Plaintiff is Mr. Beck's widow and the mother of defendant
Larry Beck (“defendant”). She testified that in 1980 Mr. Beck
retired from his career as a professional golfer. Between 1985 and
1990, she began to see behavioral changes in her husband, including
disorientation, forgetfulness and physical frailty. In 1995, Mr.
and Mrs. Beck moved from Wake Forest back to their hometown of
Lexington. Mr. Beck owned a six acre tract there, and the Becks
owned an adjacent eight acre tract as tenants by the entirety.
Larry Beck lived in a home on the six acre tract, and operated a
driving range located partly on the six acre tract and partly on
the eight acre tract. Plaintiff and her husband surveyed off a .96
acre portion of their tenants by the entirety property and built a
home there. Plaintiff testified that her husband's condition continued to
decline after the move, and that eventually she placed a lock on
his bedroom door to prevent him from wandering alone. In August
1998, plaintiff placed her husband in a nursing home. At that time
she discussed options for paying for Mr. Beck's care with her son,
defendant Larry Beck. Defendant suggested that his parents convey
their property to him to enable Mr. Beck to qualify for Medicaid,
and trust him to return the property when paying for Mr. Beck's
care was no longer an issue. Defendant introduced his mother to
his attorney, Steven Holton (“Mr. Holton”), and accompanied Mr.
Holton on his visits to speak with plaintiff.
On 19 January 1998, defendant, plaintiff, Mr. Holton and two
of his paralegals gathered at the Beck's home to execute the deed
and other papers. According to plaintiff, her husband sat across
the room facing the television and did not participate in any
discussions. Defendant brought his father over to sign the papers
at the appropriate time and then returned him to his chair in the
living room. Several documents were executed by the Becks,
including: a deed conveying the eight and six acre tracts to Larry
Beck, less the .96 acre tract on which the Beck home sat; a deed
conveying the .96 acre tract to the Becks' daughter Anita and
reserving a life estate for themselves, and several other documents
plaintiff testified that she did not clearly understand. Defendant
paid no consideration for the property he received from his
parents.
Some time later, plaintiff contacted Mr. Holton for advice
about regaining the property, but Mr. Holton continued to representDefendant and suggested that plaintiff seek other counsel. Mr.
Beck died on 22 September 2000. At trial in September 2002,
plaintiff, Anita Beck, Anita's former husband, James Johnson, Jr.,
and Mr. Beck's primary care physician each testified that Mr. Beck
did not have the capacity to execute a deed on 19 January 1998.
Plaintiff first argues that dismissal was improper because it
was based on documents which were not introduced into evidence.
Specifically, plaintiff objects to finding of fact one, in which
the court found that she executed several documents on 19 January
1998, including the deed at issue here, which was introduced.
Finding one also includes other documents executed by Mr. Beck on
that date, which were not introduced in evidence. However, all of
the documents were widely discussed by plaintiff in her testimony
before the court. We find no error in the court's consideration of
testimony about the documents not formally admitted into evidence.
Next, plaintiff challenges the court's conclusions 1) that she
was estopped from challenging her husband's mental capacity and 2)
that the property in question would pass to defendant regardless of
Mr. Beck's capacity at the time of the deed's execution. Because
the court's findings of fact are inadequate to support its
conclusions, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, based in part
on the following conclusions of law:
1. The Plaintiff, Evelyn Barton Beck, is
estopped from challenging the mental capacity
of her deceased husband as of January 19,
1998.
2. The property would pass to the Defendant
herein regardless of whether the Court findsthe decedent Avery Edward Beck incompetent or
not.
These conclusions of law purport to be based upon the court's eight
findings of fact:
1. That Avery Edward Beck executed a number
of legal documents on January 19, 1998 which
documents include the following:
a. A Last Will and Testament;
b. A Power of Attorney in favor of his
wife, Evelyn Barton Beck;
c. A Revocation of a previous Power of
Attorney;
d. A Healthcare Power of Attorney in
favor of his wife, Evelyn Barton beck;
e. A Declaration of a Desire for a
Natural Death;
f. A Deed from Avery Edward Beck and
Wife, Evelyn Barton Beck [sic] to Anita Beck;
and
g. A Deed from Avery Edward Beck and
wife, Evelyn Barton Beck, to Larry Eugene
Beck, which Deed is the subject matter of this
action.
2. That the Plaintiff now seeks to challenge
that Deed referenced in Finding of Fact 1g,
[sic] above, on the grounds of Avery Edward
Beck's alleged incompetence or lack of mental
capacity at the time of the execution of the
Deed.
3. That Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint
herein that she was Avery Edward Beck's “duly
appointed attorney-in-fact.”
4. That the Power of Attorney referenced
above was executed contemporaneously with the
Deed being challenged herein.
5. That Plaintiff filed a wrongful death
lawsuit against another party as his personal
representative by virtue of his Last Will and
Testament, also executed contemporaneously
with the Deed challenged herein.
6. That the Plaintiff is estopped from now
challenging Avery Edward Beck's mental
capacity as to one document when Plaintiff has
accepted the validity of and exercised herrights under powers granted in documents
executed contemporaneously therewith.
7. That there is currently no challenge as to
the validity of Plaintiff's execution of the
Deed individually.
8. That assuming that Plaintiff is not
equitably estopped from challenging her
deceased husband's mental capacity as of
January 19, 1998, and that he was in fact
incompetent, she cannot challenge her own
conveyance of the property under the Deed in
dispute.
