IN THE MATTER OF: THE PETITION OF CENTRAL TELEPHONE COMPANY
CONCERNING THE ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR CORPORATE INCOME TAX
PURPOSES FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1991.
NO. COA03-1313
Filed: 16 November 2004
1. Taxation_Augmented Tax Review Board_no administrative appeal_de novo action
in superior court
There is no administrative appeal process from decisions made by the Augmented Tax
Review Board (ATRB). As directed by statute, the corporate tax must be paid and recovery sued
for in superior court, with such challenges being heard de novo in superior court pursuant to that
court's original jurisdiction. N.C.G.S. §§ 105-130.4(t)(6), 105-241.4, 105-267.
2. Taxation_no appeal from Augmented Tax Review Board_de novo action in superior
court _constitutional
A corporate taxpayer challenging the apportionment formula for taxable income from the
sale of businesses was afforded a fair appeal from the Augmented Tax Review Board by way of
a de novo action in superior court. Petitioner's constitutional challenges would have merit only
if it was left completely without redress.
3. Taxation_review of Augmented Tax Review Board denied_day in court_civil action
for refund
Petitioner was not denied its day in court to contest a tax liability where the trial court
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction its appeal from the ruling of the Augmented Tax
Review Board. There is no right to judicial review of a decision by the ATRB, but petitioner's
day in court is available through bringing a civil action for refund of the paid tax.
Appeal by petitioner Central Telephone Company from order
entered 26 June 2003 by Judge A. Leon Stanback in Wake County
Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 June 2004.
Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., by Paul H. Frankel and Craig B.
Fields, (both admitted pro hac vice); and Alston & Bird,
L.L.P., by Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., for Central Telephone
Company petitioner appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Kay Linn Miller Hobart, for defendant appellee.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Central Telephone Company (petitioner) appeals from anorder by the superior court dismissing, based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, its petition for judicial review from a
decision of the Augmented Tax Review Board (ATRB). See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) (2003) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner's appeal arises from the
following undisputed facts: During the tax year ending 31
December 1991, petitioner sold two of its extraterritorial
telephone companies, one located in Iowa and one in Minnesota.
By following the normal apportionment formula (the apportionment
formula) for corporate North Carolina telephone operators,
petitioner believed the sale of these two extraterritorial
telephone companies was improperly attributed as income for its
business activities in North Carolina for the 1991 tax year. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(n) (2003).
(See footnote 1)
Specifically, petitioner
contended:
Under § 105-130.4(n), income of a telephone
company is apportioned on the basis of gross
operating revenue. Using the 12-31-91 Income
Statement, the percentage of total income
apportionable to North Carolina is 31.52%.
Under normal apportionment calculation, this
would result in an amount of income
attributable to North Carolina of
$59,602,186. North Carolina net income as
reflected on the 12-31-91 income statement is$22,304,876. By following the normal
apportionment formula, over two and one half
times the recognized income would be
attributable to business within North
Carolina. The increase is directly due to
the income from the sale of the Iowa and
Minnesota divisions.
(Emphasis added.)
On 13 April 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the ATRB
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(1), seeking relief
from the statutory formula. The ATRB acknowledged the petition
on 15 April 1992, and granted a hearing date for sometime in the
near future. Having been granted an extension for filing,
petitioner filed its taxes in conformance with the apportionment
formula on 16 September 1992. Petitioner made a tax payment to
the Department of Revenue in the amount of $4,646,872.00.
The record shows that a hearing before the ARTB was to be
set for some time between 28 December 1993 and June of 1994.
Counsel for petitioner changed during this time period. The
hearing date was scheduled for 9 November 1994. Centel
Corporation, the parent corporation of petitioner, was then
acquired by Sprint Corporation (Sprint), and counsel for Sprint
requested the ATRB hearing be continued until at least January
1995. The request was granted, and on 18 April 1995, petitioner
was given notice of a 9 May 1995 hearing date. After a hearing
was held on this date, the ATRB rendered Administrative Decision
Number 444 dated 16 June 1995, denying the use of a separate
accounting method or a bifurcated apportionment formula for
computing petitioner's North Carolina taxable income for the taxyear of 1991. The ATRB concluded petitioner failed to overcome
the presumption, as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
130.4(t)(4) (2003), that the statutory apportionment formula
reasonably attributes to North Carolina that portion of the
corporation's income earned in this State.
