An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced
ure.
NO. COA02-1351
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2003
NICHOLAS E. RUSSELL and wife,
MARGIE GIBBS RUSSELL; and
JON D. RUSSELL,
Plaintiffs,
v
.
Rutherford County
No. 00 CvS 935
MARION B. THORNTON and wife,
BETTY L. THORNTON,
Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 17 April 2002 by
Judge Loto Greenlee Caviness in Rutherford County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 June 2003.
McElwee Firm, PLLC, by John M. Logsdon, for plaintiff
appellants.
Atkins & Craven, by Lee Atkins and Susan S. Craven, for
defendant appellees.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
This case involves a land boundary dispute, the pertinent
facts of which are as follows: Plaintiffs and defendants own
contiguous lots at Lake Lure in Rutherford County, North Carolina.
The lots are long and narrow, with a straight line running down a
steep hill to the water's edge as their common boundary. In 1954,
Mr. and Mrs. Walter Lambeth conveyed a tract of land lying on the
eastern shore of Lake Lure to Mr. and Mrs. Harry Caplan and Mr. and
Mrs. Robert Liebowitz. This tract was divided into lots and was
denoted the Henry Allan Rose Tract in Plat Book 5, page 126 ofthe Rutherford County Registry. In 1960, Mr. and Mrs. Lonnie Hall
purchased adjoining Lots 10 and 11 in the Henry Allan Rose
subdivision. The plat of the subdivision was recorded in the
Rutherford County Registry on 16 June 1954. On the plat, each lot
had 100 feet along the Lake Lure shoreline. Title to Lots 10 and
11 was taken in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Hall, but it was their
intention to later subdivide the two lots into four lots and deed
three of the parcels to friends.
Mr. Joe Wells was employed as a surveyor and was hired by Mr.
Hall to divide each of the two lots equally. At that time, the
land was in a natural state and had no construction upon it. When
Mr. Wells performed his survey, he marked the division lines on the
ground and used existing iron pins at the top of the hill. When he
finished, all of the corners were marked with pins, some of which
were installed by Mr. Wells. Mr. Wells drew a plat of his survey
on 22 October 1960. The survey showed that the two halves of Lot
10 were designated Lots 1 and 2, while the two halves of Lot 11
were designated Lots 3 and 4. On 18 January 1961, Mr. and Mrs.
Hall transferred Lot 1 to Mr. and Mrs. Burgin Levi, Lot 2 to Mr.
and Mrs. J.C. Culbreth, Lot 3 to Mr. and Mrs. Harvey Gosnell, and
retained Lot 4 for themselves. The description of the lot conveyed
in each deed was identical to the description on Mr. Wells' plat
and included a metes and bounds description which corresponded with
the calls on Mr. Wells' survey. Shortly after the division
occurred, the four couples built boathouses and retaining walls on
their respective lots. Mr. Hall testified at trial that he and theother landowners agreed to place their boathouses on the extreme
left corner of their respective property lines, using the
surveyor's iron pins as guides.
Lot 1 is currently owned by defendants. Mr. and Mrs. Burgin
Levi conveyed Lot 1 to their daughter, Mrs. Linda Kay Levi Morgan.
Mrs. Morgan had the lot surveyed in February 1998 by Mr. Nathan
Odom in preparation for the sale of the lot to Mr. and Mrs. Richard
Grow. After Mr. Odom completed his survey (the Odom survey), a
plat was prepared. The Grows transferred Lot 1 to defendants by
deed dated 29 June 1999. The description of Lot 1 in the deed was
as follows:
BEGINNING at an iron pin the Southeast corner
of Paul Smith's lot, said iron pin being on
the North margin of Thomns [sic] Knoll Beach
[R]oad, and runs thence with the Smith line
North 52 degrees and 22 minutes West 239.1
feet to an iron pin, near waters edge of Lake
Lure; thence along and near waters edge in a
Southwesterly direction 50 feet to an iron
pin; thence South 59 degrees and 46 minutes
East 233 feet to an iron pin on the north
margin of said Thomns [sic] Knoll Beach
[R]oad; thence along said margin North 78
degrees and 24 minutes East 20 feet to the
BEGINNING, and known as Lot J#1 of the Lonnie
E. Hall, Jr., Subdivision.
This description was nearly identical to the description in the
original deed to Mr. and Mrs. Levi.
