2. Evidence--defendant's testimony--damages
The trial court did not err in an action arising out of an automobile accident by
considering defendant's testimony as a basis for awarding a new trial on the issue of damages to
the minor plaintiffs where plaintiff never objected to such testimony at trial, because: (1) a trial
court is not prevented from considering specific testimony when ruling on a motion for a new
trial under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(6) even if a party did not object to it; and (2) Rule
59(a)(6) requires the trial court to find the award of damages to have been influenced by passion
or prejudice, and such a determination requires a consideration of the entire record.
3. Evidence--findings of fact--conclusions of law
The trial court did not err in an action arising out of an automobile accident by its finding
of fact number 12 because it was supported by competent evidence, and the conclusions of law
were supported by the findings of fact.
4. Trials--motion for new trial--abuse of discretion standard--de novo review
While a trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo, a ruling in the discretion
of the trial court such as a decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial raises no question of
law, and thus, the issue before the court is whether the trial court abused its discretion instead of
whether the trial court's decision was proper under a de novo review.
Taylor Law Office, by W. Earl Taylor, Jr. for plaintiffs-
appellees.
Patterson, Dilthey, Clay, Bryson & Anderson, L.L.P, by Carrie
E. Meigs, for defendant-appellant
STEELMAN, Judge.
Defendant, Robert Satterly, appeals the trial court's order
setting aside the verdict previously entered and granting a new
trial on the issue of damages to the minor plaintiffs. For the
reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
On 3 March 1998, the parties herein were involved in an
automobile accident, when defendant's vehicle ran a red light and
collided into the vehicle in which plaintiffs were passengers.
After the accident occurred, defendant came over to plaintiffs'
vehicle to see if anyone was hurt. Defendant stated that when he
looked into the vehicle, he saw the driver's wife holding the baby,
and in the rear of the car he saw one child standing in the seat,
kind of jumping up and down, and the other child lying on the back
seat of the car. The children were initially taken to Wilson
Memorial Hospital for treatment of their injuries, but shortly
after their arrival they were transferred to Pitt Memorial Hospital
in Greenville, North Carolina.
As a result of the accident: (1) minor plaintiff, Sheryn Guox,
suffered multiple bruising and a fracture of her clavicle, with
some malpositioning of the bone requiring hospitalization for four
days; (2) minor plaintiff, Jonathan Guox, suffered a rib fracture
and a pulmonary contusion requiring hospitalization for three days;
and (3) minor plaintiff, Iliana Guox, suffered a loss of
consciousness, multiple skull fractures, and a moderate to severe
brain injury requiring hospitalization for five days. Several
medical experts presented conflicting evidence as to the nature and
extent of Iliana's injuries. Santos Vicente Guox, the minorplaintiffs' mother, incurred medical expenses for the treatment of
her children's injuries from the automobile accident in the amount
of (1) $5,526.40 for treatment of Sheryn Guox; (2) $9,477.95 for
treatment of Jonathan Guox; and (3)$15,523.09 for treatment of
Iliana Guox.
An eyewitness testified defendant's light was red when he
proceeded into the intersection. At trial defendant did not
dispute the eyewitness' statement and accepted responsibility for
the accident. The trial judge directed a verdict against defendant
on the issue of liability. Consequently, the only issue remaining
for the jury was the amount, if any, to award the minor plaintiffs
for damages.
After hearing the evidence, the jury awarded damages to the
plaintiff, Santos Vicente Guox, for medical expenses for her minor
children in the amount of $5,526.40 for Sheryn, $9,477.95 for
Jonathan, and $15,523.09 for Iliana. The jury awarded damages for
pain, suffering, and permanent injury to the minor plaintiffs in
the amount of (1) $2,000.00 for Sheryn; (2) $2,000.00 for Jonathan;
and (3) $37,000.00 for Iliana.
On 16 July 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial
pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) on the grounds that inadequate
damages appeared to have been awarded to the minor plaintiffs based
on passion or prejudice. In support of plaintiffs' motion, they
cited four pieces of testimony by defendant which they believed
contributed to the inadequate damages award: (1) defendant's
observations regarding the minor children following the motor
vehicle accident, which plaintiffs contend suggested that thechildren were not wearing proper safety restraints; (2) that he
purchased toys and visited the children both at the hospital and at
their home; (3) that he offered money to the family while they were
in the hospital to assist with expenses; and (4) that he
discontinued contact with the family because he knew they had
contacted an attorney and he knew “what was coming next.” On 15
March 2003, Judge Sumner granted plaintiffs' motion for a new trial
on the issue of damages and set aside the verdicts previously
entered on the issue of damages to the minor plaintiffs. As a
basis for granting plaintiffs' motion, the trial court cited in its
findings of fact those four pieces of testimony from defendant, as
well as the extent of the injuries the minor plaintiffs incurred as
a result of defendant's negligence. Defendant appealed.
[1] In his first assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
We disagree.
