CAROLINA TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Plaintiff
v
.
Pender County
No. 01 CVS 00774
INDUSTRIAL POWER &
LIGHTING, INC.,
Defendant
DurretteBradshaw P.L.C., by Douglas Scott and John C. Warley,
for plaintiff-appellant.
Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., by Steven
C. Lawrence, for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company (CT&T) appeals the
trial court's granting of a summary judgment motion by Industrial
Power & Lighting, Inc. (IPL) on CT&T's claim for damages to
underground utilities. Because the trial court prematurely granted
summary judgment despite the existence of genuine issues of
material fact, we reverse.
On or about 3 October 1998, an automobile accident damaged a
telephone pole located along Honeycutt Road on the Fort Bragg
Military Reservation (Ft. Bragg). Although the pole had not
fallen, it was continuing to crack and presented the risk thatpower lines would fall across Honeycutt Road. Larry R. Horrell
(Horrell), president of IPL, was notified of the accident by the
maintenance supervisor at Ft. Bragg and immediately responded.
Horrell participated in replacing the pole immediately adjacent to
the damaged pole and personally operated the auger, an instrument
used to dig the hole for the replacement pole. Horrell admitted
the auger damaged what appeared to be one wire within an
underground conduit, but he also stated CT&T's workers arrived
after his use of the auger and damaged a substantial portion of
underground cable with a backhoe.
On 26 September 2001, CT&T filed suit against IPL seeking
monetary damages in the amount of $31,071.73 for damage to their
underground utilities, asserting IPL was negligent and had violated
provisions of the Underground Damage Prevention Act (the UDPA).
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 87-100 to -114. IPL answered, asserting the
exceptions provided in the UDPA in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-106 barred
recovery. Thereafter, IPL moved for summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. In support
of their summary judgment motion, IPL submitted Horrell's
affidavit, which stated in part that all repair work was done with
appropriate and reasonable care. In opposition, CT&T submitted an
affidavit by Gregory Spejcher, a network engineer, which addressed
the placement of the new pole and proposed an alternative which
could avoid the danger presented by power lines dropping across a
major roadway. The motion was granted by the trial court on 15
July 2002. CT&T appeals. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c)
(2001). The rule is designed to permit penetration of an
unfounded claim or defense in advance of trial and to allow summary
disposition for either party when a fatal weakness in the claim or
defense is exposed. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218
S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975). The party moving for summary judgment has
the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Dixie Chemical Corp. v. Edwards, 68 N.C. App. 714,
715, 315 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1984). When considering a motion for
summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Dalton v. Camp,
353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001).
The UDPA guidelines specifically address when excavation is
necessary in the vicinity of a utility company's underground cable
lines. Lexington Telephone Co. v. Davidson Water, Inc., 122 N.C.
App. 177, 179, 468 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1996).
Utility companies normally lay their
individual cables in substantially the same
location as those of other utility companies.
For a utility to undertake excavations, it
must know the position of other cables or
lines in an area. The Act outlines the
framework that should be followed prior to
excavating in an area where underground
utility lines are present.
Id. Absent an applicable exception, before commencing any excavations in highways,
public spaces or in private easements of a
utility owner, a person planning to excavate
shall notify each utility owner having
underground utilities located in the proposed
area to be excavated . . . not less than two .
. . working days prior to starting, of his
intent to excavate.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-102(a) (2001). North Carolina General Statute
§ 87-106 (2001) exempts certain excavations from notice. The
following exceptions are relevant to the case at bar:
(3) The replacement of a pole as long as the
replacement pole is within three feet of the
original pole and within the line of existing
poles. This exception shall not apply to
poles at highway intersections or at the
crossings of highways and permanently marked
transmission underground utilities.
(4) In the case of an emergency involving
danger to life, health, or property requiring
immediate correction, or in order to continue
the operation of a major industrial plant, or
in order to assure the continuity of utility
services, excavations immediately required to
repair or maintain the needed service may be
made, without using explosives, if notice is
given to the utility owner or association as
soon as is reasonably possible . . . .
Performance of emergency excavation shall not
relieve the excavator of liability for
damages.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-106. We examine the affidavits presented to
the trial court to determine whether genuine issues of material
fact are presented concerning the applicability of these
exceptions.
Since it is uncontested IPL was replacing an existing pole,
IPL would not be subject to the notice requirements of the UDPA if
(1) the replacement pole [was] within three feet of the original
pole and (2) the replacement pole was within the line of existingpoles. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-106(3). Horrell stated in his
affidavit that the replacement pole was immediately adjacent to
the original pole. Spejcher stated that had the replacement pole
been set at a point equidistant from the highway as the damaged
pole, no trauma to [CT&T's] facilities would have occurred.
Neither statement provides guidance as to whether the replacement
pole was within the line of existing poles as required by the
exception; therefore, the affidavits fail to resolve genuine issues
of material fact concerning the applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
87-106(3), and the trial court could not grant summary judgment on
this basis.
The UDPA also excuses an excavator from providing notice when
the situation presents an emergency. Horrell stated in his
affidavit that the original pole was continuing to crack and risked
dropping power lines down across Honeycutt Road, which is a major
roadway on Fort Bragg. CT&T contends there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the cracked pole presented an
emergency. Spejcher's affidavit stated traffic could have been
re-routed while utility location was performed prior to digging
which would have prevent[ed] the endangerment of the traveling
public . . . . Considering the evidence contained in the record
in the light most favorable to CT&T, we cannot say as a matter of
law that the surrounding circumstances constituted an emergency.
Assuming arguendo an emergency was presented, the emergency
exception merely relieves the excavator of the notice requirements
of the UDPA but does not relieve the excavator of liability fordamages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-106(4). Negligence claims are
rarely susceptible of summary adjudication, and should ordinarily
be resolved by trial of the issues. Lamb v. Wedgewood South
Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 425, 302 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1983). In the
instant case, Horrell stated the work was done with great care
and in a workmanlike manner. Nonetheless, a portion of the
underground conduit was damaged by the auger. Viewing the
circumstances in the light most favorable to CT&T, whether IPL may
be held liable for damages associated with the work performed in
placing the new pole presents a genuine issue of material fact.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's granting of
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges WYNN and HUDSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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