Lot 2 is currently owned by plaintiffs. Mr. and Mrs. J.C.
Culbreth conveyed Lot 2 to Mr. and Mrs. Harvey Gosnell by deed on
23 August 1966, so that the Gosnells owned Lots 2 and 3. The
Gosnells hired Mr. Darrell Taylor to survey Lots 2 and 3 in
preparation for the sale of the lots to plaintiffs. Mr. Taylorcompleted his survey (the Taylor survey) and prepared a plat. The
description of lot 2 in the deed to the Gosnells is as follows:
BEGINNING at an iron pin on the North
margin of the Thomns [sic] Knoll Beach Road,
the Southwest corner of Lot One of the Lonnie
E. Hall, Jr. and Harriett F. Hall[,] his wife,
Subdivision, and deeded by them to James
Burgin Levi and Katheleen J. Levi, his wife,
under date of January 18, 1961, with this
deed, and runs thence with the line of said
Levi lot North 59 deg. 46' West 233 feet to an
iron pin at or near the water line of Lake
Lure; thence along and near waters edge in a
Southwesterly direction 50 feet to an iron
pin, the Northeast corner of Lot Three of said
Halls' Subdivision; thence South 68 deg. and
11' East 227.5 feet to an iron pin on the
North margin of Thomns [sic] Knoll Beach Road;
thence along said margin of the road North 78
deg. and 24' East 20 feet to the BEGINNING.
This description was nearly identical to the description in the
original deed to Mr. and Mrs. Culbreth. Additionally, the deed
from the Gosnells to plaintiffs described the lots by incorporating
by reference Mr. Taylor's plat.
Mr. Odom's plat described the dividing line between Lots 1 and
2 as North 59 deg. 54 min. 16 sec. West 237.93 feet. This
description is nearly identical to the dividing line in the
previously mentioned deed descriptions as well as Mr. Wells' plat.
Mr. Taylor's plat described the dividing line between Lots 1 and 2
as South 57 deg. 51 min. 42 sec. East 230.91 feet. This
description differs by approximately two degrees (approximately
twelve feet) from the dividing line in the deed descriptions as
well as Mr. Wells' plat. The dividing line on Mr. Taylor's plat
overlaps the dividing line on Mr. Odom's plat. During the summer of 2000, defendants began construction of a
house on Lot 1 and requested a variance from the zoning ordinance
of the Town of Lake Lure based upon the Odom survey. The Board of
Adjustment for the Town of Lake Lure granted the variance to
defendants based upon the survey. Thereafter, on 14 September
2000, plaintiffs filed a complaint and included actions for
trespass to try title and to quiet title based on marketable record
title, adverse possession, and adverse possession under color of
title. Defendants answered, denied plaintiffs' claims, and
asserted counterclaims to quiet title based on superior record
title, marketable record title, and slander of title. Plaintiffs
filed a reply on 1 December 2000 and denied defendants' right to
recover on their counterclaims.
At trial, the parties presented their evidence and agreed to
consecutively submit two issues to the jury; each issue was
preceded by its own set of instructions. The first issue required
the jury to determine the location of the true boundary line
between plaintiffs' and defendants' land. The jury found that the
line was located where Mr. Odom marked it on his plat. The second
issue required the jury to determine whether plaintiffs established
title to the area shown as lappage on their plat by adverse
possession. Plaintiffs requested an instruction on establishment
of the boundary by acquiescence, but the trial court denied that
request. The jury found that plaintiffs had not established title
to the lappage area by adverse possession. From the final judgment
entered 17 April 2002, plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by (I)
denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV); and (II) refusing to give their requested instruction on
establishment of the boundary by acquiescence. For the reasons
stated herein, we disagree with plaintiffs' arguments and conclude
they received a trial free from error.
Motion for JNOV
By their first assignment of error, plaintiffs contend the
trial court erred in denying their motion for JNOV because they
believe the jury's verdict was contrary to law. Upon review, we
disagree.
Generally, [t]he verdict of the jury upon conflicting
evidence is conclusive on appeal. Braswell v. Purser, 282 N.C.
