1. Churches and Religion_termination of membership_core ecclesiastical matter_no
judicial involvement
The trial court should have dismissed an action against a church for terminating
plaintiffs' membership on inaccurate grounds. Membership in a church is a matter in which the
courts should not be involved whether the church is congregational or hierarchical, incorporated
or unincorporated.
2. Churches and Religion_adoption of bylaws_within court's jurisdiction
The trial court correctly denied a motion to dismiss an action against a church claiming
that the people terminating plaintiffs' membership were without authority to do so under bylaws
which plaintiffs contest. Plaintiffs' membership in the church is in the nature of a property
interest, that interest is directly implicated, and the narrow issue of whether the bylaws were
properly adopted can be addressed without resolving ecclesiastical matters.
3. Churches and Religion_termination of membership--nonprofit corporation
statutes_ constitutional provisions
The trial court should have dismissed plaintiffs' action against a church asserting that
their membership was terminated in violation of statutory provisions concerning nonprofit
corporations. A church's criteria for membership and the manner in which membership is
terminated are core ecclesiastical matters protected by the constitutions of the United States and
North Carolina.
4. Churches and Religion_request for inspection of records and annual
meeting_standing as members_proper adoption of bylaws
On remand, plaintiffs' standing to pursue claims against their former church for orders
allowing inspection of records and for an annual meeting are dependent on whether they were
members at the time the suit was filed. If the court determines that disputed bylaws were
properly adopted, then the courts have no jurisdiction over the termination of plaintiffs'
membership and plaintiffs would lack standing to pursue these claims.
Harriss & Marion, P.L.L.C., by Joseph W. Marion, for
plaintiff-appellees.
Crews & Klein, P.C., by Paul I. Klein and Katherine Freeman,
for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Abundant Life Church, Inc. (defendant), is a corporation,
organized and existing under the provisions of Chapter 55A of the
North Carolina General Statutes (North Carolina Nonprofit
Corporation Act). Defendant was incorporated on 8 September 1982.
Both plaintiffs were founding members of the defendant. Plaintiff,
John Tubiolo, was one of the incorporators and an initial director
of the defendant. For a period of nearly two years prior to 5
September 2002, plaintiffs had disputes with the pastor and
leadership of the church. Plaintiffs contend that the disputes
arose out of the improper handling of finances by defendant.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs were in “open rebellion” against
the church leadership, and persistently engaged in conduct
detrimental to the body of the church. On 22 August 2002,
plaintiffs, through counsel, demanded copies of certain financial
records of the church. By letter dated 5 September 2002,
defendant's Church Council terminated plaintiffs' membership based
upon scriptural discipline. The letter set forth six separate
bases for the termination, and recited efforts made by the church
leadership to reconcile with the plaintiffs.
Following receipt of the letter terminating their membership
in defendant, plaintiffs filed this action on 8 October 2002.
Their complaint sought the following relief: (1) a preliminary and
permanent injunction enjoining defendant from terminating their
membership; (2) a court order directing defendant to allow
plaintiffs to inspect certain records of defendant; (3) a courtorder directing defendant to conduct an annual meeting after
reasonable notice to all members.
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule
12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. In the
alternative, defendant moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, and filed affidavits in support of
this motion. Plaintiffs filed affidavits in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.
By order dated 3 February 2003, Judge Titus denied defendant's
motion to dismiss and deferred ruling upon defendant's motion for
summary judgment pending completion of discovery. The order
specifically found that it “affects a substantial right of the
Defendant and that there is no just reason to delay an appeal
therefrom” pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. From the entry of this order, defendant appeals.
In its first assignment of error, defendant asserts that the
trial court erred in not granting its motion to dismiss. We agree,
in part.
The gravamen of defendant's argument, made both before the
trial court and this Court, is that the courts of this state should
not become involved in matters of church membership and church
discipline under the provisions of the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States of America and section 13 of
Article I of the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.
Based upon this theory, defendant's motion would have been
more properly made under Rule 12(b)(1) as a motion to dismiss forlack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Emory v. Jackson Chapel
First Missionary Baptist Church, 165 N.C. App. 489, 598 S.E.2d 667
(2004). “[Q]uestions of subject matter jurisdiction may properly
be raised at any point, even in the Supreme Court.” Forsyth County
Bd. of Social Services v. Division of Social Services, 317 N.C.
689, 692, 346 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1986)(citations omitted). In
Williams v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 104 N.C. App. 425,
428, 409 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1991)(quoting Harrell v. Whisenant, 53
N.C. App. 615, 617, 281 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1981)), this Court held
that a “motion is properly treated according to its substance
rather than its label,” and treated defendant's motion as one under
Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 12(b)(6). In the instant case, we
treat defendant's motion to dismiss as one made under Rule 12(b)(1)
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The appropriate standard of review in this case is de novo.
Emory, 165 N.C. App. at 491, 598 S.E.2d at 669. In considering a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is
appropriate for the court to consider and weigh matters outside of
the pleadings. Tart v. Walker, 38 N.C. App. 500, 502, 248 S.E.2d
736, 737 (1978).
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts three bases for their claim that
defendant improperly terminated their membership: (1) the grounds
stated in the termination letter were not accurate; (2) the persons
purporting to terminate their membership were without authority to
take that action; and (3) the termination was not conducted in a
fair and reasonable manner and in good faith as required by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55A-6-31(a). [1] The courts cannot become entangled in ecclesiastical
matters of a church.
The courts of the State have no jurisdiction
over and no concern with purely ecclesiastical
questions and controversies. . . . [T]he
courts do have jurisdiction as to civic,
contract and property rights which are
involved in or arise from a church
controversy, including the right to determine
the type organization of a particular church.
