STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Union County
Nos. 01 CRS 9983
JUSTIN TADARIAN WALKER 01 CRS 53080-82
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Alexander McC. Peters, for the State.
Reita P. Pendry for defendant-appellant.
EAGLES, Chief Judge.
Defendant Justin Tadarian Walker was indicted for four counts
of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by (1) denying defendant's motion to dismiss all charges and
(2) allowing the admission of testimony by the victims' mothers and
medical personnel. After consideration of the record and briefs,
we find no error.
The State's evidence tends to show the following. On the
night of 22 July 2000, defendant was a patron at a club located on
Highway 74 in Monroe, North Carolina. Sometime after twelve a.m.
on 23 July 2000, defendant got into a fight with Neharold Walls,another club patron. The two men were fighting inside the club,
with Walls on top of defendant. Walls was “winning the fight”
before he and defendant were separated. Shortly before the club
owner announced that the club was closed, defendant went outside
while Walls remained in the club.
Defendant stood next to a car in the parking lot, “fussing”
about the fight. Soon thereafter, Walls and other patrons left the
club. Walls stood approximately ten feet from defendant, emptied
his pockets, and held up his fists.
After getting into the car he was standing beside, defendant
raced the motor, and drove toward Walls, who was standing near a
crowd of people. Walls ran for safety, as did other members of the
crowd. Defendant did not injure Walls, but injured four teenagers
and damaged another car and a scooter. Defendant fled on foot,
leaving the car behind. Defendant later turned himself in to the
police after arrest warrants where issued.
Defendant presented evidence that tended to show he was
intoxicated at the time in question. He heard someone say
something about getting a gun, so he attempted to leave the parking
lot to avoid any further confrontation with Walls. Defendant
contends that he lost control of the car while it was moving five
to seven miles per hour. Defendant testified that he did not
realize he had injured anyone. Defendant did not intend to kill or
injure Walls when he lost control of the car. Instead, he
testified that he was trying to leave the parking lot when the
accident occurred. The jury found defendant guilty as charged on all four counts.
He was sentenced to 120-153 months of imprisonment for the first
count, 120-153 months of imprisonment for the second count, and
120-153 months of imprisonment for the third and fourth counts
which were consolidated for sentencing. The sentences were to run
consecutively. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the charges and his motion to set aside the
verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence regarding the
requisite intent to kill. We disagree.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, “the trial court is to
determine whether there is substantial evidence (a) of each
essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (b) of defendant's being the perpetrator of
the offense.” State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d
649, 651 (1982). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587
(1984). When reviewing defendant's challenge regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence, “the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving it the
benefit of all reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom.”
State v. Compton, 90 N.C. App. 101, 103-04, 367 S.E.2d 353, 355
(1988).
Assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury is a felony according to N.C.G.S. § 14-32(a) (2001). A jury is allowed to infer the requisite intent to kill “from the
nature of the assault, the manner in which it was made, the conduct
of the parties, and other relevant circumstances.” State v. James,
321 N.C. 676, 688, 365 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988); see State v.
Ferguson, 261 N.C. 558, 135 S.E.2d 626 (1964).
The State's evidence tended to show that shortly before the
assault, Walls was “winning” a fight with defendant. Defendant
left the club, went to the parking lot, and started “fussing” about
the fight. When Walls left the club, defendant got in his car,
raced the motor, and drove towards Walls. Defendant only stopped
the car after running into another car. Moreover, defendant jumped
out of his car and fled on foot. This is sufficient evidence upon
which the jury could infer the requisite intent to kill.
Additionally, based upon the evidence presented, defendant has
not shown the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to set aside the verdict. See State v. Fleming, 350 N.C.
109, 146, 512 S.E.2d 720, 745 (“The denial of a motion to set aside
the verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal under an
abuse of discretion standard.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 145 L.
Ed. 2d 274 (1999). Therefore, this assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant also argues that he was unduly prejudiced by the
admission of testimony from the victims' mothers and medical
personnel concerning the victims' injuries. Moreover, he arguesthat the trial court committed plain error in admitting this
testimony. We disagree.
Plain error is an error “so fundamental as to amount to a
miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury
reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached.”
State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988).
Here, defendant concedes in his brief that the victims'
testimony concerning the extent of their injuries, hospital
treatment, loss of function, and pain, were sufficient to prove the
infliction of serious injury. Defendant argues, however, that
admission of the additional testimony from the victims' mothers and
medical personnel was unnecessary to prove the element of
infliction of serious injury and only served to inflame the jury.
The transcript reveals that the additional testimony only
served to corroborate the victims' testimonies concerning the
nature of their injuries. As a result, defendant failed to show a
probability that the result at trial would have been different
without the contested testimony. This assignment of error is also
overruled.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***