IN RE: STEVEN MINOR Mecklenburg County
No. 02 J 367
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Kathryn Jones Cooper, for the State.
Carlton, Rhodes & Carlton, by Gary C. Rhodes, for respondent-
appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent under a petition charging
him and a co-defendant with the 12 January 2002 robbery of Juan
Carlos Saldania Gonzales, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87
(2001). The State's evidence included the testimony of an
eyewitness who identified juvenile as an active participant in the
assault on Gonzales, which occurred near a bus stop on Central
Avenue in Charlotte, North Carolina. In his own testimony,
juvenile admitted he was present during the incident, but claimed
he had just watched. Judge Miller entered her disposition order
on 26 September 2002, placing juvenile on house arrest and
probation for a period of twelve months. Juvenile appeals.
Initially, we consider juvenile's motion to deem timely filedboth the record on appeal and his appellant's brief. The record
reflects that the district court filed an order for the preparation
of a transcript on 25 October 2002, and delivered the order to the
court reporter on 31 October 2002. The court reporter mailed the
adjudication hearing transcript to the parties on 24 February 2003,
well outside the sixty-day deadline imposed by N.C.R. App. P.
7(b)(1). Neither juvenile nor the court reporter sought an
extension of time for delivery of the completed transcript pursuant
to Rule 7(b) or Appellate Rule 27(c). Juvenile served the State
with the proposed record on appeal on 28 February 2003. The State
has not opposed juvenile's motion.
[W]hen a court reporter fails to deliver a transcript within
the time allowed by the appellate rules, the better practice is
that appellant request an extension of time from the appropriate
court. Harvey v. Stokes, 137 N.C. App. 119, 124, 527 S.E.2d 336,
339 (2000). However, [i]f the court reporter fails to certify
that the transcript has been delivered within the sixty-day period
permitted by Appellate Rule 7(b), the thirty-five day period within
which an appellant must serve the proposed record on appeal does
not begin to run until the court reporter does certify delivery of
the transcript. Id. at 123, 527 S.E.2d at 338-39 (quoting Lockert
v. Lockert, 116 N.C. App. 73, 446 S.E.2d 606, disc. review allowed,
338 N.C. 311, 450 S.E.2d 487, cert. allowed, 338 N.C. 311, 450
S.E.2d 487 (1994)). Here, juvenile served the proposed record on
28 February 2003, within four days of the delivery of the
transcript by the court reporter. On 19 March 2003, the partiesagreed to the settled record on appeal, which was filed on 21 March
2003, within the period prescribed by Appellate Rule 11. Juvenile
filed his brief to this Court eighteen days after the printed
record was mailed to the parties. See N.C.R. App. P. 13(a)(1).
Accordingly, we allow juvenile's motion and proceed to the merits
of his appeal.
Juvenile first contends the State's evidence was insufficient
to support a finding that he participated in the robbery of
Gonzales. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, Juvenile made
a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Juvenile then
presented evidence but failed to renew his motion to dismiss.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2405(6) (2001), juveniles in
delinquency proceedings are granted [a]ll rights afforded adult
offenders except the right to bail, the right of
self-representation, and the right of trial by jury. A juvenile
is thus entitled to have the evidence evaluated by the same
standards as apply in criminal proceedings against adults. In re
Dulaney, 74 N.C. App. 587, 588, 328 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1985). Under
N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3), a motion to dismiss made at the close of
the State's evidence is waived if the defendant presents evidence.
In re Davis, 126 N.C. App. 64, 66, 483 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1997).
Having failed to renew his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of
all the evidence, juvenile has waived appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence. See id. (citing State v. Elliott, 69
N.C. App. 89, 316 S.E.2d 632, appeal dismissed and disc. review
denied, 311 N.C. 765, 321 S.E.2d 148 (1984)). Juvenile also argues that the trial court's findings do not
support the adjudication of delinquency. On the issue of fact-
finding, the juvenile code provides only that [i]f the court finds
that the allegations in the [delinquency] petition have been proved
[beyond a reasonable doubt], the court shall so state. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-2411; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2409 (2001)
(establishing beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in
delinquency proceedings). The statutory use of 'shall' is a
mandate to trial judges requiring them to affirmatively state that
the allegations of the juvenile petition are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Wade, 67 N.C. App. 708, 711, 313 S.E.2d
862, 864 (1984); accord In re Walker, 83 N.C. App. 46, 47, 348
S.E.2d 823, 824 (1986).
In the instant case, the district court made the following
findings beyond a reasonable doubt: . . . that the juvenile
committed the offense as alleged in the petition filed [3 April
2002] alleging common law robbery and is adjudicated delinquent.
The petition, in turn, alleged that juvenile and his co-defendant
unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did steal, take, and carry
way certain personal property from the person and presence of
Juan Carlos Gonzale[s] by means of an assault upon him consisting
of the forcible and violent taking of the property. The district
court made findings of ultimate fact sufficient to satisfy the
relevant provisions of the Juvenile Code. See In re Gleisner, 141
N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 366 (2000); In re Fewell, 32
N.C. App. 295, 297, 231 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1977). Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***