The trial court may grant a new trial due to “[e]xcessive or
inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice[.]” N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) (2003). “'A
motion for a new trial on the grounds of inadequate damages is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court[.]'” Warren
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 142 N.C. App. 316, 320, 542 S.E.2d 317, 319
(2001) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 127 N.C. App. 1, 12,
487 S.E.2d 807, 814, disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 398, 494 S.E.2d
410 (1997)). After reading the cold record, an appellate court may
reverse such a decision, but “only in those exceptional cases where
abuse of discretion is clearly shown.” Lusk v. Case, 94 N.C. App.215, 217, 379 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1989). Thus, the trial court's
discretion is “'practically unlimited.'” Anderson v. Hollifield,
345 N.C. 480, 483, 480 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1997) (quoting Campbell v.
Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 321 N.C. 260, 264-65, 362 S.E.2d 273,
275-76 (1987)).
After a careful review of the record, we are unable to say
that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial. Therefore, we hold that the trial court
did not err.
[2] In his second assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred in considering his testimony, as referenced
above, as a basis for awarding a new trial where plaintiff never
objected to such testimony at trial.
In determining whether a damages award was excessive or
inadequate due to the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial
judge must consider the testimony and evidence presented at trial.
Just because a party did not object to specific testimony does not
prevent the trial court from considering it when ruling on a motion
for a new trial pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). While there
is no case law directly on point, there are several reasons that
support our conclusion. First, nothing in Rule 59(a)(6) requires
that such an objection be made at trial in order to serve as
grounds for a new trial. We find it telling that another of the
grounds listed in Rule 59(a) for awarding a new trial does
specifically require such an objection to be made at trial. Rule
59(a)(8) states that the trial court may grant a motion for a new
trial where there was an “[e]rror in law occurring at the trial andobjected to by the party making the motion[.]” N.C. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(8) (2003)(emphasis added). Second, Rule 59(a)(6) requires
the trial court to find the award of damages to have been
influenced by “passion or prejudice.” Such a determination
requires a consideration of the entire record. See Britt v. Allen,
291 N.C. 630, 634-635, 231 S.E.2d 607, 611 (1977) (noting that
where a party moves for a new trial because the verdict is against
the greater weight of the evidence, such a motion requires the
trial judge to appraise the testimony given since the judge has the
discretionary power to set the verdict aside). For these reasons,
we hold that the trial judge did not err in considering defendant's
testimony when ruling on the Rule 59(a)(6) motion for a new trial,
even though plaintiffs' counsel never objected to the testimony at
trial.
[3] In defendant's third and final assignment of error, he
contends Finding of Fact No. 12 is unsupported by competent record
evidence and the conclusions of law are unsupported by the findings
of fact.
After careful review of the whole record, including the
transcripts, we hold the trial court's finding of fact No. 12 is
supported by competent evidence in the record.
Defendant further contends Findings of Fact Nos. 13 and 14 are
more properly classified as conclusions of law rather than findings
of fact.
A determination which requires the exercise of judgment or the
application of legal principles is more appropriately a conclusionof law. In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675
(1997). Findings of Fact 13 and 14 read as follows:
13. The court finds, in its considered
discretion, that inadequate damages were
awarded to the minor plaintiffs, Jonathan
Guox, Sheryn Guox, and Iliana Guox.
14. The courts finds, in its considered
discretion, that the inadequate damages appear
to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
Even though these determinations were stated as findings of fact,
they are more properly conclusions of law, as they require the
application of legal principles to the facts of the case.
“Generally, a judgment is in a form that contains findings,
conclusions, and a decree.” Langston v. Johnson, 142 N.C. App.
506, 508, 543 S.E.2d 176, 178 (2001). Where the lower court fails
to follow this exact form, it will not be fatal to the judgment, as
the adequacy of a writing purporting to be a judgment “is to be
tested by its substance rather than its form.” Id. Here, we are
able to determine that the findings of fact are supported by
competent evidence, and in turn the conclusions of law are
supported by the findings of fact.
[4[ Finally, defendant contends that since the findings of
fact, which are more properly classified as conclusions of law are
reviewable de novo, the inquiry then becomes whether the trial
court's decision was proper. While it is true that a trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewable de novo, State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C.
642, 653, 566 S.E.2d 61, 69 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1133,
154 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2003), that is not the case here. Pursuant to
Rule 59(a), the trial court is vested with the discretionary
authority to grant or deny a motion for a new trial. Frye v.Anderson, 86 N.C. App. 94, 96, 356 S.E.2d 370, 371, disc. review
denied, 320 N.C. 791, 361 S.E.2d 74 (1987). “A ruling in the
discretion of the trial judge raises no question of law.” Id. at
95, 356 S.E.2d at 371 (emphasis added). As a result, the issue
before this Court is not whether the trial court's decision was
proper under a de novo review, as defendant suggests. Rather, our
review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion,
and as we stated above, it did not.
Therefore, the order of the trial court which sets aside the
verdict and grants a new trial is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges WYNN and CALABRIA concur.
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