Braswell v. Purser, 282 N.C. 388, 393, 193 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1972).
Our courts have defined an ecclesiastical matter as:
“one which concerns doctrine, creed, or form
of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the
government of membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy of membership by the legally
constituted authorities of the church; and all
such matters are within the province of church
courts and their decisions will be respected
by civil tribunals.”
Eastern Conference of Original Free Will Baptists v. Piner, 267
N.C. 74, 77, 147 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1966), overruled in part on
different grounds by Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641
(1973)(quoting Western Conference of Original Free Will Baptists v.
Miles, 259 N.C. 1, 10-11, 129 S.E.2d 600, 606 (1963).
Membership in a church is a core ecclesiastical matter. The
power to control church membership is ultimately the power to
control the church. It is an area where the courts of this State
should not become involved. This stricture applies regardless of
whether the church is a congregational church, incorporated or
unincorporated, or an hierarchical church.
The prohibition on judicial cognizance of
ecclesiastical disputes is founded upon both
establishment and free exercise clauseconcerns. By adjudicating religious disputes,
civil courts risk affecting associational
conduct and thereby chilling the free exercise
of religious beliefs. Moreover, by entering
into a religious controversy and putting the
enforcement power of the state behind a
particular religious faction, a civil court
risks “establishing” a religion.
Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 721 (11th
Cir. 1987).
As to the first basis for challenging the termination of their
membership, that the grounds for termination are inaccurate,
plaintiffs acknowledge in their brief that:
Plaintiffs do not suggest that the trial court
has the authority to examine or decide whether
the grounds set forth in the purported
termination letter were accurate or whether
such grounds were legally sufficient to cause
Plaintiffs' membership to be terminated.
(emphasis in original).
The Courts will not become involved in determining whether grounds
for termination of church membership are doctrinally or
scripturally correct. The trial court erred, and should have
dismissed this as a basis for plaintiffs' claim that their
membership was improperly terminated.
[2] The second basis for plaintiffs' assertion that their
membership was improperly terminated was that the persons
purporting to terminate their membership were without authority to
take that action. Attached to plaintiffs' complaint was a copy of
what appears to be a portion of the defendant's bylaws. Article IV
is entitled “Membership”, and section 3 provides:
The members shall seek to live exemplary
Christian lives so as to bring honor to Christ
and uphold the witness of the church. Should
the need for church discipline arise among the
membership, the Senior Pastor and the ChurchCouncil shall be responsible for administering
such discipline, up to and including dismissal
from membership.
The letter dismissing the plaintiffs from the membership of
defendant, dated 5 September 2002, purports to be from the Church
Council. Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that no bylaws were ever
adopted by the defendant, and that the signatories of the 5
September 2002 letter were without authority to sign the letter.
While the Courts can under no circumstance referee ecclesiastical
disputes, they can adjudicate “property disputes”, provided that
this can be done without resolving underlying controversies over
religious doctrine. Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 316-17, 200
S.E.2d 641, 648 (1973); citing Presbyterian Church in United States
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969).
We hold that the plaintiffs' membership in the defendant is in
the nature of a property interest, and that the courts do have
jurisdiction over the very narrow issue of whether the bylaws were
properly adopted by the defendant. See Bouldin v. Alexander, 82
U.S. 131, 139-140, 21 L. Ed. 69, 71-72 (1872)(“we cannot decide who
ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated
have been regularly or irregularly cut off. . . . But we may
inquire whether the resolution of expulsion was the act of the
church, or of persons who were not the church and who consequently
had no right to excommunicate others.”). This inquiry can be made
without resolving any ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters. In so
holding we find the facts of this case to be distinguishable from
those in our recent opinion of Emory v. Jackson Chapel FirstMissionary Baptist Church, 165 N.C. App. 489, 598 S.E.2d 667
(2004). In Emory, the issue was a change in the form of governance
of the church, from an unincorporated association to a corporation.
No membership rights were implicated in this change. Thus, in
Emory, we held that the controversy only bore a “tangential
relationship to property rights.” In this case, we hold that the
plaintiffs' membership rights were directly implicated. We thus
affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
dismiss as to the second basis of plaintiffs' first claim.
[3] The third basis for plaintiffs' assertion that their
membership was improperly terminated was that the purported
termination was in violation of the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55A-6-31(a). This provision deals with the termination,
expulsion, and suspension of members of a nonprofit corporation
existing under the provisions of Chapter 55A, and reads as follows:
(a) No member of a corporation may be expelled
or suspended, and no membership may be
terminated or suspended, except in a manner
that is fair and reasonable and is carried out
in good faith.
The fact that defendant is a corporation under Chapter 55A does not
alter our analysis of whether the courts of this state have
jurisdiction in ecclesiastical disputes. Plaintiffs would have the
courts direct that churches cannot terminate membership without
following certain due process procedures including notice and an
opportunity to be heard. This we refuse to do. A church's
criteria for membership and the manner in which membership is
terminated are core ecclesiastical matters protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution andsection 13 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of North
Carolina. The trial court erred and should have dismissed this as
a basis for plaintiffs' claim that their membership was improperly
terminated.
[4] As to the plaintiffs' remaining claims seeking an order
allowing plaintiffs to inspect certain records of defendant, and
seeking an order directing defendant to conduct an annual meeting,
these claims are dependent upon plaintiffs being members of
defendant at the time of the filing of this lawsuit. If the trial
court determines that the bylaws were duly adopted, then the courts
have no jurisdiction over the termination of the plaintiffs'
membership in defendant. Since the termination occurred prior to
the filing of this action, plaintiffs would lack standing to pursue
these two claims against the defendant, and the trial court should
dismiss plaintiffs' action.
This matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent herewith.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur.
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