388, 394, 193 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1972). When the facts are
uncontroverted and the jury returns a verdict contrary to law, it
is error for the trial court to deny a motion for JNOV. Robertson
v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 564-66, 206 S.E.2d 190, 192-94 (1974).
However, [w]here a verdict is supported by the evidence, denial of
the motion to set it aside will not be disturbed. Beal v.
Dellinger, 38 N.C. App. 732, 734, 248 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1978). With
these principles in mind, we turn to the facts before us.
Mr. Wells' survey established the boundary line between
plaintiffs' and defendants' land. The lines of Lots 10 and 11 on
Mr. Wells' survey were identical to the lines depicted on the
original Henry Allan Rose subdivision plat. The key issue in this
case is where the boundary line was located and where Mr. Wells setthe iron pin at the lakeshore end of the property. Mr. Wells
testified that he used iron pins to mark boundaries once he
calculated their locations, and further indicated that his plat
accurately reflected his survey:
Q. Okay. Now, let me ask you this: Is
there a possibility -- let me ask you this
way: Do the pins represent the survey or does
the survey represent the pins? Which is it?
A. [Mr. Wells]: Well, the pins are
installed before we leave the field, and the
map is then made from the fact that those pins
are in a certain location and the map shows
that location with reference to the pins.
* * * *
Q. Let me ask you this: You say the
pins are set in the ground when you're doing
the survey?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you later create the graph,
the map of it?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any way that if the pins
were miss-set and not according to what Mr.
Hall asked you to do, how would you -- would
you be able to discover that when you made
your map if there was a mistake?
A. If there was a mistake when you made
the map, the map wouldn't close.
Q. I beg your pardon?
A. The map would not close.
Q. Is the fact that your map closed
indicative of the fact that the pins in the
ground are where the map says there [sic] are
suppose[d] to be?
A. This map makes reference to ironpins at all corners, and that's one of the
rules that we never violated. We did not
leave a tract without putting in the iron
pins.
Q. Okay. Are you satisfied that your
map accurately reflects the survey that you
actually did on the ground?
A. Yes.
When Mr. Odom prepared his survey, he first had to determine
where Mr. Wells' line was located, and did so using the course and
distance set out in the deed. Mr. Odom first found Lot 10 (which
became Lots 1 and 2 upon its division) by referring to other lots
in the subdivision, and described the process as follows:
So we tied it to those surveys. So based on
these surveys, we also located these
particular corners here and we located the
structures and then after our analysis we came
back and using reference bearings derived from
this survey up here -- these surveys up here,
2, 3, 4, and 5, survey of Lot No. 12 and
survey of Lot No. 13 was surprisingly --
jives. I mean, it matched.
You take a reference bearing from one
side and a reference bearing matched on the
other side. And based on that we took
reference bearings from these two pins down
and when we took the northern line of Ms.
Morgan's property, we found an existing iron
pin that was 6 feet .53 feet from the lake
shore. Then on the other side we took the
same reference bearing down. When I say
reference bearing, it's based on other
surveys, other existing monuments in the area
which all seem to match up very, very well.
We took the deed bearing based on those
references and ran the feet bearing to these
points on the lake. And we found this corner
that existed at the time.
Mr. Odom gave first priority to locating Lot 10's original lines in
the subdivision. This practice is in accordance with the rule that'course and distance must give way to a call for a natural
boundary, and that the line of an adjacent tract, if well known and
established, is a natural boundary.' Trust Co. v. Miller, 243
N.C. 1, 7, 89 S.E.2d 765, 770 (1955) (quoting Lumber Co. v. Hutton,
152 N.C. 537, 540, 68 S.E. 2, 4 (1910)). In every deed in
defendants' chain of title, the northeast corner of their lot was
described as the Southeast corner of [Lot 9] and their northern
boundary runs thence with the [Lot 9] line.
