STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Robeson County
No. 96 CRS 14256
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE ALFORD 96 CRS 14257
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Neil Dalton, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Defendant, Christopher Wayne Alford, appeals convictions for
possession of marijuana within a penal institution and possession
of drug paraphernalia. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse
both convictions.
The State's evidence tended to show that on 14 July 1996,
Correctional Sergeant Steve McCartney of Lumberton Correctional
Institution, had information that defendant, an inmate of the
prison, was bringing drugs into the facility following visitation.
After a visitation, McCartney took defendant into an area and
ordered defendant to unbutton his pants. When defendant's pants
fell to the floor marijuana and drug paraphernalia (a brown paper
roll used to contain and conceal the marijuana) fell to the ground. McCartney also found a hole in defendant's pocket and petroleum
jelly. Correctional Officer Shawn Graham observed the search.
Defendant was then taken to a single cell segregation unit
where he was visited by Sergeant James McCray, an investigating
officer for the Department of Corrections. McCray advised
defendant of his inmate disciplinary infraction rights. These
rights did not contain Miranda warnings, and McCray did not
otherwise advise defendant of his Miranda warnings.
The following day, McCray had a conversation with defendant in
which he asked if defendant wished to a make a statement. McCray
gave defendant a form on which to write a statement and left to
attend to other duties. When McCray came back the defendant handed
him the form through a trap door. The State's evidence tends to
show that defendant made a written statement on the paper
confessing to the crime. Defendant testified that he refused to
make a statement and instead signed the blank sheet of paper.
At trial, defendant made a motion to suppress the written
statement. The trial judge concluded that the defendant provided
officers with the written statement, that the defendant voluntarily
chose to do so after he was clearly given the option to make a
statement or not, and that Miranda warnings were neither given, nor
required to be given, in this case. The motion to suppress the
statement was denied. Defendant was convicted on both counts by a
jury, and appeals. In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement
to Officer McCray. We agree.
Upon appellate review of the trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress, the findings of fact are conclusive if supported by
competent evidence. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543
S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). In this case, defendant did not assign as
error any of the trial court's findings of fact, and they are
therefore binding on the appeal of this matter. State v. Watkins,
337 N.C. 437, 446 S.E.2d 67 (1994). However, the trial court's
determination of whether a defendant was “in custody” for purposes
of Miranda is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. State
v. Crudup, 157 N.C. App. 657, 659, 580 S.E.2d 21, 23 (2003).
Further, the determination of whether an interrogation was
conducted for purposes of Miranda is also fully reviewable on
appeal. Id. Thus, the issues of custody and interrogation are
reviewed de novo.
In this matter, the trial court made the following conclusions
of law:
Miranda warnings are required in pretrial
custodial interrogations. In this case, the
defendant was lawfully in custody post-trial
after his convictions and subject to the rules
and regulations of the North Carolina
Department of Corrections. He was advised
about his rights in this matter pursuant to
State's Exhibit Number 1 and voluntarily
elected to make a statement. Formal Miranda
Warnings were not required in this case.
Defendant asserts that his statement was the product of a custodial
interrogation, and should have been suppressed. Custodialinterrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.”
State v. Clay
, 297
N.C. 555, 559, 256 S.E.2d 176, 180 (1979), overruled on other
grounds
(quoting
Miranda
, 384 U.S. at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706).
It is not clear from the trial court's
conclusions of law
whether it found defendant was in custody for the purposes of
Miranda. “
An inmate, however, is not, because of his
incarceration, automatically in custody for the purposes of
Miranda; rather, whether an inmate is in custody must be determined
by considering his freedom to depart from the place of his
interrogation.”
State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 129, 526
S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000) (finding Defendant was not in custody
because he was free to leave the place of interrogation and return
to his cell at any time). In the instant case defendant was placed
in solitary confinement pending investigation
as a direct result of
the contraband found. He was of course not free to leave this
cell. We find on these facts that defendant was in custody for
purposes of Miranda.
We must next determine whether an interrogation took place.
The term “interrogation” is not limited to
express questioning by law enforcement
officers, but also includes “any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” The focus of the
definition is on the suspect's perceptions,
rather than on the intent of the law
enforcement officer, because Miranda protects
suspects from police coercion regardless ofthe intent of police officers. However,
because “the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of
their words or actions, the definition of
interrogation can extend only to words or
actions on the part of police officers that
they should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.”
State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d 168, 199
(2000)(emphasis added)(citations omitted). Factors that are
relevant to the determination of whether police “should have known”
their conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating response
include: (1) “the intent of the police”; (2) whether the “practice
is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused”;
and (3) “any knowledge the police may have had concerning the
unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of
persuasion . . . .”