On 17 July 1995, petitioner filed a petition for judicial
review of the ATRB decision. Petitioner based the Wake County
Superior Court's jurisdiction on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
130.4(t)(6), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-43, et seq. (2003), and
other applicable law. The State filed a motion to dismiss this
petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1),
stating the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for such
review.
As set out in the findings of fact for the Final Decision of
the Secretary of Revenue denying petitioner's corporate refund
which petitioner sought using alternative apportionment
calculations (which the ATRB had already denied the use of), the
record shows the following: On 17 July 1995, petitioner filed an
amended North Carolina Corporate Income Tax Return for the tax
year of 1991 using the alternative bifurcated apportionment
formula presented to and rejected by the ATRB. In this,
petitioner sought a refund of $4,148,422 pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105-266.1. By letter dated 17 July 1995, petitioner
sought a refund of this amount pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
267 (2003). By letter dated 6 July 1996, the Department of
Revenue denied petitioner's request for refund pursuant to N.C.Gen. Stat. § 105-267 as untimely. However, on 21 July 2000,
petitioner was allowed an administrative tax hearing under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-266.1 which was then held on 16 August 2000
before the Secretary of Revenue. The Secretary's Final Decision
pursuant to the administrative hearing, dated 29 December 2000,
denied petitioner any refund on taxes paid for the year of 1991.
Concerning its request for judicial review of the ATRB
decision, at issue in this case, petitioner filed a motion for a
continuance on 31 January 2001. The motion was based on the
following:
To the extent that the Tax Review Board
reverses the Final Decision dated December
29, 2000 and excludes the gain from the Iowa
and Minnesota Divisions from Petitioner's
North Carolina apportionable tax base on any
ground, this proceeding would be mooted in
its entirety. If, however, the Tax Review
Board declines to reverse the Final Decision,
Petitioner would seek judicial review of that
decision pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-
43.
In an effort to preserve the resources
of the Court and the litigants and to
simplify and streamline the issues for
judicial review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
150B-43, Petitioner therefore respectfully
requests a continuance of this matter from
the February 12, 2001 trial calender pending
resolution by the Tax Review Board of the
Request for Refund pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 266.1.
This motion was granted in an order filed 7 February 2001, and
the future date was not rescheduled until notice was given for
the Tax Review Board's ruling on the refund request pursuant toN.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-266.1. The record does not reflect the Tax
Review Board's disposition in that matter. Finally, in an order
filed 26 June 2003, the State's motion to dismiss the petition
for judicial review of the ATRB decision was granted.
Petitioner now raises three issues in its appeal from the
trial court's dismissal. First, petitioner alleges that North
Carolina General Statutes and accompanying regulations authorize
an appeal to superior court from a decision of the ATRB. Second,
petitioner alleges that if there is not statutory authority for
judicial review of a decision by the ATRB, then petitioner's
rights to an ensured system of checks and balances under the
North Carolina Constitution's, and the United States
Constitution's guarantees of due process, equal protection, and
rights under the commerce clause have been violated. Lastly,
petitioner contends affirming the trial court's dismissal will
deny petitioner its day in court because the parallel case
seeking refund pursuant to an alternative statutory route has
also been dismissed. We now address these issues in turn.
[1] Petitioner contends there is statutory authority
conferring jurisdiction for judicial review of a decision from the
ATRB under the following: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6), N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4 (2003) as directed by N.C. Admin. Code tit.
20, r. 4.0310 (June 2004), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-43 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). We do not agree that any of
these statutes provide for judicial review of a decision from theATRB.
Before addressing the merits of the issue presented, it is
helpful to understand the difference between the regular Tax Review
Board and the ATRB. The composition of the Tax Review Board is
set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-269.2 (2003):
The Tax Review Board shall be composed of
the following members: (i) the State
Treasurer, ex officio, who shall be chairman
of the board; (ii) the chairman of the
Utilities Commission, ex officio; (iii) a
member appointed by the Governor; and (iv) the
Secretary of Revenue, ex officio, who shall be
a member
only for the purposes stated in G.S.
