the trial court ordered respondent to provide
financial information within thirty days to allow it to assess care
or support payments. Respondent again failed to attend a review
hearing on 10 October 2000. After finding that respondent had not
been visiting the child on a regular basis, the trial court
suspended further visits until respondent appeared in court.
Respondent did attend a review hearing on 14 December 2000, and the
trial court advised her that she could “do the things previously
ordered by the court” and that “her efforts [would] be considered”
at the next hearing.
Petitioner filed a petition on 30 May 2001 to terminate
respondent's parental rights on the following grounds: (1)
respondent neglected Rakala; (2) respondent willfully left Rakala
in foster care for more than twelve months without showing
reasonable progress under the circumstances; (3) respondent
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of
Rakala's foster care for a continuous period of more than six
months; (4) respondent willfully abandoned Rakala for at least six
consecutive months; and (5) respondent had had her parental rights
to another child terminated involuntarily. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (7) and (9) (2001).
The trial court heard the petition on 13 December 2001. In
its order entered 18 January 2002, the trial court made thefollowing findings of fact on the basis of clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence:
3. That the juvenile in this case was placed in the
custody of the Mecklenburg County [DSS] on February
3, 2000 and adjudicated an abused, neglected and
dependent juvenile on April 5, 2000.
4. That at the time the juvenile was placed in the
custody of [DSS], she, along with a younger
sibling, resided with the mother along with the
mother's domestic partner in an environment where
there was domestic violence.
* * * *
7. That after DSS became involved in Gaston County,
respondent mother relocated to Mecklenburg County
along with Mr. Hicklin . . . . The case was
thereafter transferred to Mecklenburg County and
DSS in Mecklenburg began to provide services for
the mother and the children. The respondent mother
failed to cooperate with the requirements of the
Department and this juvenile, along with a younger
sibling, were eventually removed from the home due
to the home environment and the mother's failure to
comply with the requests of the Department.
8. That prior to relocating to Mecklenburg County,
respondent mother had left the juveniles with a
relative, Princess Smith, on or about July 2, 1999
and did not reappear until October of the same year.
9. That during her absence, respondent mother did not
contact the relative or inquire as to the welfare
of the juveniles.
10. That the relative . . . observed scars and bruises
on the juvenile's legs and buttocks. In addition,
the relative observed that the vagina area of the
juvenile was swollen to the size of the relative's
fist.
* * * *
14. That respondent mother reappeared in October, 1999
and asked for the juvenile to be returned to her
care, however, due to the mother's living condition
and the concerns of the relatives, she refused. The
mother admitted she had used controlled substancesand was dancing as a stripper during her absence.
15. That some time in November 1999, the juvenile[]s
were returned to the mother's care . . . . It was
not long thereafter that the mother relocated to
Mecklenburg County . . . .
16. That a Petition was filed to remove the juveniles
from the environment. A case plan was developed by
DSS which included the following: the mother was to
obtain an assessment at the McLeod Center and
follow their recommendations, obtain a
psychological evaluation; participate in domestic
violence counseling; and the mother was to visit on
a regular and consistent basis . . . .
17. That the mother failed to fully comply with the
recommendation of [DSS]. She stopped attending
visits in July 2000 and her whereabouts,
thereafter, became unknown. There was no contact
for a significant period of time and her visits
were, thereafter suspended.
18. That the mother reappeared in December, 2000 after
the Termination Petition on the younger sibling had
been filed. . . .
19. That respondent mother began domestic violence
counseling but failed to follow through and
complete the program.
20. That respondent mother has not maintained
consistent and steady employment. She was employed
for a period of time, but quit the job offering no
credible testimony for why she quit. . . .
* * * *
28. That it has cost $10,350 to maintain the juvenile
in foster care and against that amount, respondent
mother has contributed no money to defray the cost
of foster care placement.
* * * *
32. That parental rights to a younger sibling, Areanna
Graham, were involuntarily terminated on May 24,
2001. The findings of that Order are incorporated
herein by reference as though more fully set forth
in this Order.
The trial court then concluded that each of the grounds for
terminating respondent's parental rights alleged by DSS existed, as
follows:
7. That respondent mother has neglected the above-
named juvenile as that term is defined by NCGS §7B-
101(15) and that she has failed to provide proper
care, supervision and discipline for the juvenile
. . . .
* * * *
9. That the juvenile has been placed in the custody of
the Mecklenburg County Department of Social
Services and respondent mother for a continuous
period of more than six months next preceding the
filing of this petition has willfully failed for
such period to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of care for aforesaid juvenile although physically
and financially able to do so.
10. That respondent mother has willfully left the
juvenile in foster care for more than twelve months
without showing to the satisfaction of the court
that reasonable progress under the circumstances
has been made within twelve months in correcting
those conditions which [led] to the removal of the
juvenile.
11. That respondent mother has willfully abandoned the
juvenile for at least six consecutive months
immediately preceding the filing of this Petition
. . . .
12. The Court further concludes that respondent mother
was able to do the things necessary to move the
case along, but failed to do so and only at the end
of the period did the mother begin to make any
progress towards achieving the case plan
objectives. She still failed to fully comply with
the case plan requirements.
13. That parental rights to a younger sibling were
involuntarily terminated in May 2001.
14. That the best interests of the above-named juvenile
would be served by the termination of parental
rights of respondent with respect to this juvenile.
On the basis of these and other conclusions of law, the trial court
terminated respondent's parental rights. From the trial court's
order, respondent appeals.
Respondent contends the trial court erred by concluding that
she had willfully abandoned Rakala for six months, see N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2001), and that she had willfully failed to
pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Rakala's care, see N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). She has not challenged the trial
court's conclusions as to the three remaining grounds for
terminating her parental rights. Her arguments are not persuasive.
This Court's “scope of review on appeal is confined to a
consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record
on appeal,” N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) (2003), and which are properly
presented and discussed in the appellant's brief. See N.C.R. App.
P. 28(a) (2003). A finding of any one of the grounds for
termination of parental rights found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a) is sufficient to support termination. In re Faircloth, ___
N.C. App. ___, ___, 571 S.E.2d 65, 73 (2002). While respondent
does address two of the trial court's grounds for terminating her
parental rights (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) and (7)), she did
not present any arguments as to the trial court's three additional
grounds for termination (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and
(9)). As a result of respondent's failure to assign error and
present arguments as to those additional grounds for termination,
those grounds are not within this Court's scope of review.
Faircloth, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 571 S.E.2d at 73. Because any oneof the three additional grounds is sufficient to support the trial
court's decision to terminate respondent's parental rights,
respondent's arguments as to only two of the five grounds are
ineffectual.
In her remaining argument, respondent contends the trial court
did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion
that termination was in the best interests of the child. Because
respondent has not specifically assigned error to any of the trial
court's findings of fact, those findings are conclusive on appeal.
In re Caldwell, 75 N.C. App. 299, 301, 330 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1985).
Having reviewed the trial court's extensive findings of fact, we
hold those findings of fact do support the trial court's conclusion
that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best
interests of the child. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536
S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied,
353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001). We therefore affirm the trial
court's order terminating respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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