IN RE: Edgecombe County
THOMAS HUNTER GILES, No. 00 J 125
A Minor Child
DOB: 5/21/95
Lawrence, Rigsbee, & Best, P.A., by Natarlin R. Best, for
Edgecombe County Department of Social Services petitioner
appellee.
Robert Dale Pitt for Guardian Ad Litem appellee.
Etheridge, Sykes & Hamlett, LLP, by J. Richard Hamlett, II,
for Sherry Giles respondent appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Thomas Hunter Giles was born on 21 May 1995. The respondent,
Sherry Giles, is the child's mother. Thomas was placed in the
custody of the Edgecombe County Department of Social Services (DSS)
on 3 August 1999 after he was sexually abused by his father. On 3
February 2000, nunc pro tunc 21 December 1999, Thomas was
adjudicated an abused juvenile. On 4 May 2000, the trial court
determined that the permanent plan for the child should be adoption
by a non-relative caretaker.
On 10 May 2000, a petition to terminate parental rights was
filed by DSS alleging that respondent had neglected Thomas withinthe meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2001). Specifically,
the petition alleged that respondent had failed to take any action
to protect Thomas from being sexually abused by his father
following her discovery of a videotape of the sexual abuse. The
petitioner further stated that Thomas would need caregivers who
were trained in addressing his special mental health needs as a
result of the past sexual abuse by his father. The petition
alleged that respondent was incapable of providing for those
special mental health needs, and that there was a reasonable
probability that the incapability would continue for the
foreseeable future. Accordingly, DSS alleged that it was in the
child's best interests that respondent's parental rights be
terminated.
On 6 February 2002, a hearing was held on the petition to
terminate respondent's parental rights. Prior to the hearing,
respondent stipulated that she knew of the sexual abuse and failed
to protect Thomas, and did not contest that he was an abused and
neglected child. However, respondent argued that it was not in the
best interests of the juvenile for her rights to be terminated.
On 5 April 2002, the trial court determined that grounds
existed to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court
concluded that the actions of respondent had resulted in the sexual
abuse, and that the child was therefore an abused juvenile. The
trial court further concluded that respondent had willfully left
the child in foster care for 12 months without showing to the
satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress had been made incorrecting those conditions which led to the removal of the child.
Accordingly, respondent's parental rights were terminated.
Respondent appeals.
Respondent argues there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court's finding of any ground authorizing the termination
of her parental rights. Respondent contends that, although she
stipulated to knowing of the sexual abuse and failing to protect
Thomas, the trial court failed to consider any evidence of changed
conditions. Respondent argues that termination may not be based
solely on conditions of neglect which existed previously but no
longer exist. In this case, respondent notes that she has had no
contact with her son since he was removed from her custody.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2001) sets out
the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding
of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to
support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387
S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the
termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.”
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997).
In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that Thomas
was an abused juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
101(1). The trial court further concluded that respondent had
willfully left Thomas in foster care for more than twelve months
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonableprogress under the circumstances had been made in correcting those
conditions which led to the removal of the child. The trial court
based its findings and conclusions on evidence that respondent
stipulated to knowing of the abuse, but failed to protect the minor
child. Respondent alleges that there are changed conditions.
However, the trial court found that respondent had terminated
therapy sessions in May 2001, long before the hearing was held on
the petition to terminate her parental rights. Additionally, the
trial court cited testimony and adopted as a finding of fact that
respondent “refused to accept responsibility for her son's
maltreatment,” although respondent's “decision not to intervene on
behalf of the child makes her accountable.” Thus, we conclude
there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support the
trial court's findings and conclusions.
Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to terminate
parental rights, “the court shall issue an order terminating the
parental rights of such parent with respect to the juvenile unless
the court shall further determine that the best interests of the
juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be
terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2001). The trial
court's decision to terminate parental rights at the disposition
stage is discretionary. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110,
316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).
Here, the trial court concluded that it was in the best
interests of the child that respondent's parental rights be
terminated. The trial court based its conclusion on the severityof the abuse suffered by Thomas, and the recommendations of
counselors that Thomas would need special care and treatment.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that termination was in the child's best interests.
Accordingly, the order terminating respondent's parental rights is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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