Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 11 September
2002 by Judge William Graham in Forsyth County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 November 2003.
Forsyth County Department of Social Services, by Assistant
County Attorney Theresa A. Boucher, for petitioner-appellee.
Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Joann A.
Waters, for the Guardian ad Litem.
MARTIN, Judge.
Respondent, Rima Yancey, is the mother of Tre'Zha Collette
Yancey, born on 8 November 2001. Due to respondent's incarceration
at the time of the minor child's birth, Tre'Zha was placed in the
custody of the Forsyth County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
on 9 November 2001. On 13 November 2001, DSS filed a petition
alleging that Tre'Zha did not receive proper care, supervision or
discipline, and had been abandoned by respondent, and thus, was a
neglected and dependent juvenile. The petition alleged that
respondent had lost custody of another child due to neglect, and
her parental rights had been terminated as to three other children.
On 15 May 2002, nunc pro tunc 13 February 2002, Tre'Zha was
adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile pursuant to G.S. §§
7B-101(9) and (15). The trial court determined that “reunification
[with respondent] is not appropriate at this time,” approved DSS's
plan for adoption, and relieved DSS of any further reunification
efforts. However, the trial court determined that respondent was
entitled to three hours per week of supervised visitation with
Tre'Zha, and that respondent may be reunified with her daughter if
she: (1) undergoes a full psychological evaluation and follows
through with any recommendations; (2) undergoes a substance abuse
assessment and follows all recommendations; and (3) submits to
random drug testing.
On 13 March 2002, DSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights to Tre'Zha. The petition alleged that
one or more grounds existed to support the termination pursuant to
G.S. § 7B-1111. On 19 and 23 August 2002, a hearing was held to
determine the merits of the petition to terminate respondent's
parental rights. In an order entered 11 September 2002, the trial
court found that respondent neglected the juvenile pursuant to G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(1). Specifically, the trial court found that the
juvenile had previously been adjudicated neglected on 13 February
2002, that although respondent was released from prison on 10
December 2001 and re-incarcerated on 21 February 2002, she had not
visited Tre'Zha while she was able to do so, that respondent has
failed to provide any support for Tre'Zha during the lifetime of
the child, that respondent failed to complete previously orderedsubstance abuse treatment, failed to attend a previously ordered
psychological evaluation, failed to attend previously ordered
parenting classes, failed to establish steady employment during the
time she was not incarcerated, and that respondent's parental
rights to three other children had been involuntarily terminated by
the Juvenile Court of Forsyth County. The trial court also found
that respondent lacked the ability to establish a safe home
pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9). Specifically, the trial court
found that respondent “continues to maintain a lifestyle which
includes multiple incarcerations, illegal drug use and instability
in maintaining a safe home for herself and her children.”
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that it was in the best
interest of the minor child that the parental rights of respondent
be terminated. Respondent appeals.
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Respondent first argues that the trial court's conclusion that
Tre'Zha is a neglected juvenile pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is
not supported by clear and convincing evidence. After careful
review, we disagree.
An order terminating one's parental rights is not authorized
unless the trial court determines that “any one or more of the
conditions authorizing a termination of the parental rights of a
parent exist . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2001). A
finding of neglect is sufficient to authorize a termination of
parental rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2001). The
standard of review for neglect determinations under G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the juvenile is neglected pursuant to G.S. § 7B-101(15), and
(2) “the juvenile has sustained 'some physical, mental, or
emotional impairment . . . or [there is] a substantial risk of such
impairment' as a consequence of the neglect.”
In re Beasley, 147
N.C. App. 399, 403, 555 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2001)(citations omitted).
A neglected juvenile pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15)
(2001) is a juvenile:
who does not receive proper care, supervision,
or discipline from the juvenile's parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has
been abandoned; or who is not provided
necessary medical care; or who is not provided
necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's
welfare; or who has been placed for care or
adoption in violation of law.
Since respondent did not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the findings of fact, we treat such findings as
conclusive.
