D.M. FAIRCLOTH,
Plaintiff,
v
.
Sampson County
No. 02 CVS 612 <
br>
SCOTT HOWELL & CO., INC.,
Defendant.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P.,
by Scott A. Miskimon and Timothy W. Howard, attorneys for
plaintiff-appellee.
Penry Riemann, P.L.L.C., by J. Anthony Penry and Cynthia A.
O'Neal, attorneys for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
The issue on appeal is whether the statute of limitations
barred Scott Howell & Co., Inc.'s claim for consulting fee debts
arising from Senator D. M. Faircloth's unsuccessful re-election bid
for the United States Senate in 1998. We answer, yes; accordingly,
we uphold the trial court's judgment.
The record on appeal shows that an unincorporated association
called Faircloth for Senate Committee 1998" (the Faircloth
Committee) retained Scott Howell & Co., a Texas advertising
agency, to provide political consulting services. After the
election of 1998, Scott Howell & Co. sought payment for servicesrendered to the campaign from the Faircloth Committee. According
to Scott Howell & Co., the Faircloth Committee assured payment;
however, the company did not submit an invoice for payment until 1
April 2001. Shortly thereafter, the company through its attorney,
sent a letter to Senator Faircloth claiming that he was personally
liable for the debt, demanding payment, and threatening to sue to
recover the consulting fees.
In response, Senator Faircloth brought a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether he was personally liable for the
campaign debt, and asserting the statute of limitations. Scott
Howell & Co. answered and counterclaimed for damages from breach of
contract and quantum meruit. From the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Senator Faircloth, Scott Howell & Co.
appeals contending that an issue of fact existed as to whether
Senator Faircloth should have been estopped from pleading the
statute of limitations as a defense. We disagree.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1) (2001), the three-year statute
of limitation for breach of contract and quantum meruit accrues,
absent a contract stipulating otherwise, from the time the service
is last provided. Generally, whether a cause of action is barred
by the statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact.
When, however, the statute of limitations is properly pleaded, and
the facts with reference to it are not in conflict, it becomes a
matter of law, and summary judgment is appropriate. Pembee Mfg.
Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 69 N.C. App. 505, 508, 317 S.E.2d
41, 43 (1984) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a statuteof limitation operates as a complete defense, not for lack of
merit, but for security against the attempt to assert a stale
claim. Nowell v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 250 N.C.
575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1959). However, even if a party
properly pleads that the suit against him is stale, i.e., was not
brought within the time prescribed by statute, equity will deny
the right to assert that defense when delay has been induced by
acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which would
amount to a breach of good faith. Id.
In the instant case, the facts underlying the summary judgment
motion are not in dispute. Scott Howell & Co.'s last services to
the Faircloth Committee occurred before the election ended on 3
November 1998. Almost two years and six months after the services
had been rendered, Scott Howell & Co. requested payment in writing.
Although his attorney sent a demand letter to Senator Faircloth on
18 April 2001, Scott Howell & Co. did not assert legal claims
against Senator Faircloth until 8 July 2002, approximately three
years and seven months after the last service could have been
rendered, and then, only as counterclaims to Senator Faircloth's
complaint. Thus, according to the governing law, Scott Howell &
Co.'s counterclaims must fail as barred by the statute of
limitations.
Nonetheless, Scott Howell & Co. contend that members of the
Faircloth Committee repeatedly promised to pay . . . for its
services. Even so, this action was against Senator Faircloth
personally, not the Faircloth Committee. Indeed, nothing in therecord supports that an agency relationship existed between the
Faircloth Committee and Senator Faircloth, such that the Faircloth
Committee's promises to pay could bind Senator Faircloth
personally. See Simmons v. Morton, 1 N.C. App. 308, 310, 161
S.E.2d 222, 223 (1968)(internal citations omitted):
An agent's authority to bind his principal
cannot be shown by the agent's acts or
declarations. This can be shown only by proof
that the principal authorized the acts to be
done or that, after they were done, he
ratified them. One who seeks to enforce
against an alleged principal a contract made
by an alleged agent has the burden of proving
the existence of the agency and the authority
of the agent to bind the principal by such
contract.
Thus, even if the Faircloth Committee made certain assurances to
Scott Howell & Co., the record fails to show that those assurances
were personally binding on Senator Faircloth. See Nationwide Homes
of Raleigh, N.C., Inc. v. First Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 262
N.C. 79, 81, 136 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1964) (internal citations
omitted) (One who deals with an agent must, to protect himself,
ascertain the extent of the agent's authority.)
Furthermore, we hold that the record fails to show that
alleged assurances by the Faircloth Committee were in writing as
required by the Statute of Frauds. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-26
(2001) (No acknowledgement or promise is evidence of a new or
continuing contract, from which the statutes of limitations run,
unless it is contained in some writing signed by the party to be
charged thereby . . .). Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Senator Faircloth. Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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