STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Gaston County
Nos. 01 CRS 3441,
JIMMY LEE BROOKS 00 CRS 50987,
00 CRS 50989
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Robert R. Gelblum, for the State.
Reita P. Pendry for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Defendant, Jimmy Lee Brooks, argues the trial court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during
an unconstitutional traffic stop. We affirm Defendant's judgment
and conviction.
Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized as
a result of an allegedly invalid traffic stop. The evidence at the
suppression hearing tended to show that Captain John Burgin of the
Cherryville Police Department received information that the
Gastonia City Police Department had arrested Defendant on 16January 2000 for possession of cocaine and that Lincoln County vice
agents had an open case on Defendant for selling drugs. Captain
Burgin also received information from an informant that the
informant had purchased cocaine from Defendant in the past. The
informant had previously given Captain Burgin information that led
to valid arrests.
At Captain Burgin's direction, the informant called Defendant
on his cell phone on 19 January 2000 and ordered two and one half
ounces of cocaine from Defendant. Captain Burgin listened to the
informant make the phone call. Afterwards, the informant told
Captain Burgin that Defendant would drive a green Cadillac along
Route 150 to deliver cocaine to the informant's residence in
Cherryville and that Defendant would arrive shortly.
Captain Burgin subsequently drove to the vicinity of
Defendant's residence in Lincolnton. Captain Burgin saw Defendant
get into a green Cadillac. He saw several people come up to the
driver's side window, stay for a few seconds and leave. Based on
his experience and training, Captain Burgin thought these actions
to be consistent with drug activity. Defendant drove his Cadillac
west on Highway 150 and Captain Burgin followed. Captain Burgin
notified Sergeant Shannon Rogers and K-9 Officer Burleson that an
informant told him that Defendant would be traveling to Cherryville
and would be carrying cocaine. Captain Burgin told Sergeant Rogers
to stop Defendant when they entered the city limits.
Once Defendant and Captain Burgin reached the city limits,
Sergeant Rogers pulled in behind Defendant's Cadillac. SergeantRogers observed Defendant rapidly move from the travel lane to the
left turn lane, back to the travel lane, then returned to the left
turn lane and turned into a private driveway. Sergeant Rogers
activated his blue lights, stopped Defendant and requested
Defendant's driver's license. Defendant provided Sergeant Rogers
with an expired license, stating that his current license had been
stolen.
To confirm that Defendant's license was valid, Sergeant Rogers
escorted Defendant to his patrol vehicle and seated him in the
front passenger seat. Sergeant Rogers checked the status of
Defendant's driver's license using the patrol vehicle radio.
Captain Burgin asked Defendant for consent to search his Cadillac
and Defendant consented. The K-9 search of the Cadillac yielded no
contraband and Defendant's license came back valid. When Sergeant
Rogers opened the passenger side door to let Defendant out of the
patrol vehicle, he and Captain Burgin observed six or seven bags of
crack cocaine between the seat and the plastic door jamb.
Defendant was in the patrol vehicle for approximately ten to
fifteen minutes.
After the hearing, the trial court found that Defendant was
reasonably believed to be associated with drugs; that the informant
deserved reliability in the mind of Captain Burgin; Captain Burgin
had a basis for believing the informant's tip; that Captain Burgin
had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was selling drugs from
his automobile. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded
there was probable cause to believe Defendant carried cocaine inhis vehicle and that there was probable cause to stop the vehicle.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
At trial, the State presented substantially the same evidence
as presented during the suppression hearing. Defendant was
subsequently convicted of trafficking in cocaine by possession,
possession with intent to manufacture, sell and deliver cocaine,
and trafficking in controlled substances. The trial court
sentenced Defendant to thirty-five to forty-two months imprisonment
for the two trafficking in cocaine convictions and suspended an
eight to ten month sentence for the possession with intent to sell
and deliver cocaine. Defendant appeals.
Defendant assigns error to the denial of his motion to
suppress, arguing that his stop and detention violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,
and therefore, any evidence recovered as a result must be
suppressed. We disagree, and affirm the trial court.s denial of
Defendant.s motion.
Our review of a ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to
whether the trial court.s findings are supported by competent
evidence and whether those findings support its ultimate
conclusions. State v. Pulliam, 139 N.C. App. 437, 439-40, 533
S.E.2d 280, 282 (2000). .While the trial court.s factual findings
are binding if sustained by the evidence, the court.s conclusions
based thereon are reviewable de novo on appeal.. State v. Parker,
137 N.C. App. 590, 594, 530 S.E.2d 297, 300 (2000).
Defendant first argues the police were not justified ininitiating an investigatory stop of Defendant. The Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 20
of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491,
506-07, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1992), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129,
133 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1996). “It applies to seizures of the person,
including brief investigatory detentions such as those involved in
the stopping of a vehicle.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441,
446 S.E.2d 67, 69-70 (1994). An investigatory stop must be
justified by “a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts,
that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979). “A court
must consider 'the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture'
in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop exists.” Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d
67, 70.
An informant's tip may provide the reasonable suspicion
necessary for a Terry stop. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
328, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 307 (1990) (United States Supreme Court
concluded that the informant's tip carried sufficient “indicia of
reliability” to justify an investigatory stop even if insufficient
to support an arrest or search warrant). “Although reasonable
suspicion is less stringent than probable cause, it nevertheless
requires that statements from tipsters carry some 'indicia of
reliability[.].” State v. Watkins, 120 N.C. App. 804, 809, 463
S.E.2d 802, 805 (1995). There must also exist sufficient policecorroboration of the tip before the stop is made. If reasonable
suspicion exists before the stop is made, there is no violation of
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207, 539
S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000).
Here, the facts established that the tip provided by the
informant was sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion
to justify the stop. First, Captain Burgin had relied on the
informant for valid arrests in the past; the informant admitted
buying cocaine from Defendant and the informant provided specific
details concerning Defendant's future behavior. Furthermore, the
information that Defendant was involved with drugs was corroborated
by Defendant's arrest for possession of cocaine and Lincoln County
vice agents' open case on Defendant. Finally, Captain Burgin
observed several people come up to Defendant's vehicle, which he
believed to be consistent with drug activity. Based on the
information and corroboration, the police had reasonable grounds to
believe the tip was accurate and reliable, and that the
investigatory stop of the vehicle was justified.
In his remaining argument, Defendant contends that even if
Sergeant Rogers had legal justification to stop Defendant, the
detention exceeded the permissible scope allowed for such a stop.
Defendant argues that the duration of the stop to permit the search
exceeded the time necessary to verify that Defendant had a valid
driver's license.
Detentions protected by the Fourth Amendment include “brief
investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping ofa vehicle.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70
(1994). “.The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to
its underlying justification..” State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App.
421, 427-28, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1990) (quoting Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983)). “[A]n
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in
a short period of time.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75
L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983)(citations omitted).
The evidence showed that Defendant was not stopped and
detained by police for an unreasonably long period of time. Once
stopped, Defendant was detained long enough for Officer Rogers to
check Defendant's license and the consensual K-9 search of
Defendant's Cadillac. By Defendant's consent to search his
vehicle, Defendant extended the duration of the stop. Once Officer
Rogers completed the required checks and the K-9 search of the
vehicle was terminated, Defendant was free to leave. Defendant was
inside the patrol vehicle approximately ten to fifteen minutes.
Therefore, we conclude Defendant's detention did not exceed the
scope of the investigatory scope.
Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the trial court's
findings of fact, and we hold these findings support the conclusion
that Defendant's stop and detention were within the permissible
bounds of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial courtproperly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered
as a result thereof.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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