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All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the
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LEGRAND A. VAN KEUREN, Plaintiff, v. YVONNE LITTLE, Defendant
NO. COA03-1389
Filed: 6 July 2004
1. Release_mutual mistake_allegations insufficient
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff was
struck by defendant's car in a parking lot while he was walking toward his company car, plaintiff
signed a release with defendant in return for a payment from defendant's insurer, and plaintiff
later contended that he had not intended to waive pursuit of underinsured motorist coverage.
Plaintiff's affidavit does not establish a prima facie case of mutual mistake in that it did not state
with particularity the circumstances constituting mistake as to all parties.
2. Release_motion to reform_implicitly denied
The trial court did not err by not considering plaintiff's affidavit about a release as a
motion to reform the release. The court implicitly denied any motion to reform when it granted
summary judgment for defendant. Moreover, the affidavit did not request a hearing or set forth
relief sought, and did not contain the allegations required to reform a written document.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 10 July 2003 by Judge
Catherine C. Eagles in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 26 May 2004.
Pinto, Coates, Kyre & Brown, PLLC, by Paul D. Coates and
Richard L. Pinto, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Roberta B. King and Rodney A.
Guthrie, for defendant-appellee Yvonne Little.
Ellis & Winters LLP, by Thomas D. Blue, Jr., for unnamed
defendants-appellees Safeguard Insurance Company and Royal &
SunAlliance.
TYSON, Judge.
LeGrand A. Van Keuren (plaintiff) appeals after the trial
court entered summary judgment against him. We affirm.
I. Background
On 22 May 1999, plaintiff was walking across a parking lot
towards his company car when he was struck by a car driven byYvonne Little (Little). Following this incident, plaintiff
consulted with an attorney. Plaintiff's attorney sent a claim
letter to Little's liability insurance carrier, Integon Insurance
Company (Integon). Integon had a liability limit of $25,000.00
for plaintiff's claim. On 18 October 1999, plaintiff, represented
by counsel, signed a Release of All Claims (release) in favor
of Little in return for $25,000.00 from Integon.
On 26 April 2001, plaintiff contacted Royal & SunAlliance
(Royal), his employer's automobile insurance carrier. His letter
provided written notice of Integon's tender and stated:
Please be advised that we are providing you
notice, pursuant to G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4),
that Integon, the liability carrier in this
matter has tendered its limit of $25,000.00.
We are hereby providing you this notice
pursuant to the statute, so that you can
preserve your rights of subrogation, if you
deem so, by advancing pursuant to the statute.
Royal did not respond. On 31 August 2001, plaintiff executed a
release entitled, Settlement Agreement and Covenant Not to
Enforce (settlement agreement). On 19 November 2001, plaintiff
sent Royal a copy of this settlement agreement.
Plaintiff initiated this action against Little on 21 May 2002
for injuries resulting from the accident. The complaint was served
on Little and Royal, an unnamed defendant. All defendants answered
and asserted the release as an affirmative defense.
On 27 January 2003, Little moved for summary judgment and
argued the release barred plaintiff's claim. On 23 May 2003, Royal
moved for judgment on the pleadings based on the release. The
trial court conducted a hearing on 7 July 2003, considered thepleadings and plaintiff's affidavit that had been filed on 3 July
2003, and converted Royal's motion into a motion for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all
defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
II. Issues
The issues presented are whether: (1) the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment when plaintiff asserted a mutual
mistake of fact existed among the parties to the release; (2)
plaintiff's affidavit should have been considered as a motion to
reform; and (3) Royal waived its rights of subrogation and to
approve the settlement with Integon.
III. Summary Judgment
[1] Plaintiff argues the release was executed under mutual
mistake because he did not intend to release his right to pursue
underinsured motorist coverage. We disagree.
A trial court properly grants summary judgment when the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003).
An issue is material if the facts alleged
would constitute a legal defense, or would
affect the result of the action, or if its
resolution would prevent the party against
whom it is resolved from prevailing in the
action. An issue is genuine if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
Best v. Ford Motor Co., 148 N.C. App. 42, 44, 557 S.E.2d 163, 165
(2001), per curiam aff'd, 355 N.C. 486, 562 S.E.2d 419 (2002)(quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186
S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972)). Once the moving party shows that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party has the
burden to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific
facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that [he] can at least
establish a prima facie case at trial. Best, 148 N.C. App. at 44,
557 S.E.2d at 165 (quoting Gaunt v. Pittaway, 139 N.C. App. 778,
784-85, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664 (2000), cert. denied, [534 U.S. 950],
151 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2001)).
A release is a formal written statement
reciting that the obligor's duty is
immediately discharged. A release given for
valuable consideration is a complete defense
to a claim for damages due to injuries.
Releases and covenants not to sue are treated
the same under the Uniform Contribution Among
Tort-feasors Act (Act). Under the Act, a
release or covenant not to sue that is given
in good faith to one or more persons liable
for the same injury does not discharge other
tortfeasors, unless otherwise provided.
However, absent other evidence, a release that
releases all other persons or entities is
valid.
Best, 148 N.C. App. at 44, 557 S.E.2d at 165 (internal citations
omitted).
A release may be avoided upon evidence that it was executed
as a result of fraud or mutual mistake. Best, 148 N.C. App. at
44, 557 S.E.2d at 165. Mutual mistake is 'a mistake common to all
the parties to a written instrument . . . which usually relates to
a mistake concerning its contents or its legal effect.' Id. at
46-47, 557 S.E.2d at 166 (quoting Sykes v. Keiltex Indus., Inc.,
123 N.C. App. 482, 486, 473 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1996)).
In Best, the plaintiff-automobile passenger made claimsagainst her driver, the automobile dealer, the automobile
manufacturer, the air bag manufacturer, and the driver of the other
vehicle and his employer for injuries she sustained in a crash.
