STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Cabarrus County
No. 00 CRS 8794
MARK TIMOTHY SATTERFIELD,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Isaac T. Avery, III, and Assistant Attorney General
Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.
Hartsell & Williams, P.A., by H. Jay White, Sr., for
defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
Defendant Mark Timothy Satterfield seeks reversal of the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that a highway
patrol trooper lacked a constitutionally sufficient basis to stop
defendant when defendant attempted to exit the Lowe's Motor
Speedway in Charlotte by crossing a ditch rather than following the
line of traffic. Upon review of the trial court's findings of
fact, we conclude that the trooper possessed reasonable suspicionthat criminal activity might be occurring and, therefore, affirm.
Defendant was charged with driving while impaired in violation
of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 (2003). He filed a pre-trial motion
to suppress that the trial court orally denied following an
evidentiary hearing. Defendant subsequently pled guilty, but
reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
This Court ultimately dismissed the appeal on 4 June 2002 for
failure to include in the record documentation reflecting that
defendant had reserved his right to appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-979(b) (2003).
On 1 August 2002, this Court allowed defendant's petition for
writ of certiorari. The current record on appeal includes
defendant's transcript of appeal stating that "[d]efendant shall
plead guilty to Level 5 DWI and reserve his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence and intends to pursue an
appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-979." The record also includes
a single assignment of error: "Defendant assigns as error: The
Court's failure to suppress the evidence received from Defendant
after an unlawful and illegal stop, seizure and search."
Review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is
limited to a determination whether the trial court's findings of
fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings
support the trial court's ultimate conclusion of law. State v.Thompson, 154 N.C. App. 194, 196, 571 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2002).
Although defendant contends that certain findings of fact of the
trial court are not supported by evidence, he did not specifically
assign error to any of the trial court's findings of fact and
therefore, those findings are binding on appeal. State v. Adams,
159 N.C. App. 676, 679, 583 S.E.2d 689, 690, app. dismissed, 357
N.C. 659, 590 S.E.2d 272 (2003).
The trial court found the following facts. On 28 May 2000, at
approximately 11:20 p.m., following the end of a race, a mass of
cars was exiting the Lowe's Motor Speedway. The State Highway
Patrol was responsible for directing traffic out of the Speedway
facility in order to keep the traffic flowing. The traffic was
moving along an exit road and merging into multiple lanes of
traffic on a major highway. The traffic had, however, come to a
halt. Trooper R. Cook, while directing traffic, observed defendant
leave the exit road, drive across a ditch line, and try to enter a
stopped lane of traffic on the highway. Trooper Cook approached
defendant's vehicle and asked why defendant was exiting the
Speedway without following the directions of the Highway Patrol
troopers.
The court found that the purpose of the stop was for the
trooper to "mak[e] inquiry as to why [defendant] did not follow the
directions[.]" He concluded that the stop, therefore, was notillegal.
The State argued below that no stop occurred because defendant
actually came to a halt as a result of the stopped traffic. Since
the trial court did not address this question and since the State
does not repeat this argument on appeal, we do not reach the issue
and instead assume, for the purposes of this appeal, that there was
a stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Under the Fourth Amendment, before a police officer may
conduct a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle without a warrant,
the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
may be occurring. State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 212, 582
S.E.2d 371, 374 (2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)). "[R]easonable
suspicion" requires that "[t]he stop must be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those
facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious
officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins,
337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). There must be a
"minimal level of objective justification, something more than an
'unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" Id. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at
70 (quoting U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10,
109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). This Court reviews de novo the
trial court's conclusion of law that a reasonable, articulablesuspicion existed to justify a stop.
Here, the trial court found that the trooper stopped defendant
to inquire why defendant was not following the directions of the
Highway Patrol regarding exiting the Speedway. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
20-114.1(a) (2003) provides:
No person shall willfully fail or refuse to
comply with any lawful order or direction of
any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control
officer invested by law with authority to
direct, control or regulate traffic, which
order or direction related to the control of
traffic.
Based on the trial court's findings of fact, the trooper had a
reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating this statute.
The officer's stop of defendant was, therefore, lawful under the
Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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