STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Nash County
Nos. 01 CRS 54998-99
RICHARD MCKINLEY TAYLOR
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.
Margaret Creasy Ciardella for defendant appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
By this appeal, Defendant, Richard McKinley Taylor, contends
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm
the trial court's determination.
The evidence at the suppression hearing tended to show the
following: On the afternoon of 22 August 2001, North Carolina
State Highway Patrol Trooper Dean Edwards observed a silver-colored
Honda Civic automobile speeding and weaving in and out of traffic
on U.S. Highway 301 near Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Trooper
Edwards stopped the vehicle and asked the driver, later identified
as Defendant, for his driver's license and registration. Trooper
Edwards noticed “a really strong, heavy perfume smell” emanatingfrom the vehicle. Defendant appeared “extremely nervous” and
avoided making eye conduct with Trooper Edwards. Defendant's hands
shook as he handed his driver's license to Trooper Edwards. When
Trooper Edwards again requested the registration, Defendant
hesitated and then “made an unusual movement” in turning towards
the vehicle's glove compartment, thereby blocking Trooper Edwards'
view. Trooper Edwards, concerned that Defendant was retrieving a
weapon, moved to regain sight of the glove compartment. In doing
so, Trooper Edwards observed “a large amount of U.S. currency in a
bag” in the glove compartment. Defendant quickly shuffled papers
over the bag and closed the glove compartment.
Trooper Edwards asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle,
and Defendant consented to a pat-down of his person. No weapons or
contraband were found on Defendant. Trooper Edwards subsequently
requested that Defendant accompany him back to the patrol vehicle.
After Trooper Edwards issued Defendant a warning and returned his
driver's license and registration, Trooper Edwards inquired whether
there was “anything illegal in the car.” Defendant responded that
he did not know, because the vehicle belonged to his father.
Defendant refused Trooper Edwards' request to search the interior
of the vehicle.
Based on his drug interdiction training and four years of
experience with the Highway Patrol, Trooper Edwards believed that
the large amount of currency in Defendant's glove compartment,
Defendant's nervous demeanor, and the strong odor of perfume
emanating from the vehicle were “indicative of and consistent with”drug trafficking. Trooper Edwards therefore requested that an
officer with a trained canine respond to the scene.
Approximately fifteen minutes later, Officer Joyner and his
canine arrived. The canine “gave an alert” to the presence of
narcotics at the front passenger's side door of Defendant's
vehicle. To ensure the safety of his dog, Officer Joyner requested
that Trooper Edwards remove some fast-food items located on the
front seat before allowing the canine to enter the vehicle. As
Trooper Edwards removed the food, he noticed what appeared to be
crack cocaine at the bottom of the fast-food bag. In the glove
compartment, Trooper Edwards found a small amount of marijuana and
rolling papers, as well as the large amount of currency. Defendant
was thereafter arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine by
possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, possession of
less than one-half ounce of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress all
evidence seized during the traffic stop. The trial court
concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances involved,
that the search was reasonable, that Trooper Edwards had an
articulable suspicion to order the canine, and that once the canine
alerted to the presence of contraband, Trooper Edwards and Officer
Joyner had probable cause to search the vehicle.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant
pled guilty to the charges and preserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion pursuant to section 15A-979(b) of the NorthCarolina General Statutes. State v. Brown, 142 N.C. App. 491, 492,
543 S.E.2d 192 (2001). Defendant appeals from the denial of his
motion to suppress.
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Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress. A “trial court's findings of fact following a
suppression hearing concerning the search of the defendant's
vehicle are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when
supported by competent evidence.” State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132,
140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). However, a trial court's
conclusions of law regarding whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion to detain a defendant is reviewable de novo. State v.
Munoz, 141 N.C. App. 675, 682, 541 S.E.2d 218, 222, cert. denied,
353 N.C. 454, 548 S.E.2d 534 (2001). “An appellate court accords
great deference to the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
because the trial court is entrusted with the duty to hear
testimony (thereby observing the demeanor of the witnesses) and to
weigh and resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” State v.
Johnston, 115 N.C. App. 711, 713, 446 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1994).
Defendant does not argue that the initial stop for speeding
was unwarranted. Rather, Defendant argues his detention after the
issuance of the warning ticket was invalid because it was not based
on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was involved in
criminal activity. We disagree.
Detentions permitted by the Fourth Amendment include “brief
investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping ofa vehicle.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70
(1994). “'The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to
its underlying justification.'” State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App.
421, 427-28, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1990) (quoting Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983)). To further
detain a person after a lawful stop, “an officer must have
reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that
criminal activity is afoot.” State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630,
636, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). These facts, as well as the
rational inferences drawn from them, are to be “viewed through the
eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience
and training” at the time. Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at
70. In determining whether further detention was reasonable, the
trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
Munoz, 141 N.C. App. at 682, 541 S.E.2d at 222.
In McClendon, the defendant was observed speeding and
following another vehicle too closely. An officer spoke with the
defendant, who appeared extremely nervous and who was unable to
find the vehicle's registration or identify the vehicle's owner.
The address on the defendant's license matched that of the
registration, but the name specified by the defendant as the
vehicle's owner did not appear on the title. McClendon, 350 N.C.
at 636-37, 517 S.E.2d at 133. The officer issued a warning ticket
for speeding and following too closely. After the defendant
refused to consent to a search, the officers performed a canine
sniff of the vehicle's exterior, and the canine “alerted” to therear of the defendant's vehicle. A subsequent search of the
vehicle's floorboard revealed a quantity of marijuana. Id. at 633-
34, 517 S.E.2d at 131.
Our Supreme Court concluded that the detention of the
defendant subsequent to the issuance of the warning ticket was
justified by a reasonable suspicion. The Court noted that the
officer's suspicion was based on facts observed by the officer
during the traffic stop, such as the defendant's nervousness,
refusal to make eye contact and other factors. Id. at 637, 517
S.E.2d at 133.
In the instant case, we conclude that the detention of
Defendant was lawful. Trooper Edwards, guided by his previous
training and experience, could reasonably conclude that Defendant
was involved in drug trafficking. This conclusion is supported by
the following facts known by Trooper Edwards to be indicative of
illegal drug activity: (1) Defendant appeared extremely nervous and
his hands were shaking; (2) Defendant avoided eye contact with
Trooper Edwards; (3) Trooper Edwards noticed a strong odor of
perfume emanating from the vehicle; and (4) Trooper Edwards
observed a large amount of cash in the glove compartment, which
Defendant attempted to conceal. Accordingly, the circumstances in
the present case provided Trooper Edwards with reasonable suspicion
to support a further brief detention of Defendant following
issuance of the warning ticket. The trial court properly denied
Defendant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed. Judges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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