STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
No. 02 CRS 95786
RUSSELL ALEXANDER JOHNSON
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Benjamin M. Turnage, for the State.
Lynne Rupp for defendant-appellant.
McGEE, Judge.
Defendant was indicted on 9 December 2002 on a charge of
possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's counsel
subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence on 5 March 2003.
At the suppression hearing on 17 March 2003, the State presented
testimony by two officers involved in the stop of a vehicle in
which defendant was a passenger. After announcing its findings in
open court and denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial
court later entered a written order on 1 April 2003 in which it
made the following pertinent findings of fact:
4. On August 30, 2002 about 4:15 am,
officers were dispatched to the area of
3607 South Elm-Eugene Street, Lot 132.
5. Officers had prior experience with this
trailer park. Officers were aware of a
high number of break-ins or burglaries in
this trailer park.
6. Officer received a dispatch saying the
resident of Lot 132 called and said there
was a cream colored Nissan in his
driveway. The call further stated said
car was occupied by (3) three black
males.
7. The caller regarded this as suspicious.
8. Officers went to the area.
9. When officers arrived they saw a cream
colored Honda Accord, which is similar in
shape of a Nissan automobile. Both are
of Japanese make, about the same size.
10. The Honda was[] occupied by (3) three
black males.
11. Officer Graves turned his patrol vehicle
and stopped the cream colored Honda as it
was leaving the trailer park.
12. The vehicle had come around the circle
from the area of Lot 132, which is where
the officers were dispatched to, it was a
cream colored Honda and was occupied by
black males.
13. Prior to stopping the car the officers
received a dispatch saying the suspicious
car had left Lot 132.
14. This was about 1 minute before they
stopped the vehicle.
15. The officers testified it took them
approximately 6 minutes to respond so you
can calculate the vehicle was in the
driveway for 5 minutes after they were
dispatched and some unknown time before
they were dispatched.
16. The resident[']s attention was drawn to
the vehicle parked in the driveway after
4:00 am in an area with numerous break-
ins.
17. Once officers approached the car, they
smelled marijuana.
The trial court concluded that:
1. That the suspicious nature of the car
parked in a driveway at 4:30 am in an
area that is known for numerous break-
ins, the officers had reasonable
articulable grounds for the stop of the
defendant's vehicle.
2. Once the officers smelled the marijuana
smell from the car they were allowed to
search the automobile for the presence of
illegal narcotics.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant
entered a plea of guilty to the charge while reserving his right to
appeal the denial of the motion. The trial court imposed a
sentence of twelve to fifteen months imprisonment, then suspended
the sentence and placed defendant on supervised probation for
thirty months. Defendant appeals.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion
to suppress. He argues the trial court erred in holding that the
police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which he was a
passenger. Defendant contends the materials seized during the stop
were inadmissible against him as a result. We disagree.
When supported by competent evidence, a trial court's findings
of fact following a suppression hearing are conclusive and binding
on appellate courts. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446
S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). Although the trial court's findings of
fact are not before this Court because defendant failed to assign
error to any of them, see N.C.R. App. P. 10, the record on appealnevertheless contains competent evidence from the officers'
testimony to support those findings. The issue of whether those
findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law is
reviewable de novo. See State v. Munoz, 141 N.C. App. 675, 682,
541 S.E.2d 218, 222, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 454, 548 S.E.2d 534
(2001).
Before an officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop of a
vehicle and detain its occupants without a warrant, the officer
must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State
v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994). If an
anonymous tip exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability, it may
provide reasonable suspicion; otherwise, there must be sufficient
police corroboration of the tip before the stop can be made. State
v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000). "The
reasonable suspicion must arise from the officer's knowledge prior
to the time of the stop." Id. at 208, 539 S.E.2d at 631. An
investigative "stop must be based on specific and articulable
facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided
by his experience and training." Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446
S.E.2d at 70.
In determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists to make
an investigatory stop, a trial court must consider the totality of
the circumstances. Id. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70. While Officer
Kevin McNeal (Officer McNeal) testified the caller's identity was
known at the time of the dispatch, the caller's identity was notplaced in the officer's report. Officer McNeal further testified
that the caller, who was not identified at the suppression hearing,
described a suspicious vehicle that was parked in the caller's
driveway and that was occupied by black males. The trial court
found that the officers were aware of a high number of break-ins or
burglaries in that trailer park and that officers were dispatched
at 4:15 a.m. to investigate. Officers saw a vehicle similar to the
vehicle described by the caller leaving the area of Lot 132 and
heading toward the trailer park's exit. The vehicle was occupied
by black males. Officer William Graves stopped the vehicle in
which defendant was a passenger approximately a minute after being
informed that the suspicious vehicle had left the driveway.
Based upon the officers' knowledge of the area, the time of
day, and the period of time which the vehicle had been parked in
the driveway before leaving, the totality of the circumstances
afforded reasonable grounds for the officers to believe that
criminal activity was afoot and justified a brief detention. The
trial court therefore did not err in concluding that the "officers
had reasonable articulable grounds for the stop of the defendant's
vehicle." With the stop being lawful, the smell of marijuana
noticed by officers as they approached the vehicle provided
probable cause for the vehicle's search. See State v. Cornelius,
104 N.C. App. 583, 588, 410 S.E.2d 504, 508 (1991), disc. review
denied, 331 N.C. 119, 414 S.E.2d 762 (1992). Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence. No error.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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