105-122 and 105-130.4. The member whom the
Governor shall appoint shall serve for a term
of four years and until his successor is
appointed and qualified. The first such
appointment shall be made for a term beginning
on July 1, 1975.
(Emphasis added.) This composition is more clearly laid out in
N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0103 (June 2004):
The title Tax Review Board actually refers
to two boards, the regular Tax Review Board
and the augmented Tax Review Board. The
regular Tax Review Board is composed of the
following members: the State Treasurer, ex
officio, who shall be the Chairman of the Tax
Review Board; the Chairman of the Utilities
Commission, ex officio; and a member appointed
by the Governor. The augmented Tax Review
Board [ATRB] includes the Secretary of Revenue
in addition to the other members of the
regular Tax Review Board.
The relevant purpose of the regular Tax Review Board is to hear
appeals from decisions of the Secretary of Revenue as an appellate
administrative agency having quasi-judicial authority and holding
such hearings strictly on the record of appeal from the Secretary.
N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0201 (June 2004). The relevantpurpose of the ATRB is to consider petitions from corporate
taxpayers for use of alternate allocation formulas in determining
tax bases for income taxes. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0301
(June 2004). Concerning the ATRB, there is no reference to it as
an appellate administrative agency.
The ATRB composition of the Tax Review Board (with the
Secretary of Revenue as one of the decision makers for the Board)
is used only in specific instances as required in N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 105-122 and 105-130.4. Therefore, as used throughout N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105-130.4(t), the Tax Review Board refers to the ATRB.
However, because the ATRB initially reviews a corporate
petitioner's claim for relief from its apportionment formula, not
as an appellate administrative agency, the function of ATRB is
quite different, as are the implications of its decisions. The
Secretary is actually a member of the ATRB, voting in the decision,
and not a party by way of appeal before the regular Tax Review
Board.
Turning now to the merits of petitioner's claim. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105_130.4(t)(1) states in relevant part:
If any corporation believes that the method of
allocation or apportionment as administered by
the Secretary has operated or will so operate
as to subject it to taxation on a greater
portion of its income than is reasonably
attributable to business or earnings within
the State, it may file with the Tax Review
Board a
petition setting forth the facts upon
which its belief is based and its argument
with respect to the application of the
allocation formula.... At least three members
of the Tax Review Board shall attend any
hearing pursuant to such petition. In suchcases, the Tax Review Board's membership shall
be augmented by the addition of the Secretary,
who shall sit as a member of the Board with
full power to participate in its deliberations
and decisions with respect to petitions filed
under the provisions of this subsection. An
informal record containing in substance the
evidence, contentions and arguments presented
at the hearing shall be made. All members of
the
augmented Tax Review Board shall consider
such evidence, contentions and arguments and
the decisions thereon shall be made by a
majority vote of the
augmented Board.
(Emphasis added.) When a corporation makes such a petition, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(2) & (3) allows for the petitioner to
have the ATRB consider the following: instances where a detailed
accounting of receipts and expenditures [] reflects more clearly
than the applicable allocation formula prescribed by this section
the income attributable to the business within this State, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(2); or the corporation shows any other
method of allocation than the applicable allocation formula
prescribed by this section reflects more clearly the income
attributable to the business within this State. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
105-130.4(t)(3). To seek redress from an adverse decision from the
ATRB, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6) provides:
When the Secretary asserts liability under the
formula adjustment decision of the [Augmented]
Tax Review Board, an aggrieved corporation
may
pay the tax and bring a civil action for
recovery under the provisions of Article 9.
(Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, in lieu of application of the
apportionment formula, petitioner petitioned the ATRB to consider
both a separate accounting pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(2), or in the alternative, a bifurcated apportionment
formula pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(3). The ATRB
denied the petitioner's request, finding petitioner had not
overcome the statutory presumption that the appropriate
apportionment formula reasonably attributes the corporation's
income earned in the state. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(4).
Petitioner contends that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6) creates
jurisdiction in the superior court to give appellate review of the
ATRB's decision. We do not agree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6) directs the aggrieved
taxpayer to pay any tax liability, and bring a civil action under
Article 9 of North Carolina's Tax Code. Following the language of
that statute, petitioner was directed to the provision of Article
9 of the tax code for an Action to recover tax paid. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105-241.4;
see also, N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0310.