When Mr. Odom gave first priority to Lot 10's original lines,
he acted in accordance with the intent of the four couples, who
wanted to use the original lines of Lot 10 as the outside
boundaries and to have a new common boundary determined in relation
to the original Lot 10 lines when they divided the property among
themselves. The original deed for Lots 10 and 11, purchased by Mr.
and Mrs. Lonnie Hall, described the property as Lots 10 and 11 of
the Henry Allan Rose Subdivision. Mr. Hall stated that he was
present when Mr. Wells surveyed the property. With regard to the
division of the lots, Mr. Hall testified as follows:
Q. Can you remember whether you told
him where to put the pins or did you --
A. I did not tell them anything of
where to put the pins. They put them in
theirselves. [sic]
Q. You told him to just divide it.
A. I did.
Q. Pretty much equal.
A. Right. No. I didn't tell him to
divide it equal. I told him to run theoutside -- outside lines -- the outside lines
of each of the hundred foot lots. And then I
asked him how about splitting those lots in
half.
Q. Okay. So each of the two lots --
A. So we did not come up with a, say,
I'm going to give you 50 feet, or you 40 feet,
or anything of that nature.
Q. Okay. I'm just trying to see how
you did it. So you had the two lots that you
bought --
A. We had three lines. An outside line
on Lot No. 10 and an outside on Lot No. 11,
and one going between 10 and 11.
Q. Forming two lots?
A. Right. Forming two lots.
Q. Did you ask the surveyor to pretty
much divide those two lots equally as much as
he could?
A. Exactly. Just equally. Right.
When Mr. Odom completed his survey, the northern boundary of
defendants' lot was virtually identical to the boundary shown on
both Mr. Wells' plat and the Henry Allan Rose subdivision plat.
Mr. Odom used the course and distance information in the deed
to locate the iron pin set by Mr. Wells near the lakeshore. This
practice was proper because, in determining a boundary, course and
distance govern unless there be in the deed some more certain
description by which one or both may be controlled. The terminus
of a line must be either the distance called for in the deed, or
some permanent monument which will endure for years, the erection
of which was contemporaneous with the execution of the deed. Brown v. Hodges, 232 N.C. 537, 541, 61 S.E.2d 603, 606-07 (1950),
reh'g dismissed, 233 N.C. 617, 65 S.E.2d 144 (1951).
We note that the iron pin described in the deed could
conceivably be deemed a controlling monument. However, it cannot
serve as a controlling monument in this case because the original
iron pin cannot be found. Mr. Odom testified that the area had
changed considerably and that the various iron rods and iron pipes
located near the lake were not original iron pins. While working
on his survey, Mr. Taylor found a solid iron pin set in the seawall
next to the boathouse on defendants' land and used it as part of
his survey work. However, Mr. Wells testified that the solid iron
pin found by Mr. Taylor was not the kind of pin he used when
surveying. Mr. Odom, who worked for Mr. Wells for eleven years,
testified that Mr. Wells invariably used iron pipe[,] rather than
solid iron pins.
Based on the foregoing testimony, it appears the best evidence
of the location of the original iron pin set by Mr. Wells is
contained in his plat. At trial, plaintiffs argued that Mr. Wells'
course and distance stated in the deeds, later relied on by Mr.
Odom, was unreliable because Mr. Wells established the location of
the corners on the lake by measuring fifty feet between each
corner[,] causing a conflict between the distance shown along the
lake (fifty feet for each lot) and the bearings shown on the
dividing lines between the lots. However, Mr. Wells testified
that he measured fifty feet between each corner along the lake
using a series of short lines with individual bearings, rather thana single straight line. Mr. Wells further indicated that his notes
of the actual survey would show bearings and distances adding up to
fifty feet that would result in the map closing in a
mathematically correct manner. Mr. Wells agreed that a single
straight line measurement might not lead to a mathematically
correct result. Mr. Wells' explanation of the fifty feet
measurement was consistent with the Henry Allan Rose subdivision
plat, which showed a crooked line without a bearing following the
shoreline of Lake Lure.
In addition to the aforementioned evidence which showed that
the boundary line existed where the Odom survey depicted it,
defendants also presented evidence which called the Taylor survey
into question. Although plaintiffs placed great emphasis on the
location of the boathouses, Mr. Taylor's survey made no mention of
them. Mr. Odom testified that Mr. Taylor took incorrect
measurements along the lake and misplaced the southern line of Lot
10 of the Henry Allan Rose subdivision. Additionally, the Taylor
survey contained straight line measurements along the lake,
beginning at an iron pin pointed out by Mr. Gosnell, the owner of
Lot 3. Mr. Taylor then located his corners at similar solid iron
pins he found at approximately fifty-foot distances. Mr. Odom also
pointed out that straight line measurements resulted in a lake line
that was considerably shorter than fifty or one hundred feet. Mr.
