An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-177

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 October 2003

IN THE MATTER OF:                    Forsyth County
BROOKE ASHLEY ROBINSON                No. 01 J 430
                                

    

    Appeal by juvenile from adjudication order entered 20 March 2002 by Judge Laurie Hutchins and disposition order entered 25 April 2002 by Judge Lisa Menefee in District Court in Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 October 2003.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David G. Heeter, for the State.

    Lynne Rupp, for respondent-appellant.


    HUDSON, Judge.

    On 11 October 2001, William Nelson was in his home looking out his window when he saw respondent Brooke Ashley Robinson and her sister Stephanie Robinson standing near the home of Shirley Atkinson. Nelson's home was located in between the Robinson's home and the Atkinson's home. Nelson testified that he saw Stephanie enter the Atkinson's residence while respondent remained at the top of the driveway. A minute or so later, Nelson saw the sisters return to their own home, but five minutes later he saw Stephanie go again to the Atkinson's residence, with a telephone in her hand. Respondent had walked up the street in the opposite direction, toward the entrance of the subdivision. Nelson testified that “theonly way you could access that part of the development was to come down that street.” A few minutes later, Stephanie returned to her home and met respondent in their yard. According to Nelson, both had “cordless or cell” phones, and appeared to be communicating.
    When Shirley Atkinson returned home, she was told by Mr. Nelson's wife that Stephanie had entered her home. Ms. Atkinson discovered that she was missing rolls of coins amounting to fifty dollars. Atkinson testified that Stephanie did not have permission to enter her home.
    On 29 October 2001, a juvenile petition was filed alleging that respondent had committed the offenses of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny entering into the Atkinson's home and stealing the rolls of coins. On 20 March 2002, the court adjudicated respondent a delinquent juvenile for committing the charged offenses. On 25 April 2002, the court entered a disposition order placing respondent on probation for six months. Respondent appeals.
    Respondent's sole argument on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the adjudication. Specifically, respondent argues that the evidence did not show that she ever entered the Atkinson home, or that she encouraged or helped her sister break into the home. Respondent contends that her mere presence near the scene of the crime is not enough to prove her participation. Respondent also argues that the evidence did not show that she received any of the money that was alleged to have been stolen from the home.     After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we affirm. This Court has stated:
        In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, it is not our duty to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the adjudication, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

In re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 29, 550 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2001)(citations omitted).
    Here, the petition alleged that respondent was delinquent for felonious breaking and entering and larceny in violation of G.S. . 14-54 and G.S. . 14-72. The State proceeded under the theory that respondent acted in concert with her sister to commit the offenses by acting as her lookout and standing by to render assistance if necessary. Our Supreme Court has summarized the law of acting in concert as follows:
        If two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural or probable consequence thereof. For purposes of the doctrine, [a] person is constructively present during the commission of a crime if he or she is close enough to be able to render assistance if needed and to encourage the actual perpetration of the crime.

State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 306, 560 S.E.2d 776, 784, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1005, 154 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence presented by the State showed that when Stephanie first entered the Atkinson home,respondent was standing at the top of the Atkinson's driveway. A short time later, Stephanie left the residence and the two returned home and got phones. Stephanie then went back into the Atkinson home while respondent walked towards the entrance of the development. Mr. Nelson testified that essentially anybody returning to the Atkinson's home would have to pass respondent. After Stephanie left the Atkinson's home, she and respondent met back in their yard, and they were both talking on the phones. From this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the trial court could conclude that respondent was acting as a lookout for Stephanie, and was ready to render assistance to her if needed. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that respondent was “constructively present” at the Atkinson's home and acted in concert with Stephanie to commit the breaking and entering and larceny.
    Affirmed.
    Judges MCGEE and GEER concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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