In re Caldwell, 75 N.C. App. 299, 301, 330 S.E.2d 513,
515 (1985). The trial court found that Tre'Zha was previously
adjudicated neglected on 13 February 2002, that respondent failed
to attend court ordered substance abuse treatment or parenting
classes in January and February of 2002, that respondent failed to
visit with Tre'Zha while she was able to do so, attending only two
out of sixteen visitation opportunities, that respondent has
provided no support for Tre'Zha, that she failed to attend a court
ordered psychological evaluation on 12 February 2002, that she
caused herself to be re-incarcerated on 21 February 2002, with an
anticipated release date of December 2003, and that respondent'sparental rights to three other children had been involuntarily
terminated. Respondent argues that these findings of fact do not
support a conclusion that “the juvenile has sustained 'some
physical, mental, or emotional impairment . . . or [there is] a
substantial risk of such impairment' as a consequence of the
neglect,”
In re Beasley, 147 N.C. App. at 403, 555 S.E.2d at 646
(citations omitted), because none of the findings point to any
evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.
However,“[i]f there is no evidence of neglect at the time of
the termination proceeding . . . parental rights may nonetheless be
terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of neglect
and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a
probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned
to her parents.”
In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d
499, 501 (2000). In this case, there is a past adjudication of
neglect, but respondent argues that the findings of fact are not
sufficient to support a conclusion that the neglect would be
repeated if the juvenile were returned to the care of respondent.
We disagree.
In the case of
In re Davis, 116 N.C. App. 409, 413-414, 448
S.E.2d 303, 306,
disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 516, 452 S.E.2d 808
(1994), the Court held that the parents' failure to “obtain[]
continued counseling, a stable home, stable employment, and
[attend] parenting classes” was sufficient to show a probability
that neglect would be repeated if the juvenile were returned to the
care of the parents. In the case of
In re Bradshaw, ___ N.C. App.____, ___, 587 S.E.2d 83, ___ (2003), the Court held that a failure
to provide any financial support for a child, no matter how
trivial, and the failure to seek personal contact with or attempt
to convey love and affection to a child were sufficient to support
a conclusion of neglect. Likewise, the findings of fact in this
case are more than sufficient to support the conclusion that there
was a probability that the neglect would be repeated if Tre'Zha was
returned to the custody of respondent, and thus, Tre'Zha was
neglected pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
Since the trial court's findings are sufficient to support the
termination of respondent's parental rights under G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), we need not address the issue of whether the trial
court's findings are also sufficient to support the termination of
respondent's parental rights under G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9). N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2001);
see also In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404,
293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982)(if any of the grounds for termination
listed by the trial court is “supported by findings of fact based
on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the order appealed from
should be affirmed”).
Respondent lastly argues that the trial court erred when it
concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in
the best interest of the child. Once a trial court determines that
“any one or more of the conditions authorizing a termination of the
parental rights of a parent exist, the court shall issue an order
terminating the parental rights of such parent with respect to the
juvenile unless the court shall further determine that the bestinterests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the
parent not be terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2001).
Whether termination is in the best interest of the child is
discretionary.
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 543 S.E.2d
906, 910 (2001). Thus, we review such a finding for abuse of
discretion only.
A trial court may decline to terminate parental rights only
where “there is reasonable hope that the family unit within a
reasonable period of time can reunite and provide for the emotional
and physical welfare of the child.”
Id. There is no requirement
that the trial court make findings of fact when entering an order
terminating parental rights; only when the court determines that
termination is not in the best interests of the child are such
findings required.
Id.
In this case, respondent argues that the numerous demands made
of respondent in the two and half months that she was not
incarcerated were unrealistic and unmanageable, and that a
termination of parental rights only nine months after the birth of
the child was an abuse of discretion. “One of the underlying
principles guiding the trial court in the dispositional stage is
the recognition of the necessity for any child to have a permanent
plan of care at the earliest possible age, while at the same time
recognizing the need to protect all children from the unnecessary
severance of a relationship with biological parents or legal
guardians.”
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 612, 543 S.E.2d at
910. Here, respondent caused herself to be re-incarcerated and isnot scheduled to be released from prison until December 2003, over
a year after the termination proceedings were held. Coupled with
the extensive findings of fact supporting the conclusion that
Tre'Zha was neglected pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we agree
with the trial court that there was not a reasonable hope that the
family unit could be reunited successfully within a reasonable
period of time. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's conclusion that it was in the best interest of the child
that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge LEVINSON concur.
Report per rule 30(e).
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