An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA03-925

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 4 May 2004

IN THE MATTER OF:                    Mecklenburg County
                                No.    2002-J-744
V.A.M.

    

    Appeal by juvenile from orders entered 3 December 2002 and 25 February 2003 by Judges Lisa C. Bell and Elizabeth D. Miller, respectively, in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 April 2004.

    Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Margaret A. Force, for the State.

    Hall & Hall, P.C., by Susan P. Hall and Douglas L. Hall, for defendant-appellant.

    HUNTER, Judge.

    The district court adjudicated V.A.M. (“juvenile”) for two acts of indecent exposure against the minor children A and B, and for soliciting A to commit a crime against nature. The court found insufficient proof to support a fourth charge that juvenile solicited B to commit a crime against nature. In a separate disposition order, the court placed juvenile on twelve months of probation and ordered him to complete the juvenile sex offender program and perform fifty hours of community service. Juvenile appealed. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for correction of a clerical error.    Initially, juvenile claims a violation of his constitutional right to due process, arguing that the transcript of his adjudication hearing is so rife with inaudible or unintelligible passages as to preclude meaningful appellate review. We have thoroughly examined the transcript of juvenile's adjudication hearing. Although there are numerous instances in the transcript reflecting that portions of statements made in open court were inaudible, these gaps generally involve individual words or phrases, most of which are illuminated by context. Moreover, inaudible passages of witnesses' testimony are effectively cured either by counsel repeating the question to obtain a second response on the record, or by counsel's request to the trial court that the record reflect the nature of the witness' otherwise inaudible response. Juvenile has failed to identify any particular claim or issue which the transcript impedes his ability to raise on appeal. See State v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 320, 321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1984) (awarding new relief where flaws in the transcript prevented review of jury instructions at death penalty phase of murder trial). “Where '“the transcript, despite its imperfections, is not so inaccurate as to prevent meaningful review by this Court[,]”' the assertion that the recordation of juvenile court proceedings are inadequate to protect juvenile's rights is properly overruled.” In re Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. 287, 293, 580 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2003) (quoting State v. Hammonds, 141 N.C. App. 152, 168, 541 S.E.2d 166, 178 (2000), aff'd, 354 N.C. 353, 554 S.E.2d 645 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907, 153 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2002)). Because we hold the hearing transcript is sufficient to allow for meaningful review of the district court proceedings, we overrule this assignment of error.
    Juvenile next contends that the charges alleged in the delinquency petition were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A juvenile may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by making a motion to dismiss the petition in district court. See In re Hartsock, 158 N.C. App. at 291, 580 S.E.2d at 398. Juvenile made such a motion at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, which the district court denied. Juvenile then, however, “presented evidence and failed to renew his motion at the close of all the evidence” and “is therefore precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.” In re Davis, 126 N.C. App. 64, 66, 483 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1997) (citing State v. Elliott, 69 N.C. App. 89, 316 S.E.2d 632 (1984)); In the matter of Rikard, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 587 S.E.2d 467, 470 (2003); N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3).
    Juvenile further avers the district court failed to indicate in its order which facts had been proven to support the adjudication of delinquency. He notes that the adjudication order merely lists the various numbered counts of the 17 July 2002 petition as having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, without reference to the relevant criminal statute. As a result, juvenile suggests the district court provided no means by which “this Court can deduce what had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”     Juvenile's challenge to the sufficiency of the district court's findings of fact neither refers nor corresponds to either of the two assignments of error in the record on appeal. Therefore, it is not properly before this Court for review. We observe that the trial court made the following oral findings regarding the adjudication of delinquency:
        Based on the evidence that has been presented, I find that the State has met its burden as shown that [juvenile] has committed two acts of indecent exposure, one against A[] and one against B[], and I adjudicate him delinquent on both of those charges.

            I also find that the State has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he has committed one act of solicitation of a crime against nature against A[]. I adjudicate him delinquent on that charge.

Similarly, the district court's written adjudication order identifies the petition by its filing date of 17 July 2002, lists by name the offenses alleged in the juvenile petition, and finds that they “have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” These findings are sufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency. See Rikard, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 587 S.E.2d at 469-70.
    We note a clerical error in the 3 December 2002 adjudication order. As set forth above, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that juvenile committed two acts of indecent exposure against A and B, and that he solicited A to commit the crime against nature. The court further found, however, that “the State has failed to meet its burden beyond a reasonable doubt” on a second count of solicitation of a crime against nature against B. The disposition order correctly reflects the district court'sadjudication of delinquency for two counts of indecent exposure and one count of solicitation of a crime against nature. The written adjudication mistakenly lists two counts of indecent exposure and