STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
No. 00 CRS 84852
ANTHONY LEONARD BRADLEY
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Kathleen U. Baldwin, for the State.
James M. Bell for defendant-appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking his probation and
activating his suspended sentence of six to eight months of
imprisonment.
On 5 September 2000, the trial court placed defendant on
supervised probation for a period of thirty-six months upon his no
contest plea to felony possession of cocaine. A report filed by
defendant's probation officer on 25 January 2002 charged him with
the following probation violations: (1) failure to report to the
probation officer on eight occasions; (2) failure to satisfy the
monetary conditions of probation; (3) failure to be at home for
visits from his probation officer; and (4) committing and beingconvicted of the offense of public consumption. In an order dated
11 March 2002, the trial court found defendant guilty of the
violations charged in the report, continued him on probation, and
ordered defendant to write a three-page letter of apology to his
probation officer.
A second violation report filed 3 July 2002 charged defendant
with missing seven scheduled appointments with his probation
officer and failing to complete the letter of apology as ordered on
11 March 2002. In an “ADDENDUM” to this report filed 26 August
2002, defendant was charged with missing four additional
appointments and advising his probation officer that he would not
attend any future appointments or comply with the terms of his
probation.
At his 16 October 2002 hearing, defendant admitted the charged
violations and further admitted that ”they were willful and without
lawful excuse.” Upon inquiry from the trial judge, the probation
officer recommended that defendant's probation be revoked. Asked
the basis of her recommendation, the officer first noted
defendant's failure to complete the three-page letter of apology as
ordered by Judge Burke. Defense counsel objected to the court's
consideration of “everything that happened prior to this violation
we're here on.” The court replied, “In the face of your admission,
I'll consider any evidence the officer has. I've asked her to
explain the reasons for her recommendation [of revocation].” The
probation officer then described defendant's refusal to submit to
her supervision. In response, defense counsel explained thatdefendant was working two jobs in order to pay back child support
and thus had a difference of opinion with the probation officer
regarding “what the priorities in his life ought to be[.]”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found
defendant had violated the conditions of his probation as alleged
in the report filed 26 August 2002 “without cause, provocation or
justification.” The judge further found defendant's behavior
“constitutes a refusal . . . to be supervised and is in direct
willful violation of a lawful order of the Superior Court that he
abide by probation supervision.”
Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in
considering evidence of any misconduct charged in the 3 May 2002
violation report because the judgment revoking his probation and
hearing transcript refer exclusively to the 26 August 2002
violation report. While he “acknowledges that there are no
controlling cases that would exclude consideration of evidence such
as was considered in the instant case[,]” defendant insists the
court's decision to revoke probation must be based only on evidence
of the violations that are then before the court.
It is well-established that probation is an act of grace by
the State, and that probation revocation proceedings are informal
in nature and not governed by the strict rules governing a criminal
trial. See, e.g., State v. Terry, 149 N.C. App. 434, 437, 562
S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002). In the instant proceeding, defendant
acknowledged to the trial court that he willfully and without
lawful excuse violated the conditions of his probation as chargedby his probation officer. Upon this admission, the court was free
within its sound discretion to revoke defendant's probation. See
Terry, 149 N.C. App. at 437-38, 562 S.E.2d at 540; State v. Duncan,
270 N.C. 241, 245, 154 S.E.2d 53, 57 (1967). In exercising its
discretion, the court was entitled to consider the entirety of the
probation officer's experience with defendant as well as her
recommendation as to the appropriate disposition. Cf. Duncan, 270
N.C. at 245, 154 S.E.2d at 57 (noting that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion “takes account of the . . . particular
circumstances of the case”). Finding no manifest abuse of
discretion by the court here, see State v. Robinson, 248 N.C. 282,
285-86, 103 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1958), we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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