An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-533


Filed: 1 June 2004


         v.                        Wake County
                                No. 02 CRS 68987
                                    02 CRS 52699
                                    02 CRS 74185


    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 October 2002 by Judge Evelyn W. Hill in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 May 2004.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mary S. Mercer, for the State.

    A. Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for defendant-appellant.

    ELMORE, Judge.

    Defendant pled guilty on 4 October 2002 to obtaining property by false pretenses, possession of stolen property, uttering a forged check, and attaining the status of habitual felon. The court consolidated the convictions and sentenced defendant within the presumptive range to a minimum term of 93 months and a maximum term of 121 months. Defendant filed notice of appeal on the same date.
    Defendant contends (1) the habitual felon indictment is defective and insufficient to support the sentence; (2) the indictment charging her with obtaining property by false pretensesis defective; (3) the court should have found mitigating factors; and (4) her plea was not entered with full knowledge of the consequences.
    We do not address these contentions because defendant does not have a right to appeal. A defendant who pleads guilty has a circumscribed right of appeal limited to certain issues, namely: (1) whether the sentence is supported by the evidence but only when the defendant's sentence does not fall within the presumptive range; (2) whether the sentence results from an incorrect finding of defendant's prior record or prior conviction level; (3) whether the sentence contains an unauthorized sentence disposition; (4) whether the term of imprisonment is for a duration not authorized for the class of offense or prior conviction level; (5) whether the court properly denied a motion to suppress; and (6) whether the court properly denied a motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Jones, N.C. App. , S.E.2d (4 November 2003)(COA02- 1404). None of these situations is present in the case at bar. Defendant's sentence is within the presumptive range and she is not appealing from orders denying a motion to suppress or a motion to withdraw the plea.
    In addition, defendant may not seek a writ of certiorari because she has not lost any right of appeal by failure to take timely action, she is not seeking to appeal an interlocutory order, and she is not seeking review of an order denying a motion for appropriate relief. State v. Dickson, 151 N.C. App. 136, 138, 564 S.E.2d 640, 641 (2002).     Because defendant does not have a right to appeal or to seek a writ of certiorari to raise these issues, this appeal is dismissed. State v. Nance, 155 N.C. App. 773, 775, 574 S.E.2d 692, 693 (2003). This decision is without prejudice to defendant's right to file a motion in the trial tribunal seeking appropriate relief. Id. at 775, 574 S.E.2d at 694.
    Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and CALABRIA concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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