Appeal by plaintiff from judgment filed 19 April 2002 by Judge
Charles H. Henry in Pender County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 28 August 2003.
Lea, Clyburn & Rhine, P.L.L.C., by Christopher A.
Chleborowicz; and Eldridge Law Firm, P.C., by James E.
Eldridge, for plaintiff-appellant.
Anderson, Daniel & Coxe, by Bradley A. Coxe, for defendant-
appellees.
BRYANT, Judge.
Larry Waddell McAllister (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment
entered 19 April 2002 consistent with a jury verdict in favor of
defendants Dedicated Services, Inc. (the corporation) and Ellis
Clayton Williams (Williams), individually and as an agent of the
corporation, on plaintiff's negligence claim.
On 11 May 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging injuries
caused by Williams' negligent operation of a trailer truck. The
complaint further alleged that because Williams was an employee of
the corporation, the corporation was vicariously liable for
Williams' negligence. The evidence at trial revealed that on 20 June 1997, Williams
drove a trailer truck over the center yellow line of a two-lane
highway. Williams stopped on the highway and began backing his
truck across both lanes and into a side road. Williams testified
that he had performed the same maneuver for ten or eleven years,
and that the backing maneuver was safer than driving straight into
the side road. Simultaneously, plaintiff was driving a pickup
truck on the same highway toward Williams but from the opposite
direction. Williams did not notice plaintiff's truck, which was
traveling toward him from a distance at an allegedly high rate of
speed, until after he had begun backing up. Williams stopped his
truck, which remained on the center yellow line, to prevent
plaintiff's truck from hitting the fuel tank of the trailer truck,
and flashed his lights. Both trucks collided, and plaintiff
suffered injuries.
During the trial, plaintiff presented evidence to show
Williams had violated several state statutes. The applicable
statutes referred to require a driver to: (1) yield the right-of-
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction before
that driver makes a left turn, (2) drive on the right half of the
highway, and (3) avoid stopping or temporarily leaving the vehicle
on the highway. See N.C.G.S. §§ 20-155(b), 20-146(b), 161(b)
(2001). Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of
Williams' negligence. The trial court denied the motion.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, answering
in the negative the question “Was the plaintiff . . . injured bythe negligence of the defendants . . . ?” Plaintiff moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, a new
trial. The trial court denied both motions.
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The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the evidence was
sufficient to support a jury verdict for defendants on the issue of
proximate cause. Specifically, plaintiff contends the trial court
erred in denying his motions for directed verdict, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial because Williams'
violation of several traffic safety statutes established his
liability for negligence. We disagree.
In considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court
must view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Summer v. Allran, 100 N.C.
App. 182, 183, 394 S.E.2d 689, 690 (1990). A motion for directed
verdict should be denied if the evidence is sufficient to be
submitted to the jury. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is to be “entered in accordance with an earlier directed
verdict motion.”
Smith v. Childs, 112 N.C. App. 672, 682, 437
S.E.2d 500, 507 (1993). As such, the same standards are used to
review both motions.
Id.
A violation of a safety statute is negligence per se, i.e., a
breach of a legal duty.
Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353, 359, 82
S.E.2d 331, 337 (1954);
Adams v. Mills, 312 N.C. 181, 192, 322
S.E.2d 164, 171 (1984). For such a violation to be actionable,
however, proximate cause for the injuries must also be shown.
SeeAldridge, 240 N.C. at 359, 82 S.E.2d at 337 (holding the defendant
violated safety statutes by recklessly turning his vehicle left and
proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff pedestrian when a
third party swerved his car to avoid collision with the defendant's
vehicle and thereby hit the plaintiff pedestrian);
see also Adams,
312 N.C. at 195, 322 S.E.2d at 173 (holding the trial court erred
in refusing to submit the issue of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence to the jury because assuming the plaintiff violated a
statute prohibiting stopping a vehicle on a highway, the plaintiff
may have proximately caused the defendant's injuries as the
defendant's continued driving toward the plaintiff while the
defendant was blinded by the sun may be foreseeable). Whether the
violation of a safety statute is the proximate cause of an injury
is for the jury to determine.
Adams, 312 N.C. at 192, 32 S.E.2d at
171.
In the case
sub judice, the evidence raises a question of fact
as to whether Williams violated certain safety statutes and, if so,
whether such violations proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.
Probative of the issue of proximate cause is the evidence presented
regarding: the safety of Williams' method of backing into a side
road, the distance between the two trucks when Williams first saw
plaintiff's truck, Williams' flashing his lights at the moment of
stopping in an attempt to alert plaintiff, and the alleged high
rate of speed plaintiff was traveling just prior to impact.
Because such evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Williams
was sufficient for the jury to determine that Williams was notliable for plaintiff's injuries, the trial court did not err in
denying plaintiff's motions for directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. In addition, the evidence does not
indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in denying the motion.
See Taylor v. Ellerby, 146 N.C.
App. 56, 58, 552 S.E.2d 667, 669 (2001).
No error.
Judges McGEE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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