An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced
ure.
NO. COA03-413
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 February 2004
ZAIDOUN BAZZARI,
Plaintiff,
v
.
Orange County
No. 00 CVS 766
MUAWYHA SAMARA,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 June 2002 by
Judge Wade Barber in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 15 January 2004.
Levine & Stewart, by Michael D. Levine, for plaintiff-
appellee.
Stark Law Group, PLLC, by Gregory S. Connor and Thomas H.
Stark, for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Muawyha Samara (defendant) appeals from a judgment granting
Zaidoun Bazzari (plaintiff) specific performance of a contract of
sale between the parties. After defendant filed this appeal,
plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. Both parties fully
complied with the trial court's judgment prior to appeal, and the
issues in controversy have been settled. We grant plaintiff's
motion to dismiss this appeal as moot.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed an unverified complaint against defendant
alleging that the parties entered into a contract for sale of the
Pittsboro Subway and requested the trial court to order defendantto specifically perform his obligations under the contract and
transfer the franchise. Defendant denied plaintiff's allegations
in his answer and asserted defenses.
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment on
10 June 2002, granting plaintiff specific performance and ordering
plaintiff to remit the remainder of the balance owed on the
promissory note to defendant. Defendant was ordered to go to the
Subway franchiser and sign all franchise transfer agreements within
seven (7) days of the entry of judgment. The judgment also
required defendant to pay all costs incurred as a result of this
action.
Both parties complied with the judgment. Defendant executed
a limited power of attorney allowing transfer of the Pittsboro
Subway franchise to plaintiff. Defendant accepted a check on 24
June 2002, from the Orange County Clerk of Court in the amount of
$16,303.53, the amount due under the judgment after costs had been
paid, and subsequently negotiated the instrument. Defendant filed
a notice of appeal on 10 July 2002, thirty days after entry of the
judgment.
II. Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and for
sanctions pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 34. Plaintiff argues the
matters in controversy have been settled and that this appeal is
moot. As a general rule this Court will not hear an appeal when
the subject matter of the litigation has been settled between the
parties or has ceased to exist. Kendrick v. Cain, 272 N.C. 719,722, 159 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1968). Although the issues in Kendrick are
not identical, its relevancy and application here is appropriate
because the Court dismissed the appeal as moot after the appellant
had accepted the full amount of the judgment. Our Supreme Court
noted:
[a] party who accepts an award or legal
advantage under an order, judgment, or decree
ordinarily waives his right to any such review
of the adjudication as may again put in issue
his right to the benefit which he has
accepted. This is so even though the
judgment, decree, or order may have been
generally unfavorable to the appellant.
Id. (citation omitted). In dismissing the appeal, the Court gave
insight into what factors we should consider in determining whether
the appeal is moot: the subject of the litigation has been
disposed of by entry of judgment and satisfaction has been obtained
by plaintiff by acceptance of the amount awarded by the judgment.
Upon acceptance of the 'fruits of the judgment' plaintiff's action
against defendant Cain was extinguished. Id.
Here, defendant accepted the benefit of the judgment by
receiving and negotiating the check from the Clerk of Court. He
subsequently signed a limited power of attorney, which led to the
franchise transfer according to the terms of the judgment. He did
not seek or move to stay execution of judgment pending appeal
pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 62. Defendant argues his financial
difficulties prevented him from filing such a motion. However, he
had the option of applying to the trial court for a reduced bond.
Defendant did not make notice of appeal until the last day allowed
under our Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.C.R. App. P. 3 (2003). Considering these actions collectively, defendant clearly accepted
the fruits of the judgment and extinguished the matter in
controversy. Kendrick, 272 N.C. at 722, 159 S.E.2d at 35.
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is granted.
III. Conclusion
Both plaintiff and defendant fully performed their obligations
under the court's judgment. The issues raised on appeal are moot.
We grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss and deny his motion for
sanctions.
Dismissed.
Judges Hudson and Steelman concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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