An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-560

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 April 2004

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

         v.                        Davidson County
                                No. 93 CRS 4448
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE ALFORD
    

    On writ of certiorari to review the judgment entered 15 April 1993 by Judge Thomas W. Ross in Superior Court, Davidson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March 2004.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Lisa Granberry Corbett, for the State.

    Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant.

    WYNN, Judge.

    Defendant, Christopher Wayne Alford, argues the trial court erroneously (I) accepted Defendant's guilty plea without complying with the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022; and (II) found as an aggravating factor that Defendant had prior convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than sixty days confinement. We affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence.
    On or about 28 March 1993, Defendant was in lawful custody in the Davidson County jail, awaiting transfer to the state prison system   (See footnote 1)  , when he and two other inmates, escaped. Defendant wasmissing for approximately four or five days, when he was found in Lexington, North Carolina. Defendant was subsequently charged with felony escape from municipal confinement, whereupon he pled guilty as charged. On 15 April 1993, the trial court entered judgment on Defendant's guilty plea and sentenced Defendant to an aggravated term of three years imprisonment, with the sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence Defendant was then obligated to serve.
    On or about 9 October 2002, Defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari seeking a belated appeal of the trial court's 15 April 1993 judgment. By order entered 7 November 2002, this Court allowed the petition, but limited this Court's review “to those issues upon which Defendant had a right to direct appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444.”
    By his first assignment of error, Defendant argues, “The trial court erred by accepting Defendant's guilty plea without first complying with all the statutory requirements for accepting a guilty plea under G.S. 15A-1022. This argument is outside of the scope of G.S. 15A-1444, and therefore, this Court's 7 November 2002 order allowing Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we summarily dismiss Defendant's first assignment of error. See State v. Nance, 155 N.C. App. 773, 574 S.E.2d 692 (2003)(reiterating that a Defendant is not entitled to appellatereview as a matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty to a criminal charge in the superior court unless he is appealing sentencing issues or the denial of a motion to suppress; and that this Court is without authority to issue a writ of certiorari except as provided under N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1)).
    We move next to Defendant's second assignment of error, which is properly before the Court, by which he argues that “[t]he trial court erred by finding as an aggravating factor that [he] had prior convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than sixty days confinement[.]” Defendant contends that “the State failed to present competent evidence to prove the prior convictions.” We disagree.
    In 1993, G.S. § 15A-1340.4(e) provided, “A prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(e)(1993). The transcript in the present case tends to show that Defendant stipulated to the factual basis for the plea and the prosecutor summarized the evidence. During this summarization, the prosecutor stated that Defendant had been convicted of seven counts of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny, breaking and entering a motor vehicle, robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and first degree burglary on 23 March 1993. The prosecutor went on to state his sentence, and the fact that he escaped while awaiting transfer to state facilities. After the prosecutor's showing, the Court asked, “Any objection tothe showing for the State?” Defendant's attorney replied, “No.” Defendant did not propose any mitigating factors, and when asked if he personally had anything to say, Defendant twice replied, “No, sir.”
    Based upon defense counsel's agreement with the prosecutor's summarization of the evidence and Defendant's failure to propose any factors of his own or object in any way to the accuracy of the record as represented, we conclude that Defendant effectively stipulated that he had been convicted of those offenses, for which he had been sentenced to serve a total of 25 years in prison. See State v. Bynum, 65 N.C. App. 813, 814-815, 310 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1984)(holding that it was not error to find the existence of an aggravating factor had been established by a preponderance of the evidence where defense counsel did not object to, but in fact agreed with, the prosecutor's representation that Defendant had several prior convictions punishable by more than 60 days confinement; and Defendant did not, at sentencing, object to the finding of fact as to the prior convictions and did not propose any of his own proposed findings). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly found as an aggravating factor that Defendant had prior convictions punishable by more than 60 days confinement.
    Affirmed.
    Judges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).


Footnote: 1
    Defendant had been sentenced to a consolidated sentence of 25 years imprisonment at the 23 March 1993 session of DavidsonCounty Superior Court for seven counts of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny, breaking and entering a motor vehicle, robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and first degree burglary.

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