STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
No. 01 CRS 96051
ROBERT JUNIOR ROYSTER,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Donald R. Teeter, for the State.
Terry W. Alford, for defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
In this appeal, defendant Robert Junior Royster, who was
convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine,
argues that the trial court (1) should not have admitted a law
enforcement officer's testimony that he had "worked some of the
city's roughest neighborhoods [a]nd obviously in those type of
neighborhoods there's a whole lot of drug traffic;" and (2) should
have granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Because the officer's
testimony was admitted to show his law enforcement experience and
because sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction was
presented, we find no error.
The State's evidence tended to show that on 4 October 2001,
Officer D. W. Bacon asked Officer Purefoy and Sergeant Morgan toassist him, at the Heritage Park housing complex, in serving
warrants on defendant for failure to appear. The three police
officers arrived at Heritage Park in separate patrol vehicles.
Officer Bacon saw defendant standing in his backyard. As he
approached defendant, Officer Bacon told him that he had "some
paperwork". Defendant immediately turned around and ran between
the houses. Officer Bacon and Officer Purefoy both followed
defendant on foot. During the chase, Officer Purefoy saw defendant
remove from his pants pocket a plastic bag containing white objects
and throw it into the bushes. Officer Purefoy picked up the
plastic bag and continued with the foot chase.
Defendant eventually stopped running and Officer Bacon
handcuffed him. Defendant had $145.00 in his pocket. Once
defendant was secured in a patrol vehicle, Officer Purefoy showed
Officer Bacon the plastic bag containing 25 off-white objects,
later determined to be crack cocaine. Officer Purefoy testified
that a person selling 25 rocks of crack cocaine could net
approximately $300.00 to $400.00. He further testified that,
during his law enforcement career, he has seen crack cocaine
intended for sale packaged individually in several small bags or in
film containers or simply not packaged at all, but left loose in a
person's pocket.
Defendant did not present any evidence. After the court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of evidence, the jury
found defendant guilty of possession with intent to sell and
deliver cocaine. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimumof eight months and a maximum of ten months imprisonment.
Defendant contends first that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to Officer Purefoy's testimony that,
during his career, he had worked in neighborhoods where there was
"a whole lot of drug traffic." Defendant argues that this
testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence of the
reputation of defendant's neighborhood. We disagree.
Defendant is correct that evidence offered to establish that
defendant's neighborhood has a reputation for drug dealing is
generally inadmissible when the defendant has been charged with a
drug offense. State v. Crawford, 104 N.C. App. 591, 598, 410
S.E.2d 499, 503 (1991). A review of the transcript in this case,
however, reveals that the challenged testimony related only to
Officer Purefoy's law enforcement experience, was offered to
establish Officer Purefoy's credentials, did not refer to
defendant's neighborhood, and was not intended to characterize the
reputation of defendant's neighborhood.
The challenged testimony occurred at the very beginning of
Officer Purefoy's direct examination when the prosecutor was
establishing the officer's credentials and experience. After
Officer Purefoy testified that he had been a police officer for the
City of Raleigh for 15 years, the prosecutor asked for greater
specifics regarding his experience:
Q. Okay. And can you tell us what your
duties are as a law enforcement officer with
the Raleigh Police Department?
A. I'm a patrolman. I am also involved
in a special unit, specialized unit. I workin the Heritage Park apartment complex, the
housing project.
Q. And what kind of cases do you
typically work with?
A. I work with a lot of drug cases, work
with a lot of larceny cases, domestics, just
about any type of case that anybody will call
a police officer for.
Q. And how long have you been working
with drug cases?
A. In total off and on throughout my
career just several. I can't tell you the
number. It's several. Over hundreds - - over
a hundred.
Q. Can you tell us about your experience
with drug cases?
A. Yes, I can. Again, throughout my
career I've worked for 15 years. Most of that
time I've been a street cop and I've worked
some of the city's roughest neighborhoods.
