STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Columbus County
No. 01 CRS 50743
JOAN T. OLSEN
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Thomas R. Miller, for the State
Leslie G. Fritscher for defendant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Defendant (Joan T. Olsen) was indicted for feloniously
drawing, making, uttering, or issuing and delivering a worthless
check. The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most
favorable to the State, is summarized as follows: Defendant was
one of three incorporators of Green Chapel Development,
Incorporated, and was one of two people authorized to sign checks
drawn on Green Chapel Development's bank account. She signed all
or nearly all of the checks drafted by the corporation in October
and November 1999.
In the fall of 1999, Green Chapel Development was overseeing
the construction of a building project. In relation to this
undertaking, defendant hired Delton Patrick as a masonrysubcontractor to do some brickwork. During a conversation with
defendant, Patrick estimated that the brickwork would cost between
$5,000 and $6,500. Patrick began work for Green Chapel Development
in October of 1999 and worked for approximately thirteen and one-
half days. Shortly after Patrick and his crew began working, Danny
Davis, defendant's business associate and boyfriend, came by the
job site to ask whether Patrick was willing to finish the work
before submitting a bill. Patrick answered affirmatively and
indicated that he would likely finish the job on the following
Friday, 29 October 1999.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on Friday, 29 October 1999, Danny
Davis returned to the job site. Patrick anticipated completing the
brickwork later that evening. Davis asked Patrick how much he owed
him, and Patrick submitted a bill for $5,790. Davis took the bill
to his vehicle and returned with a check made out to Patrick in the
amount of $5,790, dated 1 November 1999, drawn on Green Chapel
Development's account, and signed by Joan T. Olsen. At no time
after 14 October 1999 did the account upon which the check had been
drawn have sufficient funds to honor the check. Several days
later, Patrick was unable to cash the check, and a bank teller
informed him that a stop payment order had been placed on the
instrument.
Defendant moved for dismissal at the close of the State's
evidence and again at the close of all of the evidence. The trial
court denied both motions, and defendant was convicted by a
Columbus County jury. She now appeals, contending that the trialcourt erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the State
failed to prove that she had knowledge that the check was drawn on
insufficient funds. We do not agree.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, “the trial court must
determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each
essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being
the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65,
73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996).
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant and
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
accept a conclusion. In considering a motion
to dismiss, the trial court must analyze the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and give the State the benefit of every
reasonable inference from the evidence. The
trial court must also resolve any
contradictions in the evidence in the State's
favor. The trial court does not weigh the
evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the
State, or determine any witness' credibility.
State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336, 561 S.E.2d 245, 255-56
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1006, 154 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2002). “[T]he rule for determining
the sufficiency of evidence is the same whether the evidence is
completely circumstantial, completely direct, or both.” State v.
Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981).
The crime of felony worthless check writing is defined as
follows:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation, to draw, make, utter or issue and
deliver to another, any check or draft on any
bank or depository, for the payment of money
or its equivalent, knowing at the time of the
making, drawing, uttering, issuing and
delivering the check or draft, that the makeror drawer of it has not sufficient funds on
deposit in or credit with the bank or
depository with which to pay the check or
draft upon presentation.
. . . .
(d) A violation of this section is a Class I
felony if the amount of the check or draft is
more than two thousand dollars ($ 2,000).
N.C.G.S. § 14-107 (2003) (emphasis added). Knowledge is one of the
essential elements of the crime of felony worthless check writing.
See id. “Guilty knowledge, being a state of mind, is almost never
provable by direct evidence. Its existence almost always must be
proved, if at all, by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Weldon,
314 N.C. 401, 406, 333 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1985). This Court has held
that “the mere issuing of a check which is returned due to
insufficient funds or lack of credit, without more, is not evidence
from which the requisite knowledge can be inferred.” Semones v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 106 N.C. App. 334, 340, 416 S.E.2d
909, 913 (1992). However, such knowledge may be gleaned from
other facts and circumstances. See Weldon, 314 N.C. at 406, 33
S.E.2d at 704 (holding that guilty knowledge may be proved by
circumstantial evidence); State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208
S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974) (indicating that intent “must ordinarily be
proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred”).
In the present case, Patrick testified that during a
conversation with defendant he had informed her that the masonry
work would cost between $5,000 and $6,500. Patrick further
testified that approximately one week prior to the issuing of the
check, Davis, defendant's business associate and boyfriend, visitedthe job site to ask Patrick if the masonry crew would complete the
job before submitting a bill. According to Patrick, he answered
affirmatively and told Davis that the masonry crew would probably
finish on the following Friday, 29 October 1999. Davis testified
that he and defendant had an understanding that Patrick would
receive a check when he was finished with the work. It undisputed
that on Friday, 29 October 1999, Danny returned to the job site and
issued a check, signed by Joan T. Olsen, payable to Patrick in the
amount of $5,790.
Bank records introduced by the State indicated that defendant
was one of only two people authorized to sign checks drawn on the
account of the Green Chapel Development and that, during the months
of October and November 1999, all of the Green Chapel Development's
checks which could be recovered by the bank were signed by
defendant. Two checks could not be physically located by the bank:
one check was written for $142.09 and debited on 26 October 1999;
the other check was the check which had been issued to Patrick.
A bank statement issued on 26 October 1999 revealed that there were
insufficient funds in the account to pay the check given to
Patrick. The Green Chapel Development checking account had a
balance of $13,446.41 on 26 September 1999. Between 26 September
and 26 October, seven deposits, totaling $32,146.50 were credited
to the account. During the same period, defendant signed at least
twenty-eight checks drawn against the account, totaling $41,278.09,
not including the check written to Patrick and the other check
which could not be located. A section of the statementdenominated as “balance by date” revealed that the account had not
had sufficient funds to honor the check written to Patrick since 14
October 1999. At no time after the check was written to Patrick
were sufficient funds to cover the check placed in the account.
This evidence, cast in the light most favorable to the State,
is sufficient to permit the inference that defendant was
sufficiently involved with the account such that she was aware of
its balance of funds and that the check given to Patrick would
exceed that balance. Accord State v. Cruse, 253 N.C. 456, 459, 117
S.E.2d 49, 51 (1960) (testimony from bank officers that a business
did not have sufficient funds on deposit to pay checks drawn on an
account, together with evidence that defendants knew that checks
could not be drawn against uncollected commercial paper, was
sufficient to permit the inference that defendants had knowledge
of insufficient funds to cover the checks). Therefore, the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was proper with
respect to the element of knowledge.
No error.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge MARTIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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