State v Hamrick, (03-402) 05/18/2004

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 December 2002 by Judge Christopher M. Collier in Rutherford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 2004.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Douglas W. Corkhill, for the State.

Gary C. Rhodes for defendant-appellant.

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.

    Jay William Hamrick (“defendant”) appeals his conviction of obtaining property under false pretenses and habitual felon. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.
    The State's evidence presented at trial tends to show the following: On 18 September 2001, defendant presented a hydraulic jack to Butler's Jewelry & Loan for pawn. Jim Davis (“Davis”), part owner of Butler's Jewelry & Loan, was at the counter when defendant and “some more fellows” entered the pawn shop. Davis testified that he did not know what the hydraulic jack was, nor how it worked. Defendant showed Davis how to operate the jack. Davisgave defendant $50 for the jack and defendant signed a pawn ticket which stated the jack was his “to sell or pawn.”
    In February 2002, Sergeant Bob Ward of the Forest City Police Department saw the jack sitting in Butler's Jewelry & Loan. Sergeant Ward remembered a report concerning a stolen jack, and began an investigation. It was later determined that the jack was stolen from A+ Body Repair Shop in July 2001. Defendant was subsequently convicted for obtaining property under false pretenses for his involvement in pawning the stolen jack. Defendant was also convicted of habitual felon. Defendant appeals.

    On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charge as contained in the indictment; (2) admitting into evidence copies of defendant's criminal record and a computer printout of defendant's waiver of counsel in one of his prior convictions; and, (3) imposing an enhanced habitual felon sentence in excess of the sentence permissible for the conviction.
    Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the charge of obtaining property under false pretenses as contained in the indictment. We disagree.
    “In reviewing a motion to dismiss, 'the trial court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence (a) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (b) of defendant's being the perpetrator of the offense.'” State v. Stancil, 146 N.C. App. 234, 244, 552S.E.2d 212, 218 (2001) (citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 355 N.C. 266, 559 S.E.2d 788 (2002). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Compton, 90 N.C. App. 101, 103-04, 367 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1988).
    Pursuant to the North Carolina General Statutes, a person is guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses when a person makes a false presentation of a known fact, with the intent to deceive, and receives or attempts to receive something of value based on the false representation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 (2001); see State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 242, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980). An essential element of this offense is “that the act be done 'knowingly and designedly with intent to cheat or defraud.'” State v. Hines, 54 N.C. App. 529, 532-33, 284 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1981) (citations ommitted). Intent to deceive is seldom proven by direct evidence; and therefore, must ordinarily be inferred from the circumstances of the case. State v. Bennett, 84 N.C. App. 689, 691, 353 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1987). “In determining the absence or presence of intent, the jury may consider 'the acts and conduct of the defendant and the general circumstances existing at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged.'” Id. (citations omitted).
    In the instant case, the State presented evidence thatalthough defendant knew that the hydraulic jack was not his, he pawned it to Butler's Jewelry & Loan. Defendant signed a pawn slip, attesting that he was the owner of the jack, and received $50 for the exchange. In addition, defendant demonstrated the jacks' purpose to Davis to procure the sale. Thus, there existed sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that defendant possessed the requisite intent to deceive the pawn shop as to his authority to pawn the jack. See Cronin, 299 N.C. at 242, 262 S.E.2d at 285. The statute does not require the State to prove that defendant had actual knowledge that the jack was stolen. See N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-100. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charge in the indictment. Defendant's first assignment of error is overruled.
    Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence copies of prior convictions that were not original or certified copies. Defendant further argues that one of the prior convictions submitted to the court did not include any indication of whether defendant was represented by counsel or effectively waived his right to counsel for that case. We note that appellate review is based solely on the record on appeal. N.C.R. App. Rule 9(a). Moreover, the record must set forth “so much of the evidence . . . as is necessary for an understanding of all errors assigned.” N.C. R. App. Rule 9 (a)(1)(e).
    In the instant case, defendant failed to include copies of his prior convictions in the record on appeal. The transcript reflects the State's assertions that the copies were certified and thisCourt has before it neither the “file” nor the “computer printout” which allegedly contains a discrepancy regarding defendants prior legal representation. Without any additional evidence, we will not disturb the trial court's admissibility ruling.
    Defendant's last assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in imposing a Class C sentence when obtaining property by false pretenses is a Class H felony. We disagree.
    Defendant was found guilty of having attained the status of habitual felon. N.C.G.S. § 14-7.6 clearly states that “[w]hen an habitual felon . . . commits any felony under the laws of the State of North Carolina, the felon must, upon conviction or plea of guilty . . . (except where the felon has been sentenced as a Class A, B1, or B2 felon) be sentenced as a Class C felon.” This assignment of error is summarily overruled.
    No error.
    Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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