IN THE MATTER OF:
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.
Angela H. Brown, for juvenile-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
On 2 October 2002, a Juvenile Petition was filed alleging
juvenile was delinquent for committing Second Degree Trespass. The
evidence tended to show that on 20 September 2002, the principal of
John A. Holmes High School suspended fifteen-year-old student
D. J. W. (“juvenile”) from 20 September until 23 September. The
out-of-school suspension bars the student from being on the school
campus for any reason. Several students saw juvenile both inside
and outside the school building during a school dance held on the
evening of 20 September. The assistant principal testified that
every student received a school handbook detailing the out-of-
school suspension policy, and the principal testified that he gave
juvenile a copy of his suspension form clearly stating thatsuspended students were not allowed on campus for any
extracurricular events.
Juvenile moved to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence
and again at the close of all evidence, contending that the school
had not notified him to stay away from the dance and thus, he was
not trespassing. The court denied juvenile's motions, and found
juvenile guilty as charged, adjudicated him delinquent, and ordered
him to serve fourteen twenty-four-hour periods in the Department of
Juvenile Justice. The court also placed juvenile on supervised
probation for twelve months. Juvenile appeals. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm the judgment and remand the matter for
amendment of the disposition order consistent with this opinion.
Juvenile first argues that it was error and an abuse of
discretion for the court to deny his motions to dismiss because the
State failed to prove an essential element of second degree
trespass. We disagree.
A juvenile has the right “to have the evidence evaluated by
the same standards as apply in criminal proceedings against
adults.” In re Dulaney, 74 N.C. App. 587, 588, 328 S.E. 2d 904,
906 (1985). “A motion to dismiss on the ground of sufficiency of
the evidence raises for the trial court the issue whether there is
substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense
charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.”
State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 351, 572 S.E.2d 108, 131 (2002),
cert. denied 155 L. Ed.2d 1074, __ U.S. __ (2003). Substantial
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “The court must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the
State the benefit of every reasonable inference from that
evidence.” State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548 S.E.2d 712, 721
(2001). Motions to dismiss for sufficiency of the evidence should
be denied “if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in
issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly
logical and legitimate deduction.” State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474,
488, 501 S.E.2d 334, 343 (1998) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
To commit second degree trespass, a person must enter or
remain on another's property “[a]fter he has been notified not to
enter or remain there by . . . a person in charge of the premises.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13 (a)(1) (2001). Juvenile contends that
he did not receive the required notice that he was barred from
extracurricular events during his suspension. Juvenile asserts
that the testimony of the principal and assistant principal that
they could not recall specifically telling juvenile he could not
attend the school dance supports his position that he had no
notice.
However, evidence included testimony that all students
received a school handbook, and also that juvenile received a copy
of his suspension form, both of which described the school
suspension policies with regard to extracurricular events. In
addition, the assistant principal testified as follows, to no
objection: Q: Was Mr. W[.] told that he could not be on
campus?
A. Yes, Mr. W[.] knew that rule.
This evidence supports a reasonable inference that juvenile knew he
was not permitted on campus for the school dance during his
suspension, and thus supports the court's denial of juvenile's
motion to dismiss.
Juvenile next argues, and the State agrees, that the court
erred in classifying second degree trespass as a class 2
misdemeanor rather than a class 3 misdemeanor and that the matter
should be remanded to amend the judgment. Juvenile further
contends that this error was prejudicial and entitles him to a new
sentencing hearing. We disagree.
Disposition level is determined by a juvenile's delinquency
history and the level of the instant offense, either minor, serious
or violent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508 (f) (2001). Juvenile
received a Level 2 disposition because his offense was correctly
classified as “minor” and his delinquency history was classified as
“high” based on his prior adjudications and the fact that he was on
probation when the trespass occurred. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
2507 (2001). Because second degree trespass was correctly noted as
a “minor” offense, despite its incorrect denomination as a class 2
offense, the error in the listed class level was not prejudicial.
However, the court “has the inherent power and duty to make its
records speak the truth,” and we may remand for the court to do so.
State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 403, 94 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1956). Affirmed and remanded to amend the judgment consistent with
this opinion.
Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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