An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-400


Filed: 2 March 2004


    Chowan County
D. J. W.                        No. 02 J 10

    Appeal by juvenile from judgment entered 24 October 2002 by Judge C. Christopher Bean in the District Court in Chowan County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 January 2004.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.

    Angela H. Brown, for juvenile-appellant.

    HUDSON, Judge.

    On 2 October 2002, a Juvenile Petition was filed alleging juvenile was delinquent for committing Second Degree Trespass. The evidence tended to show that on 20 September 2002, the principal of John A. Holmes High School suspended fifteen-year-old student D. J. W. (“juvenile”) from 20 September until 23 September. The out-of-school suspension bars the student from being on the school campus for any reason. Several students saw juvenile both inside and outside the school building during a school dance held on the evening of 20 September. The assistant principal testified that every student received a school handbook detailing the out-of- school suspension policy, and the principal testified that he gave juvenile a copy of his suspension form clearly stating thatsuspended students were not allowed on campus for any extracurricular events.
    Juvenile moved to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence and again at the close of all evidence, contending that the school had not notified him to stay away from the dance and thus, he was not trespassing. The court denied juvenile's motions, and found juvenile guilty as charged, adjudicated him delinquent, and ordered him to serve fourteen twenty-four-hour periods in the Department of Juvenile Justice. The court also placed juvenile on supervised probation for twelve months. Juvenile appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment and remand the matter for amendment of the disposition order consistent with this opinion.
    Juvenile first argues that it was error and an abuse of discretion for the court to deny his motions to dismiss because the State failed to prove an essential element of second degree trespass. We disagree.
    A juvenile has the right “to have the evidence evaluated by the same standards as apply in criminal proceedings against adults.” In re Dulaney, 74 N.C. App. 587, 588, 328 S.E. 2d 904, 906 (1985). “A motion to dismiss on the ground of sufficiency of the evidence raises for the trial court the issue whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 351, 572 S.E.2d 108, 131 (2002), cert. denied 155 L. Ed.2d 1074, __ U.S. __ (2003). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable inference from that evidence.” State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548 S.E.2d 712, 721 (2001). Motions to dismiss for sufficiency of the evidence should be denied “if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction.” State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 488, 501 S.E.2d 334, 343 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    To commit second degree trespass, a person must enter or remain on another's property “[a]fter he has been notified not to enter or remain there by . . . a person in charge of the premises.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13 (a)(1) (2001). Juvenile contends that he did not receive the required notice that he was barred from extracurricular events during his suspension. Juvenile asserts that the testimony of the principal and assistant principal that they could not recall specifically telling juvenile he could not attend the school dance supports his position that he had no notice.
    However, evidence included testimony that all students received a school handbook, and also that juvenile received a copy of his suspension form, both of which described the school suspension policies with regard to extracurricular events. In addition, the assistant principal testified as follows, to no objection:        Q:    Was Mr. W[.] told that he could not be on campus?

        A.    Yes, Mr. W[.] knew that rule.
This evidence supports a reasonable inference that juvenile knew he was not permitted on campus for the school dance during his suspension, and thus supports the court's denial of juvenile's motion to dismiss.
    Juvenile next argues, and the State agrees, that the court erred in classifying second degree trespass as a class 2 misdemeanor rather than a class 3 misdemeanor and that the matter should be remanded to amend the judgment. Juvenile further contends that this error was prejudicial and entitles him to a new sentencing hearing. We disagree.
    Disposition level is determined by a juvenile's delinquency history and the level of the instant offense, either minor, serious or violent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508 (f) (2001). Juvenile received a Level 2 disposition because his offense was correctly classified as “minor” and his delinquency history was classified as “high” based on his prior adjudications and the fact that he was on probation when the trespass occurred. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- 2507 (2001). Because second degree trespass was correctly noted as a “minor” offense, despite its incorrect denomination as a class 2 offense, the error in the listed class level was not prejudicial. However, the court “has the inherent power and duty to make its records speak the truth,” and we may remand for the court to do so. State v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 403, 94 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1956).    Affirmed and remanded to amend the judgment consistent with this opinion.
    Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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