Odom testified that Mr. Taylor's reliance on the lakeshore
measurements was suspect because it was difficult to measure due to
the steep embankment and the shoreline itself was in a constantstate of flux. Finally, Mr. Odom testified that the Taylor survey
did not correctly locate the dividing line between Lots 10 and 11,
as there was a two-degree difference between his survey and the
surveys performed by everyone else.
The crux of plaintiffs' argument is that the four couples who
obtained Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 constructed boathouses and retaining
walls immediately after the Wells survey was complete, when the
original iron pins and marked line were visible. They maintain
that the boathouses are monuments reflecting the location of the
boundary line, and that the jury erroneously accepted the testimony
of Mr. Odom, who established the lines based on bearings and
distances in the deeds, rather than the boathouses and retaining
walls (which were built on the lines marked at the time of the
original survey). We cannot agree.
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the Taylor
survey's location of the boundary line was based on a marked
line. Plaintiffs argued that the boathouses were monuments of the
original markers of Mr. Wells' line and that the Taylor survey was
based on the location of the boathouses (indicated by the retaining
walls). Mr. Wells testified that he routinely placed stakes in the
ground and hack[ed] the sides of standing trees to mark lines
when he conducted surveys. However, no evidence of such marks on
any of the lots was introduced at trial. The uncontroverted
testimony indicated that the boathouses were built after the Wells
survey was completed. The parties put on contradicting evidence as
to the exact location of the boathouses. While plaintiffsmaintained the structures were built on the marked line, defendants
argued that Mr. Wells' iron pins were set up on the bank, rather
than on the water's edge. The boathouses themselves were built at
the lake's edge and extended out into the water. Finally,
defendants pointed out that Mr. Hall himself stated he built his
boathouse within a foot or so of where he believed the boundary
line to be, to [make] sure it was on my property.
In sum, defendants presented evidence which indicated that the
Odom survey matched the Wells survey, which in turn was based upon
the deed descriptions of the lots in question. Defendants also
presented evidence which indicated that the Taylor survey relied
upon by plaintiffs contained incorrect measurements and was based,
at least in part, upon the location of the boathouses, which
themselves were not constructed until after the Wells survey.
Defendants also pointed out a number of errors they believe Mr.
Taylor committed in his survey, including reliance on iron pins
which were in irregular locations, straight line measurements along
the shoreline, and the difficulty in measuring the shoreline
because of the steep embankment. The jury considered the foregoing
evidence, placed greater weight on the evidence presented by
defendants, and found in their favor. It appears from the record
that the jury properly performed its function and returned a
verdict supported by the evidence; thus, the trial court did not
err in denying plaintiffs' motion for JNOV. Plaintiffs' first
assignment of error is overruled.
Jury Instruction
By their second assignment of error, plaintiffs contend the
trial court erred in denying their request to instruct the jury on
the establishment of boundaries by acquiescence. Again, we
disagree.
At the charge conference, plaintiffs requested the following
jury instruction:
[W]here adjoining landowners occupy their
respective lands up to a certain line that
they mutually recognize and acquiesce in as
the boundary line for a long period of time,
the landowners and their successors are
precluded from claiming that the acquiesced
boundary line is not the true one.
The trial court refused to give the instruction. Plaintiffs'
requested instruction was taken from
Webster's Real Estate Law in
North Carolina, § 14-23, Boundaries by Acquiescence, p. 674 (5th
ed. 1999).
The aforementioned instruction was prefaced in
Webster's by
the caveat no North Carolina cases specifically address
acquiescence[.] Under the case law of this State, boundaries
which are uncertain and controverted may be established based on a
line mutually recognized and acquiesced in over a long period of
time. Plaintiffs contend that the disputed boundary line in this
case cannot be located with certainty based solely on the deed
descriptions and the Wells plat because the lots (as described on
the deeds and the Wells plat) were incorrectly described.
