IN RE:
SHI'ESHA HUNTER Nash County
A Minor Child, No. 02-J-41
DOB: 3-10-01
Jayne B. Norwood, for petitioner-appellee Nash County
Department of Social Services, and Judith L. Kornegay, for
guardian ad litem.
Terry W. Alford for respondent-appellant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Shi'Esha Hunter, born 10 March 2001, is the eighth child of
respondent. Respondent has several other children who are not in
her custody and who have either aged out of the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court system or have been placed with relatives by the
juvenile court system. Respondent's parental rights to another
child, Iesha Fields, were terminated by order entered in District
Court on 26 July 2001.
On 9 August 2001, the Nash County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) received a protective services referral alleging
that Shi'Esha's parents were engaged in a fight in which respondentwas armed with a knife and that during the fight, Shi'Esha was
placed on the trunk of an unattended vehicle parked in the street.
On 6 September 2001, DSS filed a petition alleging that Shi'Esha
was a neglected and dependent juvenile, and she was placed in the
custody of DSS on that date.
In an order entered on 1 November 2001, Shi'Esha was
adjudicated a dependent juvenile pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9)
in that respondent (1) did not have stable housing, (2) had
recently tested positive for alcohol use in August 2001 and for
cocaine use in October 2001 but continued to deny using alcohol or
drugs, and (3) had previously had several of her other children
removed for similar issues, which she had repeatedly failed to
address. The trial court determined that respondent should
“continue with mental health counseling, including substance abuse,
random drug testing and anger management until she is released in
writing for successfully completing therapy.” The court further
provided that respondent should obtain a substance abuse
assessment, complete parenting classes, pay regular child support,
maintain frequent contact with her social worker regarding visits
with Shi'Esha, and “continue with her plans to gain full time
stable employment and stable housing and demonstrate that she can
provide for her child.”
Respondent entered into a case plan with DSS to address the
issues which led to the removal of the child; however, respondent
did not comply with the terms of the case plan. She failed to
secure employment, and quit the employment training program priorto completion. She did not obtain a residence of her own. She did
not complete mental health counseling, and she testified at the
permanency planning hearing that she did not intend to return to
counseling and admitted to continuing to drink. Respondent missed
eleven scheduled visits with Shi'Esha and went long periods of time
without seeing the child.
On 12 April 2002, DSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights alleging that one or more of the
following grounds existed to support the termination pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111: (1) respondent neglected Shi'Esha; (2) Shi'Esha
had been in the custody of DSS for six months and respondent had
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of child
care; (3) Shi'Esha was a dependent juvenile in that respondent was
incapable of providing for her proper care and supervision; and (4)
respondent's parental rights to another child had been terminated
involuntarily and that she lacked the ability or willingness to
establish a safe home.
On 5 September 2002, a hearing was held on the petition to
terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court found that
respondent had failed to address the issues that led to the removal
of Shi'Esha. The trial court made the following specific findings
of fact:
7. . . . [Respondent] has not secured
employment and in fact quit the employment
training program at Tri-County Industries
before she completed the program. She has no
residence of her own and has resided with
friends and family since October 2001. [She]
initially attended [mental health] counseling
. . . but did not complete the program and testified herself . . . that she did not
intend to return to therapy and admitted that
she continues to drink. [Respondent] did not
visit regularly with Shi'Esha.
. . . .
9. [Respondent] has a mental health diagnosis
of mixed personality traits, substance abuse,
and alcohol and cocaine dependency and has not
consistently sought counseling to address any
of those issues. Shortly before Shi'Esha was
born and shortly after she was born,
[respondent] was admitted to Coastal Plain
Hospital. She admitted to drinking and using
drugs and on one of those admissions had
attempted to commit suicide. Her prognosis
upon discharge was noted as being poor.
10. That [respondent] was on Intensive
Probation . . . until she absconded . . .
.[Respondent] has had numerous convictions for
numerous crimes stemming as far back as 1992.
She has served time in prison for Assault with
a Deadly Weapon and had only been released
from parole a short time when Shi'Esha was
born. [Respondent] was placed on intensive
probation . . . for larceny and shoplifting
convictions. Some of these offenses occurred
within less than six months of Shi'Esha's
birth. After being placed on intensive
probation, [respondent] absconded by leaving
her residence with electronic monitoring
equipment and her whereabouts were unknown
until . . . she was located based on an
anonymous tip made to local law enforcement. .
. .
11. [Respondent] has not been employed since
Shi'Esha was placed in the non-secure custody
of [DSS] although physically able to maintain
employment
. . . .
16. [Shi'Esha] has had one foster care
placement and is extremely well cared for.
She is developmentally on target and no
barriers exist that would prevent adoption
from being the appropriate permanent plan.
The trial court concluded that there were “sufficient, clear,cogent and convincing facts to terminate the parental rights of
[respondent] to Shi'Esha . . . pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111.”
The trial court further concluded that it was in Shi'Esha's best
interests that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
Respondent appeals from the trial court's order terminating her
parental rights to Shi'Esha.