(See footnote 2)
In relevant part, this statute states:
Within 30 days after notification of the
Secretary's decision with respect to liability
under this Subchapter or Subchapter V, any
taxpayer aggrieved thereby, in lieu of
petitioning for administrative review thereof
by the Tax Review Board under G.S. 105-241.2,
may pay the tax and bring a civil action forits recovery as provided in G.S. 105-267.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4. Following the language of this
statute, a petitioner is directed to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267
(2003) which, in relevant part, states:
Whenever a person has a valid defense to the
enforcement of the collection of a tax, the
person shall pay the tax to the proper
officer, and that payment shall be without
prejudice to any defense of rights the person
may have regarding the tax. At any time within
the applicable protest period, the taxpayer
may demand a refund of the tax paid in writing
from the Secretary and if the tax is not
refunded within 90 days thereafter, may sue
the Secretary in the courts of the State for
the amount demanded.... The protest period
for all other taxes is three years after
payment.
The suit may be brought in the Superior
Court of Wake County, or in the county in
which the taxpayer resides at any time within
three years after the expiration of the 90-day
period allowed for making the refund. If upon
the trial it is determined that all or part of
the tax was levied or assessed for an illegal
or unauthorized purpose, or was for any reason
invalid or excessive, judgment shall be
rendered therefor, with interest, and the
judgment shall be collected as in other cases.
The amount of taxes for which judgment is
rendered in such an action shall be refunded
by the State. G.S. 105-241.2 provides an
alternate procedure for a taxpayer to contest
a tax and is not in conflict with or
superseded by this section.
Therefore, ultimately N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267 is the relevant
blueprint for a petitioner's relief from an adverse decision by
the ATRB. Additionally, a corporation is not required to first
petition the ATRB before pursuing redress under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
105-267.
Oil Corp., 267 N.C. at 19, 147 S.E.2d at 526. The plain,unambiguous language of that statute requires the petitioner to pay
the tax and file a civil action in superior court against the
Secretary. Pursuant thereto, a trial is held to determine whether
the Secretary's tax assessment was correct. Therefore, the
superior court determines this issue pursuant to its original
jurisdiction.
Duke v. Shaw, Commissioner of Revenue, 247 N.C. 236,
240, 100 S.E.2d 506, 508-09 (1957) (where our Supreme Court
explained that the only time the superior court has appellate
jurisdiction in reviewing the Secretary's tax assessment is when
the regular Tax Review Board, upon its review of the Secretary's
final decision, renders a decision pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
105-241.2 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.3.).
The tax regulation for Appeals from the Decision of the
ATRB, relied on heavily by petitioner, at first blush purports to
grant appellate jurisdiction in the superior court to review a
decision by the ATRB. It states:
When the Secretary of Revenue asserts
liability under the formula adjustment
decision of the board, an aggrieved
corporation may pay the tax and bring a civil
action for recovery under the provisions of
G.S. 105-241.4. On appeal the superior court
will view the hearing record of the augmented
board. This record will consist of claimant's
petition, brief, evidence, documents, and
papers and the final decision of the board.
N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0310. However, a close reading of
this regulation reveals that it is inconsistent. The first half of
the regulation requires the aggrieved corporation to pay its tax
and bring a civil action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4.As set out above, this civil action is to be filed in accord with
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267 and is therefore before the superior
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. However, the last two
sentences of N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0310 seem to confer
appellate jurisdiction upon the superior court, where the court
will consider only the record of the ATRB hearing. We can find no
statutory authority for the creation of this appellate
jurisdiction, and it conflicts with the regulation's direction to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4 and ultimately N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
267.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-21.9(a)(1) (Regulations must be
within the authority delegated to the agency by the General
assembly.). To the extent this regulation is inconsistent with
its statutory authority, we hold it to be invalid and without legal
effect.
