Paternity_deceased father_other known children_intervention not allowed
Those not listed in N.C.G.S. § 49-16 may not intervene in a paternity proceeding, and the
trial court correctly denied a motion to intervene by the guardian of the other children of the
deceased putative father.
McGEE, Judge.
The issue before this Court is whether a party not designated
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-16 may intervene in a civil paternity
action commenced pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-14.
Terry Darnell Thompson (decedent) died on 1 September 2001 in
a motorcycle accident. At the time of his death, decedent had two
minor, legitimated daughters, Tekia C. Jordon and Tené Caroline
Jordan (Tekia and Tené).
J.T. was born 1 March 2002 to Dianne Stockton (plaintiff), who
was living with decedent at the time of decedent's death. Genetic
testing conducted on decedent's brother and mother revealed a
99.96% probability that decedent was J.T.'s biological father. Prior to decedent's death, he repeatedly acknowledged that he was
the father of J.T. and stated his intention to care for J.T.
A petition was filed by the administrator of decedent's estate
on 7 August 2002 requesting that the trial court appoint guardians
ad litem for the known minor children of decedent, Tekia and Tené,
and for decedent's known illegitimate child, J.T. The petition
further requested that the trial court determine the status of the
heirs to decedent's estate. The trial court appointed guardians ad
litem on 7 August 2002 for all heirs at law noted in the
administrator's petition. On 14 January 2003, the natural guardian
of Tekia and Tené filed a response to the estate's petition in
which the guardian alleged that the statute of limitations for
J.T.'s paternity claim barred the action, and thus, Tekia and Tené
were the sole heirs to decedent's estate. The guardian ad litem
for J.T. filed an answer to the response. At the 5 February 2003
hearing regarding the estate's petition, the clerk of court held
that Tekia and Tené were heirs to the estate, but the clerk
deferred ruling as to J.T's status pending the resolution of a
paternity action regarding J.T.
Plaintiff filed a paternity action on 5 February 2003 alleging
that J.T. was the biological child of decedent. The guardian ad
litem for Tekia and Tené filed a motion to intervene in the
paternity action on 10 February 2003 in order to protect their
pecuniary interest in decedent's estate. Tekia's and Tené's
guardian ad litem also filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint
asserting that the statute of limitations had passed for initiating
a paternity action. In an order filed 14 March 2003, the trialcourt denied the motion to intervene and on 27 March 2003, the
trial court denied Tekia's and Tené's guardian ad litem's motion
for reconsideration of the motion to intervene. The guardian ad
litem for Tekia and Tené appeals.
We first note that the trial court's order denying appellant's
motion to intervene is interlocutory. See generally Alford v.
Davis, 131 N.C. App. 214, 216, 505 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1998); Veazey
v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). The order
in this case is interlocutory because the trial court had not
disposed of the entire controversy among the parties. United
Services Automobile Assn. v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 395, 485
S.E.2d 337, 339 disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 141, 492 S.E.2d 37
(1997). Interlocutory orders are generally not subject to
immediate appeal; however, "immediate appellate review is permitted
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 [2003] and N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-27(a) [2003], if the order adversely affects a substantial right
which the appellant may lose if not granted an appeal before final
judgment." Id.; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. . 1-277 (2003); N.C. Gen.
Stat. . 7A-27 (2003).
By failing to address the interlocutory nature of the order in
a brief to this Court, appellant violated N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4).
However, pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2, this Court elects, in its
discretion, to hear the merits of appellant's argument. We
conclude that appellant's motion to intervene involves a
substantial right which would be irreparably impaired if the trial
court's order was not reviewed prior to the trial court's final
judgment in the underlying paternity action. The paternity action regarding J.T. was filed pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. .§ 49-14 and 49-16 by J.T.'s biological mother.
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 49-16 (2003) explicitly lists those individuals
who have standing to participate in a paternity proceeding. Under
the statute which is entitled, "Parties to proceeding," a paternity
action may be brought by
(1) The mother, the father, the child, or the
personal representative of the mother or the
child. [or]
(2) When the child, or the mother in case of
medical expenses, is likely to become a
public charge, the director of social
services or such person as by law performs
the duties of such official[.]
N.C.G.S. . 49-16. It is logical to conclude that the General
Assembly anticipated that the only defendant in a paternity
proceeding would be the putative parent. N.C. Gen. Stat. . 49-14
(2003) provides for the procedure by which a civil action to
establish paternity may be initiated by those specifically listed
in N.C.G.S. . 49-16. "The primary goal of statutory
construction is to effectuate the purpose of the legislature in
enacting the statute." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356
N.C. 571, 574, 573 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2002). "When confronting an
issue involving statutory interpretation, [an appellate court's]
'primary task is to determine legislative intent while giving the
language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the
context requires otherwise.'" Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire
Dep't, Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 320, 523 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2000) (quoting
Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397
(1988)). In Smith v. Bumgarner, 115 N.C. App. 149, 151, 443 S.E.2d 744,
745 (1994), this Court recognized that "[t]he legislative purpose
of an action under G.S. § 49-14 is to provide the basis or means of
establishing the identity of the biological father so that the
child's right to support may be enforced and the child will not
become a public charge." In Smith, our Court acknowledged that in
enacting N.C.G.S. § 49-16, the General Assembly knowingly abrogated
the common law and specifically listed those individuals and
entities who may bring an action pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 49-14.
Smith, 115 N.C. App. at 151-52, 443 S.E.2d at 745-46 ("If the
legislature had intended to require the child to be joined as a
necessary party in an action under G.S. § 49-14, then it would have
specifically stated such[.]"). We conclude that the General
Assembly, in explicitly listing who may be a party to a paternity
proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 49-14, did not intend for others
not set forth in the statute to intervene in such a paternity
proceeding. To hold otherwise, would render ineffective the clear
and unambiguous meaning of N.C.G.S. § 49-16. Thus, appellant's
argument is without merit.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***