And obviously in those type of neighborhoods
there's a whole lot of drug traffic.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. Okay, there's a whole lot of drug
traffic in those types of neighborhoods and
I've made arrests from everything from simple
possession of drugs and possession with intent
to sell and deliver drugs. And also
throughout my career I've been involved in
several, several undercover drug operations.
So many that I can't even count where I've
actually gone out and bought drugs from
people.
Q. And can you tell us then if you were
working on October the 4th of 2001?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Where were you working on that day?
A. In the area of Heritage Park.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, Officer Purefoy did not
testify about the reputation of defendant's neighborhood during his
testimony. Rather, Officer Purefoy was establishing his experience
in handling drug cases by testifying generally that he had worked,
over his 15 years as a Raleigh Police Officer, in neighborhoods
where there was substantial drug trafficking. This experience was
necessary in order to lay an adequate foundation for Officer
Purefoy's later testimony regarding the street value of the drugs
recovered and the type of packaging that he had observed. The
trial court, therefore, properly overruled defendant's objection.
As a second ground for appeal, defendant contends that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge based
on insufficiency of the evidence. In challenging the adequacy of
the evidence to support his conviction of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, defendant
argues that there was insufficient evidence (1) that he possessed
the cocaine and (2) that he had an intent to sell or deliver the
cocaine.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must decide
"whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential
element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the
perpetrator of the offense." State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215,
393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990). Substantial evidence is that relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 449-50,
439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, thetrial court must consider all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Davis,
130 N.C. App. 675, 679, 505 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998). "Any
contradictions or discrepancies arising from the evidence are
properly left for the jury to resolve and do not warrant
dismissal." State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 36, 468 S.E.2d 232, 237
(1996).
With respect to defendant's possession of crack cocaine, "[a]
defendant has actual possession of a substance if it is on his
person, he is aware of its presence, and either by himself or with
others, he has the power and intent to control its disposition or
use." State v. Diaz, 155 N.C. App. 307, 314, 575 S.E.2d 523, 528
(2002). Here, Officer Purefoy observed defendant pull a plastic
bag containing small white objects from his pants pocket and throw
it into the bushes. The plastic bag was later determined to
contain 25 rocks of crack cocaine. Although defendant argues that
Officer Bacon never saw defendant throw anything, Officer Purefoy's
testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to find that defendant
possessed the cocaine uncovered under the bushes. See State v.
Wilder, 124 N.C. App. 136, 140, 476 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1996)
(sufficient evidence of possession existed when officers saw
defendant throw object into bushes and neighbor later discovered
drugs in those bushes).
Circumstantial evidence may establish an intent to sell or
deliver. State v. James, 81 N.C. App. 91, 94, 344 S.E.2d 77, 80(1986). Officer Purefoy, who had significant experience in drug
arrests, testified that the 25 rocks of crack cocaine had a street
value of $300.00 to $400.00. In addition, defendant had $145.00 in
cash in his pocket. This evidence was sufficient to allow a jury
to infer that defendant possessed the cocaine for sale and not for
personal use.
Our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he mere quantity of the
controlled substance alone may suffice to support the inference of
an intent to transfer, sell or deliver." State v. Morgan, 329 N.C.
654, 659, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991). We believe that a jury could
find the amount of cocaine in this case to be "'more than an
individual would possess for his personal consumption.'" Id. at
660, 406 S.E.2d at 836 (quoting State v. Williams, 307 N.C. 452,
457, 298 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1983)). Additionally, the jury could
consider the amount of cash found in defendant's pocket. State v.
Taylor, 117 N.C. App. 644, 653, 453 S.E.2d 225, 230-31 (1995)
(evidence of intent to sell sufficient when defendant had bags of
crack cocaine in his mouth and $261.00 in cash on his person). We,
therefore, find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion
to dismiss.
No error.
Judges McGEE and HUDSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***