Additionally, petitioner argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-43
of the APA provides appellate jurisdiction in the superior court
over decisions by the ATRB. However, in light of the direction of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6) to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4
after paying the tax liability, we do not agree. Generally, a
taxpayer contesting liability has two routes in seeking relief. The
first is by way of administrative review: without paying the
contested tax liability, a taxpayer must obtain a hearing before
the Secretary of Revenue, and assuming the party is aggrieved, the
regular Tax Review Board will review the Secretary's final
decision.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.2. If an adverse decision
from the regular Board is received, then the taxpayer may pay thetax and penalties, and appeal to the superior court for
appellate
review of the regular Board's decision pursuant to Article 4 of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.3. This is also
explained in the regulations for the regular Tax Review Board:
Any taxpayer aggrieved by the decision of the
regular board may either pay the tax,
penalties and interest asserted to be due or
may file with the Secretary of Revenue a bond
in the amount due and then appeal the decision
of the board to the superior court under the
provisions of Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the
General Statutes.
N.C. Admin. Code tit. 20, r. 4.0208 (June 2004) (emphasis added).
The second route in which a taxpayer may seek relief is to bypass
administrative review, pay the tax liability immediately, and bring
a civil action for its recovery pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
267. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4. There is also a hybrid of these
two routes, such that, in lieu of appealing for superior court
review of the regular Tax Review Board's decision made pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.2, the taxpayer can pay the tax and file
a civil action for recovery under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4 in
the superior court's original jurisdiction.
In sum, administrative review is a process invoked by
receiving a final decision from the Secretary, and appealing that
decision to the regular Tax Review Board which then renders a final
decision.
See Duke, 247 N.C. at 240, 100 S.E.2d at 508-09. The
administrative review route is not an option for corporations
contesting the applicable apportionment formula before the ATRB, as
the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6) requiresaggrieved corporations to pay the tax and
bring a civil action,
thus directing them to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 241.4 (emphasis added).
(See footnote 3)
Additionally, the APA provides for a right of judicial review under
its provisions when
[a]ny person who is aggrieved by the final
decision in a contested case, and who has
exhausted all administrative remedies made
available to him by statute or agency rule...
unless adequate procedure for judicial review
is provided by another statute in which case
the review shall be under such other statute.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-43. Therefore, we cannot find appellate
jurisdiction in the superior court for the ATRB's decision, which
is allowed only in the route statutorily foreclosed to these
contesting corporations and an alternative route of judicial review
is available.
We find support not only in the plain language of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4, and N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105-267, all directing an aggrieved corporation to file a
civil action, but additionally in the statutory language setting
the parameters of the regular Tax Review Board when conducting
hearings:
The chairman or any two members, upon five
days' notice, may call a meeting of the Board;
provided, any member of the Board may waive
notice of a meeting and the presence of amember of the Board at any meeting shall
constitute a waiver of the notice of said
meeting. A majority of the members of the
Board shall constitute a quorum, and
any act
or decision of a majority of the members shall
constitute an act or decision of the Board,
except for the purposes and under the
conditions of the provisions of G.S. 105-122
and 105-130.4.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-269.2 (emphasis added). The language of this
statute suggests that decisions by the ATRB pursuant to petitions
brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t), do not constitute an
act or a decision by the [Tax Review] Board.
Id. This is
consistent with the fact that aggrieved corporations are not
directed to the administrative appeal route as laid out above,
because as this statutory language suggests, they have not been
rendered an administrative decision by the regular Tax Review
Board which would be capable of administrative review. Once the
ATRB decision to deny variation of a corporate statutory
apportionment formula has been rendered, petitioner must pay its
liability under the presumptive formula, though it believes such
payment may be unconstitutional. Our Supreme Court has long held
that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267 is the appropriate procedure under
which to challenge an income tax not attributable to North Carolina
and which the State may not constitutionally tax.
Oil Corp., 267
N.C. at 20, 147 S.E.2d at 526. The law does not contemplate that
administrative boards shall pass upon constitutional questions.
Id.; see Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 713, 323
S.E.2d 381, 384 (1984),
disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329
S.E.2d 392 (1985);
Meads v. N.C. Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656,669-70, 509 S.E.2d 165, 174 (1998). Therefore, we hold such
challenges must be heard
de novo in superior court pursuant to that
court's original jurisdiction.
In conclusion, we hold that there is no administrative appeal
process from decisions made by the ATRB, but, as directed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t)(6), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.4, and N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-267, the corporate tax must be paid and recovery
sued for in superior court.
All assignments of error raised by this issue are overruled.
