IN RE: Cumberland County
GILEAH MASON, No. 01 J 369
A Juvenile
John F. Campbell for petitioner-appellee, Cumberland County
Department of Social Services.
Annick Lenoir-Peek for respondent-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Gileah Mason was born on 20 October 1999. Respondent is the
child's father. Gileah was placed in the custody of the Cumberland
County Department of Social Services (DSS) on 25 August 2000 and
adjudicated a dependent juvenile on 21 November 2000.
On 3 July 2001, a petition to terminate parental rights was
filed by DSS alleging that respondent had neglected Gileah within
the meaning of G.S. 7B-101(15), and had failed to pay a reasonable
portion of the cost of child care for her in the six months
preceding the filing of the petition. On 28 December 2001, nunc
pro tunc 14 November 2001, the trial court determined that grounds
existed to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial courtbased its determination on its finding that respondent had failed
to complete a parenting assessment, to complete a RESOLVE Program,
and to follow through with all individual psychological
evaluations. Additionally, the trial court found that respondent
had failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for
Gileah although physically and financially able to do so.
Respondent stipulated that the allegations in the petition to
terminate his parental rights were true and that grounds existed
for the termination of his parental rights. The court withheld
making a best interest determination regarding respondent and
continued disposition for ninety days.
On 4 April 2002, nunc pro tunc 18 February 2002, the trial
court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child that
respondent's parental rights be terminated. The trial court found
that respondent's efforts were “very last minute” and it would be
unfair to the minor child for her to continue in the custody of
DSS. Accordingly, respondent's parental rights were terminated.
Respondent appeals.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by concluding it
was in Gileah's best interests to terminate his parental rights.
Respondent contends that although grounds existed to terminate his
parental rights at the 14 November 2001 hearing, conditions had
changed by 18 February 2002. Respondent contends that he had
substantially complied with the demands presented to him in order
to regain custody of Gileah, and thus argues that the evidence does
not support a finding that it was in Gileah's best interests toterminate his parental rights. Respondent additionally argues the
trial court erred by finding that his efforts to regain custody
were “very last minute” and that he had ample time to complete the
items necessary to show his ability to care for the minor child.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. Section 7B-1111 of the General Statutes
sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A
finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is
sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App.
57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning
for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental
rights exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614
(1997); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(b) (2001).
In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that
respondent had neglected Gileah within the meaning of G.S. 7B-
101(15). The trial court based its conclusion and findings on
evidence that respondent had failed to complete a parenting
assessment, failed to complete a RESOLVE Program, and did not
follow through on recommendations from his psychological
evaluation. The trial court also found that respondent had failed
to pay any child support. Respondent did not contest the
allegations, and stipulated that grounds existed at the 14 November
2001 hearing to support termination of his parental rights.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was clear, cogent and
convincing evidence to support the trial court's findings thatrespondent had neglected Gileah and failed to pay any child support
although financially and physically able to do so.
Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to terminate
parental rights, “the court shall issue an order terminating the
parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless
the court shall further determine that the best interests of the
juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be
terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1110(a) (2001). The trial court's
decision to terminate parental rights at the disposition stage is
discretionary. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d
246, 252 (1984).
Here, the trial court concluded that it was in the best
interests of the child that respondent's parental rights be
terminated. The trial court found that Gileah had been in the
custody and control of DSS for a substantial period of time, and
that it was unfair to her for these conditions to continue. We
note that at the time of the hearing, Gileah was just over two
years old and had spent eighteen months of her life in the custody
of her foster parents, who sought to adopt her. Furthermore, the
trial court found that respondent's efforts “were at the very last
minute.” The trial court based this finding on the fact that
respondent's sole child support payment was made just four days
prior to the hearing. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the
child's best interests. Accordingly, the order terminating
respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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