STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Henderson County
No. 02 CRS 4010
ROBIN DALE STEPP
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Richard A. Graham, for the State.
Michael E. Casterline for defendant appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Defendant Robin Dale Stepp was charged with possession of
methamphetamine. The State's evidence tends to show that at
approximately 1:48 a.m. on 3 March 2002, Officer James Case of the
Hendersonville Police Department observed two men and a truck near
a dumpster, which was located behind a Bi-Lo grocery store. After
calling for back-up, Officer Case approached the men and asked one
of the men, defendant, for identification. He then patted defendant
down, at which time he discovered a hard, plastic cigarette case.
When Officer Case removed the cigarette case from defendant's
pocket, defendant began to walk away. Despite the officer's
command to stop, defendant continued toward the dumpster and
reached inside. At about that time, Officer Bruce Simonds, also ofthe Hendersonville Police Department, arrived to assist Officer
Case.
Officer Case and Officer Simonds subdued defendant, and
defendant was placed under arrest. Officer Case then returned to
the dumpster and retrieved a syringe from the top of the trash.
Methamphetamine is injected into the body with the use of a
syringe.
During the struggle with defendant, the cigarette case
dropped. Officer Simonds picked up the cigarette case and found
two baggies inside. The baggies contained a granular substance
which was later determined to be methamphetamine.
Defendant presented the testimony of his girlfriend, Catherine
Ball, which tended to show that defendant did not know that there
was methamphetamine in the cigarette case on 3 March 2002. Ball
testified that she had purchased the drugs from a dealer for
another friend and placed them in her cigarette case. Ball stated
that she intended to remove the drugs from the case, but forgot.
Later she rode to Bi-Lo with defendant and another man to look
around the dumpsters. When defendant asked her for a cigarette,
Ball testified that he gave her cigarette case to him, forgetting
that the methamphetamine was in the case. Ball had walked to a
nearby store to buy some more cigarettes when Officer Case arrived
on the scene. When she saw the officer questioning defendant and
his associate, she left the scene.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel, the jury
found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant then pled guilty ofattaining the status of habitual felon. The trial court sentenced
defendant to a presumptive term of 90-121 months in prison.
Defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss. Specifically, defendant contends
that there was insufficient evidence to show that he knowingly
possessed methamphetamine. In fact, defendant asserts that he
“presented uncontroverted evidence which fully explained how he had
unwittingly come to hold the controlled substance.” We disagree.
A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is
properly denied if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State and giving the State every reasonable intendment
arising therefrom, there is substantial evidence that the defendant
committed the offense charged. State v. Jarrett, 137 N.C. App. 256,
262, 527 S.E.2d 693, 697 (2000). It is well settled that “[i]f
there is more than a scintilla of competent evidence to support the
allegations in the warrant or indictment, it is the court's duty to
submit the case to the jury.” State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342,
344-45, 103 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1958); see State v. Williams, 136 N.C.
App. 218, 220, 523 S.E.2d 428, 430 (1999) (defining substantial
evidence as being “more than a scintilla”). “'Contradictions and
discrepancies [in the evidence] are for the jury to resolve and do
not warrant [dismissal].'” State v. Pallas, 144 N.C. App. 277,
286, 548 S.E.2d 773, 780 (2001) (quoting State v. McKinney, 288
N.C. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 578, 581 (1975)).
In the instant case, defendant was convicted of possession ofmethamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. To obtain a
conviction for possession of methamphetamine, the State must show
that the defendant knowingly possessed the subject controlled
substance. State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 403, 333 S.E.2d 701, 702
(1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(3) (2003). In State v. Bogle,
90 N.C. App. 277, 281, 368 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 324 N.C. 190, 376 S.E.2d 745 (1989), this Court stated,
“Knowledge may be implied when there is no direct evidence that a
defendant actually had knowledge of a certain fact but the
circumstances are such as would lead the defendant to believe that
the fact existed.” The Court further explained, “Our Supreme Court
has recognized that knowledge often must be inferred from
circumstantial evidence and has held that juries are free to make
such inferences.” Id. at 282, 368 S.E.2d at 428.
The evidence in the light most favorable to the State tends to
show that defendant was rummaging through a dumpster behind a
grocery store during the predawn hours on 3 March 2002, when he was
observed by Officer Case. Officer Case approached defendant, asked
him for identification, and patted down his outer clothing. During
the pat-down, the officer noted a hard object in defendant's
pocket. The officer removed the object, which was determined to be
a plastic cigarette case. Defendant then walked away from the
officer to a nearby dumpster in an attempt to evade Officer Case
and had to be subdued. The cigarette case dropped from Officer
Case's grasp during the scuffle with defendant. The cigarette case
was discovered to contain methamphetamine. Officer Case also founda needle in the dumpster into which defendant had reached.
Significantly, methamphetamine is injected into the body with a
syringe.
Although defendant presented evidence that tended to show that
he did not know about the methamphetamine, that evidence was not
uncontroverted. The State's evidence was sufficient to allow the
jury to infer that defendant had knowledge of the drugs.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that defendant received a
fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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