[2] Next, petitioner contends that if decisions from the ATRB
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(t) are unreviewable by the
superior court, then the statute violates petitioner's state and
federal constitutional rights of due process. Petitioner is correct
in its assertion that a taxpayer must be given both a fair
opportunity to challenge the tax and a clear and certain remedy for
any erroneous and unlawful tax collection. McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 51-52, 110
L. Ed. 2d 17, 45 (1990). However, pursuant to the analysis below,
we hold that petitioner has been afforded both a fair opportunity
to challenge the tax and a clear and certain remedy.
The taxpayer asserting nonliability may be afforded
constitutional protection by either administrative or judicial
review. Kirkpatrick v. Currie, Comr. of Revenue, 250 N.C. 213,215, 108 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1959). There is no requirement the
taxpayer be afforded both. As held above, we have determined that
an aggrieved party from the ATRB decision is ultimately directed to
the exclusive redress as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267. In
Kirkpatrick, our Supreme Court held that [t]his statute permitting
payment to be made under protest with a right to bring an action to
recover the monies so paid is constitutional and accords the
taxpayer due process. Id.
When an aggrieved corporation petitions the ATRB to review an
alleged unconstitutional application of the relevant apportionment
formula, as occurred in the case at bar, they are challenging the
lawfulness of the statutory apportionment formula either generally,
or as applied to them. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Coble, Sec. of Revenue,
293 N.C. 565, 568, 238 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1977), the Supreme Court
held that, where a tax is challenged as unlawful rather than
excessive or incorrect, the appropriate remedy is to bring suit
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267; see also Oil Corp., 267 N.C. at
20, 147 S.E.2d at 526 (where the Court held N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
267 is the appropriate statute to test the constitutionality of an
income tax statute or its application). Therefore, when choosing
to petition the ATRB to challenge the legality of the statutory
apportionment formula for a specific tax year, an aggrieved
petitioner is afforded due process in seeking relief from an
adverse decision by way of a de novo action in superior court
brought pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Petitioner's
constitutional challenges would have merit only if, after adecision by the ATRB was rendered, they were completely left
without some redress.
All assignments of error raised by this issue are overruled.
[3] Petitioner contends that, in affirming the trial court's
dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we have
denied the corporation its day in court to contest the
constitutionality of the tax liability asserted against them for
the year of 1991. We do not agree.
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of an action
is the most critical aspect of the court's authority to act.
Harris
v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987).
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal
with the kind of action in question.
Id. Appellate jurisdiction of
the superior court is derivative from an independent tribunal of
original jurisdiction.
See, e.g.,
In re Will of Hine, 228 N.C. 405,
411, 45 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1947) (superior court has appellate
jurisdiction derived from the clerk of the superior court in the
exercise of probate jurisdiction);
In re Simmons, 266 N.C. 702, 706-
07, 147 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1966) (For the appointment and removal of
guardians, the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court is
derivative and appeals present for review only errors of law
committed by the clerk); and
Sherrill v. Town of Wrightsville Beach,
76 N.C. App. 646, 649, 334 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1985) (Under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 160A-388(e), the superior court, and this Court, through our
derivative appellate jurisdiction, had the statutory power to reviewonly the issue of whether a variance was properly denied. The
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance from which the variance
was sought was not properly part of the proceedings since the denial
of the variance never addressed the validity of the zoning
ordinance.).
We have held in this opinion that there is no right to judicial
review of a decision by the ATRB. As provided in the analysis
above, the superior court lacks any derivative appellate
jurisdiction from the ATRB. Therefore, the trial court is without
jurisdiction to review an appeal from the ATRB, and the petition for
such review was properly dismissed. Petitioner's day in court was
available pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267, in the superior
court's original jurisdiction, by bringing a civil action against
the Secretary for a refund of the paid income tax. The record
indicates that petitioner has initiated such a claim. Issues
related to that action, specifically as to whether or not it was
timely filed, are not before this Court, and we have no jurisdiction
to review them in this appeal. Petitioner's day in court on those
issues should be raised in a
de novo hearing in superior court, or
on appeal from any final decision from that court.
After careful consideration of the issues raised by petitioner
properly before our Court, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of
this case based on its lack of subject matter jurisdiction to review
a decision by the ATRB.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur.
Footnote: 1