STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
New Hanover County
No. 01 CRS 50136
RANDALL HAYDEN HUGHES 01 CRS 50137
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Edwin W. Welch, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Charlesena Elliott
Walker, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Defendant, Randall Hayden Hughes, appeals two convictions of
first-degree murder. He asserts three assignments of error. For
the reasons discussed herein, we find no error.
The State's evidence tended to show that defendant lived in
Carolina Beach with four roommates, Colleen Wilder, Ronald
Mitchell, Daniel Nalley and Joan Hubbard. Wilder and Mitchell
shared one upstairs bedroom. Defendant had the other upstairs
bedroom. Hubbard slept on the downstairs couch. Nalley slept onthe floor downstairs.
On 1 January 2001, Hubbard came home at about 6:00 a.m. She
saw Nalley lying on the floor next to the couch and Mitchell lying
on the loveseat. There was a mess in the living room and kitchen;
the phone was smashed, there was glass in front of the
entertainment center, and a silver tray normally on the kitchen
counter was knocked off. Hubbard assumed it was the result of a
New Year's celebration and that Nalley and Mitchell in their prone
positions were now sleeping off the effects of alcohol consumed the
night before. She cleaned up, noticing a small bullet casing near
a bar stool. She then fell asleep on the floor.
Wilder returned home at about 9:00 a.m. on 1 January 2001 and
went directly upstairs to bed. Later that morning, Nalley's boss
called the house and Wilder answered the phone. The boss wanted
Nalley to come to work. Wilder went downstairs to give him the
message. She realized that he and Mitchell were dead. Wilder and
Hubbard called the police. The police found the victims in the
living room. Mitchell was in a loveseat. Nalley was on the floor.
Bullet holes were found in the loveseat and the floor. There was
no indication that either victim had fired a weapon.
A few hours later, Detective Jon Knoll interviewed defendant,
who told Knoll that he had been out at bars all night, and that he
used to own a gun but that he had sold it. At the time of theinterview, defendant did not seem to be drunk or hung over.
Defendant was then interviewed by Police Chief William Still.
Defendant told Still that he had no idea who had killed Mitchell
and Nalley.
After the interview, Still and defendant returned to the
apartment to do a walk-through. Still did not observe any cuts or
abrasions on defendant which would indicate that he had been in a
fight. Still and defendant were unable to locate the murder weapon
anywhere in the apartment.
Upon later examination, Mitchell and Nalley each were found to
have six bullet wounds. Each of them had at least one bullet
directly through the heart. The police recovered one bullet casing
upstairs in defendant's bedroom, and located the projectile from
this casing downstairs in one of the kitchen cabinets.
Chief Still noted that the living room couch had bullets in
it, and he testified that it appeared the shooter was moving as he
discharged the firearm, because the bullets entered the couch at
different angles.
On 4 January 2001, defendant came to the police station
voluntarily and was read his Miranda rights. During his interview,
he said that he and the victims had issues with money and he
admitted that he had shot both Mitchell and Nalley.
Defendant's evidence tended to show that he had moved to NorthCarolina from New York in February 2000. When he moved, he was
just getting through a divorce, and acknowledged that he had a
drinking problem. He met Mitchell in June or July 2000 and Nalley
in November 2000. Defendant and Mitchell were trying to start a
construction business. Nalley occasionally worked with them.
On 31 December 2000, defendant and Mitchell worked together
all day. After work, defendant came home and got cleaned up, and
then headed out around 6:30 p.m. First he ran some errands and
then he went to see his girlfriend, Trish Hernandez, at the Silver
Dollar, a bar where she worked. Defendant then visited several
bars but eventually returned to the Silver Dollar. Once there, he
kept falling asleep at the bar. Hernandez finally asked him to
leave.
Sometime between midnight and 1:30 a.m., defendant went home,
having consumed between five and fifteen beers, as well as four or
five shots of liquor. As defendant approached the house, he heard
Mitchell and Nalley arguing loudly. When he walked in, they were
pushing each other. Defendant tried to separate them. Mitchell
and Nalley turned on defendant. Nalley shoved him into the
entertainment center, shattering the glass, and Mitchell punched
him in the chin, which caused him to hit a chair. The collision
with the chair aggravated a pre-existing back injury which
defendant had sustained at work a few months before. Defendant became afraid of Mitchell, and ran upstairs to his
bedroom to try and get away from him. Mitchell, a larger, stronger
man than defendant, followed. Defendant went straight to his
closet to get his gun, and by the time he turned around Mitchell
was so close that they were almost touching. Defendant did not
plan to shoot Mitchell, but he thought that the sight of the gun
would cause him to back off. Defendant did not remember pulling
the trigger, but somehow the gun went off and shot through the
floor. Mitchell ran downstairs.
Defendant decided to take his gun and get out of the house, so
he went back downstairs. When he reached the living room, Mitchell
stood up from the loveseat and started across the room, threatening
him. Defendant fired the gun at him several times. Mitchell fell
back across the loveseat. Then, Nalley advanced on defendant from
his left side. Defendant fired at him, and kept shooting until the
gun was empty.
Defendant did not stop to check if Mitchell and Nalley were
alive. Instead, he went outside, threw the gun into the lake
behind the apartment, and went back to the Silver Dollar. While
there, he helped Hernandez and the bar's owner, Jetty Gray, move
some boxes. Gray testified that defendant did not seem drunk at
the time.
Defendant and Hernandez went to the store and then went toHernandez's house for breakfast. At some point the next morning,
he called home to see if the shooting had all been a bad dream.
In his first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court committed prejudicial error by sustaining the State's
objection to evidence regarding his reputation for honesty and
being a law-abiding citizen. We disagree.