State v. Fisher
, 158 N.C. App. 133, 142-43,
580 S.E.2d 405, 413 (2003)
(quoting
Rhode Island v. Innis
, 446 U.S.
291, 302, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980))
.
In State v. Stokes,
150 N.C. App. 211, 565 S.E.2d 196 (2002)
(overruled in part on other grounds,
357 N.C. 220, 581 S.E.2d 51
(2003)), a police officer unexpectedly arrived at Defendant's cell
and the Defendant asked the officer what he wanted. The police
officer responded with the word “How?” Defendant then confessed.
This Court found this to be an interrogation. Id. “We find that
Officer Varner interrogated defendant because the question 'How?'
is the type of question that necessarily invites a response. The
officer's question was designed for the purpose of eliciting a
response he knew or should have known was reasonably likely to beincriminating.”
Id. at
222
, 565 S.E.2d at 204,
see also State v.
Phelps, 156 N.C. App. 119, 123,
575 S.E.2d 818, 821 (2003) reversed
on other grounds by 358 N.C. 142, 592 S.E.2d 687 (2004)(finding an
interrogation where the police officer's objective purpose was to
obtain defendant's admission or denial of the possession of
contraband).
In this case, Officer McCray talked with the defendant on 14
July 1996 concerning the drugs and paraphernalia found following
defendant's visitation. He advised defendant of his rights under
the Department of Corrections disciplinary procedures. One of
these rights was to make a verbal or written statement to the
investigating officer. The next day, 15 July 1996, Officer McCray
went to the defendant's cell where he was being held in solitary
confinement due to the incident with the drugs. McCray testified
that he went to defendant's cell with the purpose of finding out
what took place. He spoke with defendant for 30-45 minutes and
asked defendant if he wished to make a statement. Upon receiving
a positive response, McCray gave defendant a form captioned
“Statement by Witness” and left the defendant in his cell. Later
that day McCray returned and picked up the statement from the
defendant.
We hold that this did constitute an interrogation. Since
defendant was in custody, this was a custodial interrogation
requiring Miranda warnings. Under Miranda the defendant must be
advised:
(1) that he has a right to remain silent;
(2) that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court;
(3) that he has a right to consult with a
lawyer and to have a lawyer with him during
interrogation; and
(4) that if he is an indigent a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him. . . .
State v. Holcomb, 295 N.C. 608, 611, 247 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1978).
The Department of Corrections rights given to the defendant on 14
July 1996 did not contain any of the above-enumerated rights
required under Miranda. It was thus error for the trial court to
deny defendant's motion to suppress his confession.
The State contends that if defendant's statement should have
been suppressed that any such error was not prejudicial. We
disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§
15A-1443(b)
(2004) provides:
“
A violation of
the defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States
is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was
harmless.”
“The fact that, exclusive of the erroneously admitted
evidence, there was plenary evidence to support the verdict is not
determinative. The test is whether, in the setting of this case,
we can declare a belief that the erroneously admitted evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, that there is no
reasonable possibility the admission thereof might have contributed
to the conviction.” State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 292, 204 S.E. 2d848, 853 (1974)
(emphasis added)
. Our Supreme Court has said:
“Ordinarily, where a confession made by the defendant is
erroneously admitted into evidence, we cannot say beyond a
reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the confession did
not materially affect the result of the trial to the prejudice of
the defendant.” State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543, 552, 234 S.E.2d 733,
739 (1977).
This issue was recently addressed in the case of State v.
Phelps, 156 N.C. App. 119, 575 S.E.2d 818 (2003) reversed by, 358
N.C. 142, 592 S.E.2d 687 (2004). In that case, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the admission of a
confession obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Our Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, and adopted Judge
Hunter's dissent, which held:
“without the admission of defendant's incriminating statement,
there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have had
reasonable doubt as to whether defendant knowingly possessed the
cocaine and returned a different verdict.” Phelps, 156 N.C. App.
at 127-28, 575 S.E.2d at 824.
In the instant case, there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the defendant was in a area by himself or in an area with
a large number of other inmates at the time the drugs and
paraphernalia were found. Neither of the officers actually saw the
drugs or paraphernalia
in the possession of the defendant, but
rather found the drugs and paraphernalia
on the floor after
defendant had dropped his pants. Defendant's confession clearlyeliminated any doubt that the jury might have had of defendant's
guilt.
It is the burden of the State to demonstrate that the
admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We hold that the State has failed to meet this burden. Defendant's
confession should have been suppressed. Defendant's convictions
are vacated and these matters are remanded to the Superior Court of
Robeson County for a new trial.
NEW TRIAL.
Judges McGEE and CALABRIA
concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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