“Findings” six and eight are actually conclusions of law,
essentially restating the court's two denominated conclusions.
Standing alone, they cannot be a basis for the conclusion that
defendant would own the property regardless of Mr. Beck's mental
capacity.
In reaching its first conclusion of law, the court's order
fails to specify what theory of estoppel it applied here.
Defendant argues in his brief that the conclusion was proper under
either the theory of quasi-estoppel or equitable estoppel. The
doctrine of quasi estoppel appears most applicable here, but, even
assuming this issue was addressed at trial, the court's findings
are insufficient to support the court's first conclusion on that
basis.
“Quasi-estoppel is based on a party's acceptance of the
benefits of a transaction, and provides where one having the right
to accept or reject a transaction or instrument takes and retains
benefits thereunder, he ratifies it, and cannot avoid its
obligation or effect by taking a position inconsistent with it.”
Parkersmith Props. v. Johnson, 136 N.C. App. 626, 632, 525 S.E.2d
491, 495 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, thecourt must determine whether plaintiff ratified the deed and other
instruments executed 19 January 1998 by accepting benefit under
them, such that she may not now take an inconsistent position.
Finding five, that Mrs. Beck filed a wrongful death suit as
personal representative of the estate, is the only finding relating
to a possible benefit received by plaintiff, but the court did not
specify how she benefitted, if at all. In his brief, defendant
summarizes a number of “facts” which he contends are relevant to
these issues and which address possible benefits to plaintiff from
the execution from these documents. However, the court did not
make these or any other specific findings that plaintiff received
a benefit of any kind, which would be necessary to support the
application of quasi-estoppel.
Further, the stipulation of the parties barred the court from
using the fact of her qualification as personal representative as
evidence of Mr. Beck's competence in 1998. After Mr. Beck's death,
two wills appeared, one executed in 1995 and the other executed in
1998, at the time of the deed execution. After the Clerk of
Superior Court in Davidson County insisted on probating only the
1998 will, the parties stipulated that:
6. Rather than subject the estate to the
expense which would be involved in determining
the validity of the 1998 will, the parties
have agreed to stipulate that, if Evelyn
Barton Beck qualifies as the executor of Avery
Edward Beck under the 1998 will, evidence of
this fact will not be admissible in the
present action for the purpose of proving that
Avery Edward Beck was competent on January 19,
1998.
This stipulation is binding on the court and prevents it from
considering the plaintiff's appointment as personal representativeunder the 1998 will as evidence of Mr. Beck's mental capacity to
execute that will. Thus, the findings are insufficient to support
the court's first conclusion that plaintiff was estopped from
challenging her husband's capacity.
Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in concluding that
the property in dispute would pass to defendant “regardless of
whether the Court finds the decedent Avery Edward Beck incompetent
or not.”
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the court's
findings are insufficient to support this second conclusion, and we
thus remand the case to the trial court for additional findings.
The court's second conclusion of law, that “[t]he property
would pass to the defendant herein regardless of whether the Court
finds the decedent Avery Edward Beck incompetent or not,” appears
to be based on “findings” 7 and 8:
7. That there is currently no challenge as to
the validity of Plaintiff's execution of the
Deed individually.
8. That assuming that Plaintiff is not
equitably estopped from challenging her
deceased husband's mental capacity as of
January 19, 1998, and that he was in fact
incompetent, she cannot challenge her own
conveyance of the property under the Deed in
dispute.
Finding 8, as we explained earlier, is actually a conclusion of
law.
Although the order does not refer expressly to estoppel by
deed, we believe that the conclusion may be referring to this
theory.
Estoppel by deed provides that “[i]f a grantor having no
title, a defective title, or an estate less than that which he
assumed to grant, conveys with warranty or covenants of likeimport, and subsequently acquires the title or estate which he
purported to convey . . . such after-acquired . . . will inure to
the grantee . . . by way of estoppel.
Baker v. Austin, 174 N.C.
433, 434, 93 S.E. 949, 950 (1917). “This is well settled: Where
a deed is sufficient in form to convey the grantor's whole
interest, an interest afterwards acquired passes by way of estoppel
to the grantee.”
Id. See also Barnes v. House, 253 N.C. 444, 449,
117 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (1960) (“Where one has only a contingent
interest in land and conveys such interest by warranty deed, such
deed passes the contingent interest in the land, by way of
estoppel, to the grantee as soon as remainder vests by the
happening of contingency upon which such vesting depends”);
Sparkes
v. Choate, 22 N.C. App. 62, 62, 205 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1974) (holding
as a matter of law that a person who joins in the execution of a
general warranty deed without limitation, reservation, or
exception, and who later obtains an interest through a conveyance
from an independent source, is later estopped to assert a claim of
right of way over the land conveyed by such deed).
If the court is basing its decision on the doctrine of
estoppel by deed, additional findings are needed to support such a
conclusion.
Estoppel by deed requires a showing 1) that plaintiff
Mrs. Beck had no title, a defective title, or an estate less than
that which she assumed to grant at the time of the deed execution,
2) that she purported to convey the property in dispute with
warranty or covenants of like import, and 3) that she subsequently
acquired the title or estate which she had previously purported to
convey.
See
Baker, 174 N.C. at 434, 93 S.E. at 950
. Because the findings of fact are insufficient to support the
court's conclusions and the order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 41 we vacate the order and remand for
additional findings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded for additional findings of fact.
Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
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