A criminal defendant is always permitted to offer character
evidence as substantive evidence of his guilt or innocence. State
v. Williams, 299 N.C. 652, 263 S.E.2d 774 (1980). The most common
method of proving character is by general reputation in the
community. State v. Floyd, 56 N.C. App. 459, 289 S.E.2d 139
(1982).
In the instant case, defendant's girlfriend, Trisha Hernandez,
was asked “Do you know what [defendant's] reputation was in the
community of Carolina Beach for honesty and being a law abiding
citizen at that time?” The prosecution objected to this question.
Although no basis for the objection was given at trial, the State
argues that the question was objectionable because it was a
compound question and because the defense had not laid a proper
foundation for the admission of reputation evidence.
Compound questions are objectionable because they are
ambiguous. State v. Pearson, 59 N.C. App. 87, 295 S.E.2d 499
(1982), rev. denied, 307 N.C. 472, 299 S.E.2d 227 (1983); State v.Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306 (1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995), superseded by statute on other
grounds by State v. Price, 337 N.C. 756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021, 131 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1995).
Reputation is “eminently a matter of hearsay based upon what
the witness has heard or learned, not as to any particular acts,
but as to the general opinion or standing in the community.”
Brandis, North Carolina Evidence § 86 (5th ed. 2001) (citing State
v. Kiziah, 217 N.C. 399, 8 S.E.2d 474 (1940)). “[B]efore a witness
may testify as to another witness's reputation, a foundation must
be laid showing that the testifying witness has sufficient contact
with the community to enable him to be qualified as knowing the
general reputation of the person in question.” State v. Morrison,
84 N.C. App. 41, 47-48, 351 S.E.2d 810, 814, cert. denied, 319 N.C.
408, 354 S.E.2d 724 (1987).
In the instant case, the only foundation laid by defendant was
that Hernandez had known defendant “pretty well” for approximately
one year. There was no showing that Hernandez was familiar with an
appreciable group of people in Carolina Beach who had an adequate
basis upon which to form opinions of defendant's reputation.
Moreover, after the objection, the defense did not make an
offer of proof to the trial court. “Absent such an offer of proof,
coupled with the failure to lay a proper foundation for theintroduction of the [evidence], there was no showing of relevance.
Evidence not relevant is not admissible. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 402
[(2001)].” State v. Solomon, 340 N.C. 212, 217, 456 S.E.2d 778,
782, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 996, 133 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1995).
Further, even if there were error, it is not prejudicial due to the
amount of evidence against defendant, including his own admission.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2001). This assignment of error
is therefore without merit.
In his second assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court committed prejudicial error by denying his motion to dismiss
because of insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the only issue for the
trial court is whether there is substantial evidence of each
essential element of the charged offense and of the defendant being
the perpetrator. State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d
920, 925 (1996). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995).
The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable
inference from that evidence. State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 274,
464 S.E.2d 448, 463 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed.
2d 1080 (1996). Contradictions and discrepancies in the evidenceare resolved in favor of the State. State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142,
150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 199 (1995).
The elements of first-degree murder are: (1) the unlawful
killing of another human being; (2) with malice; and (3) with
premeditation and deliberation. State v. Haynesworth, 146 N.C.
App. 523, 553 S.E.2d 103 (2001). As to the first element,
defendant confessed that he shot and killed Mitchell and Nalley.
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to prove the
remaining two elements.
Malice is defined as the condition of mind that prompts a
person to take the life of another without just cause, excuse or
justification. State v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. 506, 335 S.E.2d
506 (1985), rev. denied, 315 N.C. 593, 341 S.E.2d 33 (1986).
However, malice may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon.
State v. Hedgepeth, 330 N.C. 38, 409 S.E.2d 309 (1991); cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1006, 146 L. Ed. 2d 223 (2000). A gun is a deadly
weapon. State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 277 S.E.2d 515 (1981).
Therefore, malice is presumed in this case.
Premeditation means that the act was thought out beforehand
for some length of time, no matter how short. State v. Small, 328
N.C. 175, 400 S.E.2d 413 (1991). Deliberation is an intent to
kill, which is carried out in a cool state of blood without legal
provocation and in furtherance of a fixed design. State v.Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981). Circumstances from
which premeditation and deliberation may be inferred include: (1)
lack of provocation on the part of the deceased; (2) the conduct
and statements of the defendant before and after the killing; (3)
threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the
occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased; (4) ill-will
or previous difficulties between the parties; (5) the dealing of
lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered
helpless; (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal
manner; and (7) the nature and number of the victim's wounds.
State v. Keel, 337 N.C. 469, 489, 447 S.E.2d 748, 759 (1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1198, 131 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1995).
In the instant case, the evidence showed that: (a) defendant
followed one of the victims downstairs; (b) defendant fired his gun
once upstairs and then an additional twelve times into the victims'
bodies downstairs; (c) defendant left the scene without calling for
assistance; (d) the victims possessed no weapons at the time of the
shooting; (e) defendant suffered no visible injury prior to the
shootings; (f) defendant shot each victim six times into vital
areas of their bodies; and (g) neither victim had injuries to their
hands, indicating that they were not involved in a fight prior to
the shootings. We hold that this constitutes substantial evidence
of premeditation and deliberation to survive a motion to dismiss. This assignment of error is without merit.
In his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court committed plain error in not dismissing the first-
degree murder charge where the short-form murder indictment was
used. Defendant acknowledges that this Court has repeatedly held
that the short-form murder indictment is sufficient to indict on
any theory of murder. See State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 531
S.E.2d 428 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L. Ed. 2d 797
(2001). This assignment of error is therefore without merit.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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