NO. COA02-1304

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

         v.                        Harnett County
                                Nos. 00CRS3396, 4223,
JEFFERY RAY PLUMMER                        7814, 50840, 53549,
                                    01CRS50862

    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 14 March 2002 by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr. in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 June 2003.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Ann Reed, for the State.

    Paul Pooley for defendant-appellant.

    TYSON, Judge.

    
    Jeffrey Ray Plummer (“defendant”) was charged with common law robbery (2 counts), possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, delivery of cocaine, sale of cocaine, breaking and entering (2 counts), larceny, and possession of a controlled substance on jail premises. Defendant entered an Alford plea to the common law robbery charges on 10 December 2001, and the State prayed judgment. Defendant also entered an Alford plea as to the remaining charges on 14 March 2002. These charges were consolidated for judgment and the trial court sentenced defendant as a prior record level IV offender to a presumptive term of 20-24months imprisonment. After the State prayed judgment on the robbery cases, the court sentenced defendant, again as a prior record level IV offender, to a consecutive, presumptive term of 20- 24 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

    Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that he had rendered substantial assistance under N.C.G.S. 90- 95(h)(5) (2001) and in considering the same when imposing sentence.
    While defendant argues to the contrary, we conclude that a defendant, who enters Alford pleas of guilty to all of the charges against him, is not entitled to raise this argument on appeal.
    G.S. 15A-1444(a1) and (a2) limit those issues that may be raised on appeal in this case. The statute provides,
        (a1) A defendant who has . . . entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a felony, is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether his or her sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing only if the minimum sentence of imprisonment does not fall within the presumptive range for the defendant's prior record or conviction level and class of offense. . . .

        (a2) A defendant who has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a felony or misdemeanor in superior court is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether the sentence imposed:

            (1) Results from an incorrect finding of the defendant's prior record level under G.S. 15A-1340.14 or the defendant's prior conviction level under G.S. 15A-1340.21;

            (2) Contains a type of sentence disposition that is not authorized byG.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant's class of offense and prior record or conviction level; or

            (3) Contains a term of imprisonment that is for a duration not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant's class of offense and prior record or conviction level.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a1),(a2)(2001).
    The issue presented is not reviewable under either subsection (a1) or (a2). The statutory provisions referenced by defendant in support of his argument that this issue is cognizable on direct appeal-- G.S. 15A-1442(6) and -1446(d)(18), are inapplicable. Defendant was not entitled to consideration of whether he had rendered substantial assistance under G.S. 90-95(h), as he was not convicted of a drug trafficking offense. Defendant was sentenced within the presumptive range of sentences under G.S. 15A-1340.17. The trial court was not required to make any findings, mitigating or aggravating, in sentencing defendant. State v. Rich, 132 N.C. App. 440, 453, 512 S.E.2d 441, 450 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 386, 527 S.E.2d 299 (2000).
    Defendant has failed to bring forward his remaining assignments of error. They are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Defendant's request that his failed appeal be treated as a petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Defendant did not lose his right to appeal by failing to take timely action, did not seek review of an interlocutory order, and did not seek review of an order denying his motion for appropriate relief under Appellate Rule 21 (a)(1). This Court is without authority to issue thediscretionary writ of certiorari in this instance. See State v. Dickson, 151 N.C. App. 136, 564 S.E.2d 640 (2002) (providing that although G.S. 15A-1444(e) does suggest that the defendant, who pleads guilty or no contest and who is sentenced in the presumptive range of sentences, may petition this Court for review of additional matters by writ of certiorari, this Court is limited by the provisions of N.C.R. App. P. 21 (a)(1) in issuing the discretionary writ).

    This appeal is dismissed. Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
    Appeal Dismissed.
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari is Denied.
    Judges WYNN and STEELMAN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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