On appeal respondent argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Specifically, respondent contends that no
statutory ground for termination exists, and the trial court,
therefore, erred in determining that it had authority to terminate
her parental rights. Respondent makes arguments with respect to
several of the grounds for terminating parental rights enumerated
in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 (2003); however, we conclude that we only
need address respondent's argument that there is no evidence and no
specific finding that her alcohol and substance abuse problems had
an adverse impact on her child such that termination is justified
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2003). For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the trial court.
G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) sets forth the following grounds for
terminating parental rights:
(a) The court may terminate the parental
rights upon a finding of . . . the following:
(6) That the parent is incapable of providing
for the proper care and supervision of the
juvenile, such that the juvenile is a
dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S.
7B-101, and that there is a reasonable
probability that such incapability will
continue for the foreseeable future.
Incapability under this subdivision may be theresult of substance abuse, mental retardation,
mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any
other similar cause or condition.
A “dependent juvenile” is “[a] juvenile in need of assistance or
placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or
custodian responsible for the juvenile's care or supervision or
whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the
care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care
arrangement.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9) (2003). A finding of any one
of the separately enumerated grounds in G.S. § 7B-1111 is
sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App.
57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning
for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental
rights exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614
(1997).
In the case sub judice, the trial court entered the following
conclusion of law, which parallels the language of G.S. § 7B-
101(9): “Respondent is incapable as a result of long term substance
and alcohol abuse of providing for the proper care and supervision
of [Shi'Esha], such that the child is a dependent juvenile within
the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9), and there is a reasonable
probability that such incapability will continue for the
foreseeable future.” We find that this conclusion is supported by
the trial court's findings of fact, which are in turn supported by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
Specifically, the trial court's conclusion of law with respectto dependancy-related incapacity is supported by the following
findings of fact:
7. . . . [Respondent] initially attended
counseling at Edgecombe Nash Mental Health,
but did not complete the program and testified
herself at the permanency planning hearing . .
. that she continues to drink. . . .
9. [Respondent] has a mental health diagnosis
of . . . substance abuse[] and alcohol and
cocaine dependency and has not consistently
sought counseling to address any of those
issues. Shortly before Shi'Esha was born and
shortly after she was born, [respondent] was
admitted to Coastal Plain Hospital. She
admitted to drinking and using drugs and on
one of those admissions had attempted to
commit suicide. Her prognosis upon discharge
was noted as being poor.
These findings support the trial court's conclusion for the
following reasons: Inasmuch as respondent's substance abuse
problems were resulting in her being admitted to institutions and
were causing her to be suicidal, her substance abuse problems had
an immediate adverse impact on Shi'Esha. See In re Phifer, 67 N.C.
App. 16, 25, 312 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1984) (holding, under a
predecessor of G.S. § 7B-1111, that “[a] finding of fact that a
parent abuses alcohol, without proof of adverse impact upon the
child, is not a sufficient basis for an adjudication of termination
of parental rights for neglect.”). Inasmuch as respondent was
unwilling to pursue treatment for her substance abuse problems,
“there [was] a reasonable probability that such incapability
[would] continue for the foreseeable future.” G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6).
Moreover, there is sufficient evidence in the record tosupport the trial court's findings. First, Shea Neal, a counselor
with DSS, testified: (1) that respondent admitted to using illegal
substances while she was working with her; (2) that respondent
indicated she would not continue substance abuse treatment; (3)
that respondent was diagnosed with alcohol and cocaine dependence;
(4) that respondent had tested positive for drugs while she was
working with respondent. Additionally, a Court Study prepared 23
January 2002 and contained in the record indicated that: (1)
respondent was scheduled for seven appointments with her substance
abuse therapist, respondent failed to show for five of her
appointments; (2) respondent tested positive for cocaine on 26
November 2001; and (3) respondent admitted to continuing to abuse
alcohol, including being intoxicated three times over a recent
weekend.
Thus, there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence in the
record to support the trial court's findings and conclusion that
respondent's long term alcohol and substance abuse rendered her
incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of
Shi'Esha. Because we have determined that a ground exists pursuant
to G.S. § 7B-1111(6) to support the trial court's order, we need
not address the remaining grounds found by the trial court in
support of termination. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at
233-34. Once the trial court has found that grounds exist to
terminate parental rights, “the court shall issue an order
terminating the parental rights of such parent with respect to the
juvenile unless the court shall further determine that the bestinterests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the
parent not be terminated.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2003). The
trial court's decision to terminate parental rights at the
disposition stage is discretionary. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C.
101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). In the instant case
respondent has a history of long term drug and alcohol abuse, and
she had consistently failed to attend drug counseling or follow the
court ordered plan for reunification. She has been given a poor
prognosis for overcoming her dependency. Moreover, Shi'Esha is of
a young age and in need of good parental care. In her new foster
placement, Shi'Esha is well cared for and is developmentally on
target. In light of these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that
termination was in the child's best interests.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***