Plaintiffs therefore believe they were entitled to an instruction
that boundaries can be established based on a line which the
adjoining landowners recognized and acquiesced in as the boundaryline over a long period of time. Plaintiffs argue that [t]he
construction of the boathouses and retaining walls at the southwest
corner of each lot, in accordance with the agreement of the four
original lot owners, and the recognition of the boundary lines for
forty years is such acquiescence in the location of the boundary as
should have been considered by the jury in this case.
We first note that plaintiffs did not request a separate issue
on establishment of the boundary by acquiescence, but instead made
their request in conjunction with the adverse possession issue that
was submitted to the jury. Plaintiffs first mentioned establishment
of the boundary by acquiescence during the charge conference,
thereby precluding defendants from addressing acquiescence before
or during the trial. Acquiescence was not mentioned in the
pleadings, in the pretrial conference, during the charge conference
on the issues to be submitted to the jury, or during the charge
conference on the first issue to be submitted to the jury.
Recognizing that (1) defendants had no notice that the case was
being tried on the theory of acquiescence, and (2) that the request
for the instruction was a request to expand current North Carolina
law, the trial court refused to give the instruction. We discern
no error in this decision.
The theory of acquiescence is completely independent from deed
descriptions. Prior case law indicates that acquiescence is
competent to determine the location of marks of the original
survey,
see McNeill v. Massey, 10 N.C. 91 (1824), and to determine
the location of a line described in a deed where the location ofthe line is uncertain.
See Kirkpatrick v. McCracken, 161 N.C. 198,
76 S.E. 821 (1912);
Boddie v. Bond, 158 N.C. 204, 73 S.E. 988
(1912); and
Hanstein v. Ferrall, 149 N.C. 240, 62 S.E. 1070 (1908).
However, evidence of acquiescence is not admissible to establish a
line not described in the deed.
See Davidson v. Arledge, 97 N.C.
172, 2 S.E. 378 (1887).
In
Andrews v. Andrews, 252 N.C. 97, 113 S.E.2d 47 (1960), our
Supreme Court stated:
A multitude of jurisdictions hold that an
uncertain and disputed boundary line may,
under certain circumstances, be fixed
permanently by parol agreement, if accompanied
by sufficient acquiescence and possession, but
where there is no
uncertainty as to the
boundary line, a parol agreement fixing a
boundary line in disregard of those fixed by
the deeds is void under the Statute of Frauds,
as it amounts to a conveyance of land by
parol. This general rule of law invoked by
respondent is not applicable to the facts
here, and it is not necessary for us to decide
as to whether or not it is in conflict with
some of our decisions, for the reason that
here there is no uncertainty as to what the
true boundary line is, and its true location
on the premises can be fixed by the deeds and
a survey.
Id. at 102, 113 S.E.2d at 51 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). The
Andrews Court further indicated that, where a
boundary line is certain, adjoining landowners cannot change its
location by parol agreement alone. We believe that adoption of the
theory of acquiescence would create additional uncertainty as to
the location of boundary lines and would make deed descriptions
unreliable.
In any event, the true location of the boundary line in thiscase is certain based on the deeds and a survey; therefore,
acquiescence is not applicable to the facts before us.
See
Andrews, 252 N.C. at 102, 113 S.E.2d at 51. Moreover, even if the
boundary line was not certain, plaintiffs were still not entitled
to an instruction on acquiescence because they did not present
sufficient evidence of a marked line -- a necessary element of the
theory. The line depicted in the Taylor survey had no physical
markings; Mr. Taylor drew his boundary line based on iron pins he
found at either end of the lot. Without a marked line, the
adjoining landowner has no notice that someone else is laying claim
to his land. Finally, defendants' predecessors did nothing to
recognize the line proposed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were not
entitled to an instruction on the theory of acquiescence based on
these facts. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Upon careful review of the record, the transcript, the
exhibits, and the arguments presented by the parties, we believe
the trial court properly denied plaintiffs' motion for JNOV and
properly declined to give plaintiffs' proposed instruction on
acquiescence. Accordingly, we conclude plaintiffs received a trial
free from error.
No error.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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