NO. COA03-241
Appeal by respondent mother from order filed 1 August 2002
by
Judge Jacquelyn L. Lee in Johnston County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 29 October 2003.
Jennifer S. O'Connor for petitioner-appellee Johnston County
Department of Social Services.
Attorney Advocate James D. Johnson, Jr. for guardian ad litem-
appellee.
Angela H. Brown for respondent-appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.
Vanessa Koehli (respondent) appeals an order entered 1 August
2002 terminating her parental rights over her son Jamal Jones.
On 20 December 2001, the Johnston County Department of Social
Services (DSS) filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental
rights over Jamal, who was just under four years old at the time.
DSS alleged that respondent had neglected Jamal, and there was
“little improvement in her ability to care for the child and the
probability of a repetition of neglect if the child [were] returned
home.” DSS additionally alleged that, although respondent was
physically and financially able, she had willfully failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost for Jamal's care while he was in DSScustody.
On 3 July 2002, a hearing was held on the petition to
terminate respondent's parental rights. Subsequently, the trial
court found in its 1 August 2002 order that: (1) Jamal had been
adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile on 15 August 2001
and custody placed with DSS; (2) respondent had not obtained or
maintained stable housing or employment; (3) she had failed to take
any action to parent Jamal since his removal from her care and
abandoned her responsibility as a parent; and (4) she had sporadic
employment after Jamal was removed from her care but did not pay
for any support or care for him while he was in foster care. The
trial court further found that DSS attempted to work with
respondent toward reunification. All efforts, however, were
unsuccessful because respondent refused to cooperate and left the
area without providing contact information. Finally, the trial
court found that respondent failed to provide any evidence of a
change in the conditions that led to Jamal's removal. Accordingly,
the trial court concluded grounds for termination of respondent's
parental rights existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)
(neglect) and (3) (failure to provide support for juvenile while in
foster care) and that it was in Jamal's best interest to terminate
respondent's parental rights.
__________________________
The sole issue is whether the trial court's findings are
supported by the evidence.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds forthe termination of parental rights.
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 (2001).
A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is
sufficient to support a termination.
In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App.
57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning
for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental
rights exist.”
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614
(1997).
In the case
sub judice, the trial court found that respondent
had neglected Jamal and that there was likelihood the neglect would
be repeated if he were returned to respondent. In making its
findings and conclusions, the trial court relied on the testimony
of Jennifer Hughes, a DSS social worker. Hughes testified that
respondent: (1) would leave Jamal with various individuals for
extended periods of time without disclosing her whereabouts, a way
of contacting her, or granting legal authority to provide medical
treatment for the child should the need arise, (2) violated a
protection plan by being the sole caretaker for Jamal while under
the influence of alcohol, (3) failed to obtain stable housing or
employment, (4) failed to substantiate claims that she had
addressed her substance abuse or domestic violence issues and
refused to submit to a drug test, and (5) did not provide any
support, cards, or gifts to Jamal while in DSS custody. Respondent
also acknowledged that even though she had a history of domestic
violence with Kareem Muhammad, the man with whom she lived, she and
Jamal continued to stay with him, and respondent allowed Muhammadto provide care for Jamal. Finally, despite the evidence of her
past neglect of Jamal and a history of substance abuse and domestic
violence, respondent testified that she was not at fault. Instead,
respondent contended that DSS “stole” Jamal, and if he were
returned, she would “continue taking care of [her] son just like
[she] always took care of [her] children.” Although petitioner
takes issue with several of the trial court's findings, her
testimony, along with Hughes' testimony, presented clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence to support the trial court's findings,
which in turn support the conclusion that Jamal was a neglected
juvenile pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(1).
See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(15) (2001) (defining a neglected juvenile as one “who does not
receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's
parent”);
see also In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d
499, 501 (2000) (“[i]f there is no evidence of neglect at the time
of the termination proceeding, . . . parental rights may
nonetheless be terminated if there is a showing of a past
adjudication of neglect and the trial court finds by clear and
convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the
juvenile were returned to [his or] her parents”).
Since grounds exist pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(1) to
support the trial court's order, we need not review the additional
ground found by the trial court to support termination.
See
Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34. Accordingly, the
assignment of error is overruled.
In her brief to this Court, respondent also argues the trialcourt erred by failing to make any findings or conclusions on the
record at the termination of parental rights hearing. Respondent,
however, has failed to raise this issue in her assignments of
error. Thus, it is not properly before this Court.
See N.C.R.
App. P. 10(a) (“the scope of review on appeal is confined to a
consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record
on appeal”).
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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