Child Support, Custody, and Visitation--prohibiting possession or ownership of firearms-
_failure to address safety of children
The trial court erred in a child custody and support case by ordering that defendant father
cannot possess or own any firearms until the parties' children are emancipated or until further
order, because: (1) the court's finding that defendant owns and keeps guns at his home and on his
person, without any finding or conclusion that the children are endangered by those guns, does
not support this order; and (2) the trial court failed to address whether the safety of the children is
affected by the father's ownership of firearms as required by N.C.G.S. § 50-13.2(a).
Daniel J. Clifton, for defendant-appellant.
No brief filed for plaintiff-appellee.
HUDSON, Judge.
On 15 November 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint and motion
for domestic violence protective order against defendant for their
son's protection, and the court granted a ten-day order ex parte.
Following a hearing on 25 November 2002, the court granted the
domestic violence protective order for one year. The order
prohibited anyone from using physical discipline on the son, and
prohibited defendant from possessing firearms for the duration of
the order.
Also on 25 November 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking
child custody and support. That matter was consolidated with the
domestic violence case protective order. On 31 March 2003, aftera hearing, the court entered an order setting temporary child
support. A permanent child custody and child support order was
filed on 4 June 2003. This order prohibited defendant from owning
or possessing any firearms until the children are emancipated or
until further order. Defendant appeals. Plaintiff did not file a
brief in this Court. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.
Defendant Steven Martin and plaintiff Jamie Martin married on
22 September 1995. They have two minor children, a son, C., born
2 January 1996, and a daughter, S., born 22 June 1998. After
plaintiff and defendant separated in February 2000, defendant began
living with Pam Whitty (Ms. Whitty). Plaintiff and defendant
shared custody of the children, and Ms. Whitty sometimes cared for
the children at defendant's home. These proceedings began after 14
November 2002, when Ms. Whitty spanked C. and injured him.
Defendant argues that the court exceeded its statutory
authority in ordering that defendant not possess or own any
firearms until the children are emancipated or until further order.
We agree.
In the permanent custody and child support order filed 4 June
2003, the court made extensive findings of fact, only one of which
pertains to defendant's possession of guns:
10. Father is a gun collector. When the DVPO
was entered, eleven firearms were removed by
the Sheriff's Department. When father had his
guns, he kept them with him much of the time,
including in his vehicle on errands with the
children. Mother testified, and the court
finds this more likely than not to be true,
that he slept with a loaded handgun under his
pillow (he denies this). He has continued to
purchase gun parts, and knives, on Ebay. The
DVPO will expire November 25, 2003 and unless
it is renewed, father will have theopportunity to retrieve his firearms, upon
filing a motion and getting a court order.
Although both defendant and Ms. Whitty testified that defendant
never allowed a loaded gun to be out in the open, and that he
followed rules of gun safety, the court made no further findings
about this matter. The court mentioned neither guns nor any threat
or danger to the children's safety or well-being from defendant in
its other findings and conclusions. Defendant contends that
finding 10 alone does not support the court's order that:
9. Father shall not own or possess any
firearms until the children are emancipated,
or until further order. Should he file a
motion for return of firearms in 02 CVD 20738,
that motion shall be set for hearing before
the undersigned.
We agree.
The standard of review of a child custody order is well-
established:
Our trial courts are vested with broad
discretion in child custody matters. This
discretion is based upon the trial courts'
opportunity to see the parties; to hear the
witnesses; and to detect tenors, tones, and
flavors that are lost in the bare printed
record read months later by appellate judges.
. . . In addition to evaluating whether a
trial court's findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, [an appellate court]
must determine if the trial court's factual
findings support its conclusions of law.
Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474-5, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253-4
(2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52. By enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-
13.2(a) the General Assembly has specifically required trial courts
to take into account any history of domestic violence, as follows: An order for custody of a minor child entered
pursuant to this section shall award the
custody of such child to such person, agency,
organization or institution as will best
promote the interest and welfare of the child.
In making the determination, the court shall
consider all relevant factors including acts
of domestic violence between the parties, the
safety of the child, and the safety of either
party from domestic violence by the other
party and shall make findings accordingly.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(a) (2003) (emphasis added). Here, the
court's finding that defendant owns and keeps guns at his home and
on his person, without any finding or conclusion that the children
are endangered by those guns, does not support its order barring
defendant from owning or possessing guns until the children are
emancipated or until further court order.
Further, in this custody order, the trial court has reached
this conclusion without addressing whether the safety of the
children is affected by the father's ownership of firearms, as the
statute specifically requires. Because these findings are required
by the statute, we conclude that in the absence of such findings,
we must vacate the order and remand for further proceedings and a
new order entered consistent with the statute and with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***