STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Forsyth County
No. 01CRS060588
ANTHONY LEON HOOVER
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Brent D. Kiziah, for the State.
David Childers for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Anthony L. Hoover (“defendant”) appeals a judgment imposing a
sixty-day suspended sentence for first degree trespass on the basis
that he did not have the mental competency or capacity to proceed
at a trial where he represented himself pro se. For the reasons
stated herein, we conclude the trial court did not err.
On 19 October 2001, defendant was charged by warrant with
misdemeanor breaking and entering and first degree trespass.
Defendant waived counsel and represented himself in district court.
After being convicted of the charges, defendant appealed to
superior court. Defendant once again waived counsel and
represented himself. During his trial in superior court, neither
defendant's competency to represent himself nor his mental capacitywere called into question. Defendant was subsequently found guilty
by a jury of first degree trespass only. The evidence offered at
trial supporting his conviction was as follows.
Defendant resided in Apartment F7 at the Salem Crossing
Apartments until he was evicted for non-payment of rent. After the
eviction, Connie Colt (“Colt”), the resident manager of the
apartment complex, learned that defendant was residing in Apartment
B8 rented by Treva Reader (“Reader”). Colt informed defendant on
22 June 2001 that he needed to make arrangements to pay his unpaid
past due rent for Apartment F7 in order to continue residing in
Apartment B8. However, after receiving insufficient payment of the
past due rent by 30 August 2001, Colt informed defendant that he
must vacate the premises or be deemed a trespasser as of 1
September 2001. Defendant apparently vacated the premises for a
short period of time.
On 19 October 2001, Reader vacated Apartment B8 and turned in
her keys to Colt. Since Reader had paid the rent through the end
of the month, defendant believed he could stay in the apartment
until that time. After a maintenance supervisor observed defendant
in the apartment, the police were notified. Evidence of defendant
living in the apartment was found. It was later discovered that
defendant had been entering Apartment B8 using a spare set of keys
given to him by Reader.
By the sole assignment of error brought forth in his brief on
appeal, defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error
by failing to inquire into his mental competency or capacity toproceed at a trial where he represented himself pro se. Defendant
contends that throughout the trial, his actions “exhibited a marked
limitation in his ability to comprehend the nature and object of
the proceedings, his own situation in reference to the proceedings,
or the nature of the proceedings; by possible reason of mental
illness or defect.” We disagree.
Section 15A-1001 of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides, inter alia, that:
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced,
or punished for a crime when by reason of
mental illness or defect he is unable to
understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to comprehend his own
situation in reference to the proceedings, or
to assist in his defense in a rational or
reasonable manner.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001(a) (2003).
Our Supreme Court has . . . held that “'a
trial court has a constitutional duty to
institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if
there is substantial evidence before the court
indicating that the accused may be mentally
incompetent.'” “[E]vidence of a defendant's
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial,
and any prior medical opinion on competence to
stand trial are all relevant” to a bona fide
doubt inquiry.
State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 390, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000)
(citations omitted), appeal after remand, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___
S.E.2d ___ (6 April 2004). If the trial court fails to protect a
defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while mentally
incompetent, that defendant has been deprived of his due process
right to a fair trial and any conviction entered must be vacated.
Id. at 389-90, 533 S.E.2d at 559. After reviewing the record, we conclude that there was not
substantial evidence before the trial court indicating defendant
lacked mental competency or capacity to proceed at trial.
Considering he was not a member of the bar, defendant represented
himself effectively at trial through (1) the cross-examination of
State witnesses, (2) the introduction of exhibits into evidence,
(3) testifying on his own behalf, and (4) his participation
regarding jury instructions. While defendant occasionally offered
testimony irrelevant to the offenses of which he was accused, such
testimony is not unexpected from a non-attorney unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Defendant's unfamiliarity with the processes
associated with the criminal justice system would also explain why
he questioned the trial court several times as to “[w]hy it took so
long for this case to come to court?” His lack of knowledge on
these issues, however, is not substantial evidence that he was
mentally incompetent or incapable.
Nevertheless, defendant contends that the trial court
obviously questioned his mental state because the trial judge asked
him at sentencing, “[h]ave you ever had any psychological
treatment, sir?” Although defendant responded “[n]o, no, I I --
ain't nothing wrong with my mind[,]” the trial court ordered
defendant to submit “to the Mental Health Center for an assessment,
and comply with their recommendations with respect to treatment[]”
as a condition of his probation. Admittedly, the trial court's
question and probation condition may provide some evidence that
defendant's mental state was in doubt. However, not everyindividual that undergoes a psychological assessment is mentally
incompetent or incapable. At the time of sentencing, the trial
court was aware that defendant (1) had previously been convicted of
several other offenses, (2) was upset over the loss of his mother,
(3) had recently filed for disability, (4) was residing in a
homeless shelter, and (5) wanted to re-acquire several items of
sentimental value that were in the possession of the apartment
complex. It is very likely that the trial court simply determined
that defendant could benefit from a psychological assessment based
on the past and present occurrences in his life. Moreover, we note
that defendant does not argue that the trial court ordered him to
submit to a “substance abuse assessment and comply with their
recommendations” despite there being no evidence that he had such
a problem. Thus, even when considered in light of defendant's
other actions at trial, there was not substantial evidence that
defendant was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial
because he was mentally incompetent or incapable of proceeding at
trial where he represented himself pro se.
No error.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THORNBURG concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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