STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Rowan County
Nos. 98 CRS 11899,
00 CRS 15032
RHONACA LYEE WOODRUFF
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
June S. Ferrell, for the State.
Gilda C. Rodriguez, for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Rhonaca Lyee Woodruff (“defendant”) appeals judgments of the
trial court revoking her probation and activating her suspended
sentences of 23 to 37 months and 120 days in the North Carolina
Department of Correction. We affirm.
On 21 July 1999, defendant pled guilty to assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and driving while her
license was revoked. Defendant's cases were consolidated for
judgment. She received a suspended sentence of 23 to 37 months'
imprisonment, and she was placed on supervised probation for a
period of thirty-six months. As a special condition of probation,
she was assigned to the intensive supervision program for six
months. On 16 February 2000, defendant's probation officer filed a
violation report alleging defendant failed to fulfil her monetary
condition of probation and tested positive for marijuana use on two
occasions. The trial court found defendant violated the terms of
her probation but modified and continued her probationary sentence
with the additional condition that “[i]f defendant test positive
for any illegal controlled substance, she is to be arrested and
held on a $5,000.00 secure bond.”
Defendant's probation officer filed a second violation report
in August of 2001 alleging failure to fulfil the monetary condition
of probation and additional positive drug tests for marijuana use.
On 15 November 2001, the trial court found defendant violated the
terms of her probation but continued probation with the additional
special condition that defendant be placed on electronic house
arrest for a period of ninety days.
On 27 September 2001, defendant pled guilty to two charges of
driving while her license was revoked. Defendant received a
sentence of 120 days' imprisonment; however, the trial court
suspended that sentence and placed defendant on supervised
probation for a period of twenty-four months. The special
conditions of defendant's probation included six months' electronic
house arrest and a requirement to either remain employed full-time
or enroll as a full-time student.
Additional probation violation reports were filed, and the
trial court continued defendant on probation. On 26 June 2002, two
probation violation reports specifically alleged defendant violatedher probation relating to the electronic house arrest as well as
the condition that she “obtain prior approval from the officer for,
and notify the officer of, any change in . . . employment.” After
hearing the evidence and arguments of the parties, the trial court
found that each violation occurred and constituted a sufficient
basis for the revocation of probation. The trial court revoked
defendant's probation and activated her suspended sentences of (1)
23 to 37 months for the offenses of assault with a deadly weapon
and driving while her license was revoked and (2) 120 days for the
two subsequent offenses of driving while her license was revoked.
Defendant appeals.
“'[P]robation . . . comes as an act of grace to one convicted
of, or pleading guilty to, a crime.'” State v. Tennant, 141 N.C.
App. 524, 527, 540 S.E.2d 807, 808 (2000) (quoting State v. Duncan,
270 N.C. 241, 245, 154 S.E.2d 53, 57 (1967)). Thus, it has been
noted that a probationer carries “'the keys to his freedom in his
willingness to comply with the court's sentence.'” Id. (quoting
State v. Robinson, 248 N.C. 282, 285, 103 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1958)).
In a proceeding to revoke a defendant's probation, the State need
only “'reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound
discretion that the defendant has violated a valid condition upon
which the sentence was suspended.'” Id. (quoting Robinson, 248
N.C. at 285-86, 103 S.E.2d at 379). See also State v. Tozzi, 84
N.C. App. 517, 521, 353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987) (“Any violation of
a valid condition of probation is sufficient to revoke [a]
defendant's probation”). Defendant's violation of a condition ofprobation must be willful or without lawful excuse. State v.
White, 129 N.C. App. 52, 57, 496 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1998). In
reviewing a probation revocation order, an appellate court will not
disturb the trial court's findings if they are supported by
competent evidence, nor will it overturn the trial court's judgment
based upon such findings unless there is a manifest abuse of
discretion. Tennant, 141 N.C. App. at 527, 540 S.E.2d at 808.
In the instant case, the trial court found defendant
“willfully and without valid excuse” violated two conditions of
probation and either violation would support revocation of
defendant's probation. Relevant to our disposition of this case on
appeal, the violation reports alleged and the trial court found
that defendant violated a regular condition of probation by failing
to
“obtain prior approval from the officer for,
and notify the officer of, any change in . . .
employment” in that defendant was terminated
from Wendy's Restaurant in Salisbury, North
Carolina on Friday, 06-21-02 but still left
her residence on 6-21-02, 06-22-02 and 06-23-
02 during the hours she was supposed to have
been working at Wendy's had she not been
terminated. Defendant did not notify her
probation officer of her termination until
Monday, 06-23-02 when questioned regarding
same.
Defendant testified that she was employed at Wendy's but “just got
tired of” it and terminated her employment on 21 June 2002.
Nonetheless, defendant failed to obtain prior approval from or
notify the probation officer of her change in employment pursuant
to the conditions of her probation. On the contrary, from the time
of defendant's termination until 23 June 2002, defendant continueda pattern of leaving her residence during the hours she had been
designated to work at Wendy's. Defendant finally informed her
probation officer of her termination only after the probation
officer confronted her.
Defendant concedes the veracity of these facts but argues
“[t]he lapse in time between termination and notification in this
case is so insignificant that it should not be the basis upon which
a probation is revoked” and that she “was really not even given an
opportunity to come forward on her own.” We disagree. First, the
two days between the time defendant quit her job and the time she
was confronted by her probation officer presented ample opportunity
to “come forward on her own.” Second and more importantly, where,
as here, a defendant chooses to terminate her employment it is
particularly appropriate to comply with the probation condition to
seek prior approval from a probation officer before a change in
employment occurs. Certainly, defendant presented no objective
reason necessitating her resignation; rather, defendant testified
she “just got tired of [her job at] Wendy's.” Thus, the period of
time between when the change in employment and when the
notification occurred is not, under these facts, defendant's
primary failing. Moreover, defendant acknowledged that probation
officers had “better things to do with their time than to look
after [her].” We perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in predicating revocation of defendant's probation on this
ground. Defendant argues in the alternative that, because defendant
was employed at both Wendy's and Regis, her termination of
employment at Wendy's did not trigger any duty on her part to
notify her probation officer of a change in employment. This
argument is unavailing. The condition of probation at issue
expressly requires that defendant notify the officer of any change
in employment. This condition is not activated solely when a
defendant becomes unemployed but, rather, it is triggered when a
change in employment occurs. It is undisputed that, when defendant
was terminated from her position at Wendy's, such a change
occurred. Accordingly, defendant was required to notify her
probation officer, and defendant's argument to the contrary is
without merit. Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in revoking defendant's probation for violation of this condition,
we need not address defendant's arguments pertaining to other
alleged violations. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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