148 N.C. App. at 43-44, 557 S.E.2d at 164. In conjunction with her
settlement with the other driver and his employer, the plaintiff
executed a general release. Id. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the dealer and manufacturers in a subsequent
action based on the release. Id. at 44, 557 S.E.2d at 164.
Plaintiff argued the release was executed under a mutual mistake of
fact and asserted her affidavit, along with a former adjuster's
affidavit, stating that she had not intended to release any other
party. Id. at 46, 557 S.E.2d at 166. The plaintiff's affidavit
merely stated she never intended to release the other parties and
failed to set forth specific facts to establish mutual mistake.
Id. at 47, 557 S.E.2d at 166.
We affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment
against the plaintiff due to her failure to submit any evidence
that . . . the other parties to the Release . . . were mistaken as
to the effect of the Release. Id. We held, because mutual
mistake is one that is common to all the parties to a written
instrument, the party raising the defense must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting mistake as to all of
the parties to the written instrument. Id. at 47, 557 S.E.2d at
166 (citation omitted).
Here, plaintiff's affidavit fails to establish a prima facie
case of mutual mistake. The release signed by plaintiff states:
the Undersigned, being of lawful age, for the
sole consideration of Twenty Five Thousand and00/100 _ Dollars . . . does hereby . . .
release, acquit and forever discharge Yvonne
Little . . . and all other persons, firms,
corporations, associations or partnerships of
and from any and all claims of action . . .
resulting from the accident, casualty, or
event which occurred on or about the 22nd day
of May 1999, at or near Adams Farm,
Greensboro, N.C. . . . .
Plaintiff's affidavit states, It is my belief that the carrier for
the defendant forgot, as did my attorneys, of the potential
underinsured claim in preparing and reviewing the settlement
documents that were executed. Plaintiff also stated, When I
accepted the $25,000 . . . I intended to pursue an underinsured
claim . . . . These conclusory statements fail to show specific
facts of mutual mistake, lack[s] particularity and is
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id. at
47, 557 S.E.2d at 166.
Further, plaintiff's affidavit fails to state with
particularity the circumstances constituting mistake as to all
parties to the written instrument. Id. Plaintiff presented no
evidence and made no allegation that Little, who was a named party
to the release, was mistaken concerning any legal effect of the
release.
Plaintiff failed to forecast evidence sufficient to make a
prima facie case and show that a genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding mutual mistake in executing the release. The
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against
plaintiff. This assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Motion to Reform
[2] Plaintiff contends the trial court failed to consider hisaffidavit as a motion to reform. We disagree.
When the issue of reformation has been raised,
[t]he party asking for relief by reformation
of a deed or written instrument, must allege
and prove, first, that a material stipulation,
as alleged, was agreed upon by the parties, to
be incorporated in the deed or instrument as
written, and second, that such stipulation was
omitted from the deed or instrument as
written, by mistake, either of both parties,
or of one party, induced by the fraud of the
other, or by the mistake of the draughtsman.
Equity will give relief by reformation only
when a mistake has been made, and the deed or
written instrument because of the mistake does
not express the true intent of both parties.
The mistake of one party to the deed, or
instrument, alone, not induced by the fraud of
the other, affords no ground for relief by
reformation.
Matthews v. Shamrock Van Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 722, 725, 142 S.E.2d
665, 668 (1965) (quoting Crawford v. Willoughby, 192 N.C. 269, 271,
134 S.E. 494, 495 (1926)). [M]istake as a ground for relief
should be alleged with certainty, by stating the facts showing the
mistake . . . . Matthews, 264 N.C. at 725, 142 S.E.2d at 668
(quoting 1 McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure § 990
(2d Ed. 1956)). In order to satisfy this requirement and
sufficiently set forth the grounds to reform the writing, our North
Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Massachusetts Supreme Court's
reasoning that the party must allege (1) that the parties intended
to include the omitted provision; (2) stating the substance of the
omitted provision; (3) stating the provision of the executed lease;
and (4) that the omission was by mistake (that is, human failure of
performance) of the parties and 'without intention or design' . .
. . Matthews, 264 N.C. at 726, 142 S.E.2d at 669 (quoting De
Vincent Ford Sales v. First Mass. Corp., 336 Mass. 448, 451, 146N.E.2d 492, 494 [1957])).
Here, plaintiff filed an affidavit with the trial court on 3
July 2003 that stated, justice and equity require the first
Release document be reformed so as to allow my pursuit of an
underinsured claim . . . . The parties stipulated that during the
summary judgment hearing plaintiff orally moved the trial court to
consider his affidavit as a motion to reform the release. After
review[ing] the submissions of the parties including the
plaintiff's affidavit, the trial court entered an order granting
summary judgment for both Little and Royal.
By granting summary judgment, the trial court implicitly
denied plaintiff's motion to reform the release. Were we to
presume the trial court granted plaintiff's oral motion to consider
his affidavit as a motion to reform the release, the affidavit did
not request a hearing or set forth the relief or order sought as
required by the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1) (2003). Further, plaintiff's affidavit
fails to set forth any of the allegations to reform a written
document as required under our Supreme Court's reasoning in
Matthews. 264 N.C. at 726, 142 S.E.2d at 669. This assignment of
error is overruled.
V. Rights of Subrogation
Plaintiff argues Royal waived its right of subrogation and
right to approve plaintiff's settlement with Integon. In his
brief, plaintiff cites to his assignments of error and asserts
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the validity of the
release and mutual mistake among the parties. We have alreadyruled on these assignments of error and held that the trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment against plaintiff. This
assignment of error is overruled.
VI. Conclusion
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Little and Royal. The trial court properly refused to treat
plaintiff's affidavit as a motion to reform the release. The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
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